Philosophy Now Forum

Belinda wrote: ↑Fri Jul 13, 2018 8:56 am
Yes, but there is an alternative moral objectivism, an alternative to theism. That alternative is Humanism.

I know about Humanism very well, Belinda, whether we talk about first manifesto, second, third or whatever. Humanism offers only a gratuitous and unfounded claim about right and wrong. It lacks and anthropogeny that rationalizes with right and wrong. So even on its own term, and even if Theism didn't exist, Humanism would be a failure in that regard.

Given that, as the third manifesto puts it, "Humans are an integral part of nature, the result of unguided evolutionary change." (Precept 2)

Why should something that is the result of an unguided, natural process be obligated to do or not do any actions in particular? If that's what human beings are, then the smart ones will realize that amorality makes sense -- not immorality, and not morality, but rather the selective behaving as "good" or "bad" without particular regard for either, but simply for pragmatic advantage of some kind. And that's what rationalizes perfectly with their anthropogeny, as stated above.

Immanuel Can

Your sticking point seems to be that if morality is subjective, there is no obligation to behave morally. Consider the following.

1 Why do you think there must be moral obligation? Where is that rule laid down? Is moral obligation a feature of reality?

2 Do you think moral values, judgement and action are only, or are more, moral if there is moral obligation? What about free will and moral choice?

3 Do you think that, relying only on their judgement, people can't make what we could call morally good choices, for sound reasons?

4 Could the obligation on each of us to behave morally come from a morally good society, enforced with moral laws?

And I'm looking forward to your demonstration of the feature of reality that justifies a moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' in the way a feature of reality justifies a factual assertion such as 'the earth orbits the sun'. If morality is objective (independent of opinion), there must be such a feature of reality. Please produce the goods, or explain why you can't.

immanuel Can

Pending your reply, I'll pursue the argument.

1 The absence of evidence for objective moral obligation may not mean it doesn't exist. But it does mean that to believe it does exist is irrational, because unjustified.

2 Autonomous moral judgement and choice is invalidated by moral obligation.

3 if, relying on their own judgement, people can make what could be called morally good choices, for sound reasons, the claim that this is impossible in the absence of external moral obligation is false. That they may not make morally good choices is irrelevant.

4 If it's possible that the obligation on each of us to behave morally can come from a morally good society, enforced with moral laws, the claim that such obligation must be external is false.

And - to the crux. If there is no feature of reality that justifies a moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' in the way a feature of reality justifies a factual assertion such as 'the earth orbits the sun', then the judgement 'slavery is wrong' is not objective - independent of judgement - and morality is not objective. And in that case, to believe morality is objective is irrational, because unjustified.

If the only justification for believing morality is objective is that it comes from a god, that belief is both unjustified and fallacious: unjustified, because so far there has been no evidence for the existence of a god, or the divine source of any scripture or other revelation - let alone for which of numerous supernatural claims are true; and fallacious, because the source of a factual assertion has no bearing on its truth value.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jul 13, 2018 6:47 pm Immanuel Can

Your sticking point seems to be that if morality is subjective, there is no obligation to behave morally. Consider the following.

1 Why do you think there must be moral obligation?

That's quite straightforward, actually. Because we only need morals when what we want to do, and what we should do are different things. That happens often enough; but when it doesn't, we have no need to consult morality at all...we are fine just doing what we want.

Take laws as an example. We have laws that say, "No stealing bicycles." We have none that say, "No stealing sewage." We have no laws that say, "You must collect your lottery winnings," but we do have laws that say, "You must pay your parking fines."

To say someone is "morally obligated" just means that they ought to do something they are at least somewhat disinclined to do or disincentivized from doing. If it's exactly what they want to do anyway, no problem...and no moral issue.

...Where is that rule laid down? Is moral obligation a feature of reality?

That's three questions in one. I think the first one will need a response first, or we'll try to say too much too fast.

2 Do you think moral values, judgement and action are only, or are more, moral if there is moral obligation?

The first answer, I think answers this.

What about free will and moral choice?

You can't have morals without choice. You always have the option to do the right thing, or the option to do the wrong thing. If there's no choice, then it's useless to invoke morality. If you can't not-do something, you can't be morally responsible for doing it; and if you cannot do it, you cannot be responsible for not having done it.

3 Do you think that, relying only on their judgement, people can't make what we could call morally good choices, for sound reasons?

Judgement always requires some sort of data upon which to operate. So does reason. But since, as you have so frankly put it, you're suspicious of the idea of moral facts or objective moral values existing at all, there would be no data upon which a "judgment" could draw. There would be no premises upon which "reason" could work.

For our choice making, we'd be left with our intuitions, our impulses and our pragmatic calculations of self-interest, and that's all. There would be no way to "call morally good choices" anything. They'd just be "choices." Morally good or bad wouldn't enter into the question, because neither would exist.

4 Could the obligation on each of us to behave morally come from a morally good society, enforced with moral laws?

What is "a morally good society"? How do you know when you've got one, if there are no moral facts or objective values? How do you know when a law is "moral," if there are no objective morals?

If morality is objective (independent of opinion), there must be such a feature of reality.

What do you define as "reality"? That's the key question.

I said earlier that ontology precedes ethics. In order to answer the question you're trying to ask me, I have to ask what is your ontology in asking me that?

In other words, which story are you going with -- ontological narrative 1, or ontological narrative 2, or a different ontological narrative?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jul 13, 2018 7:47 pm immanuel Can

Pending your reply, I'll pursue the argument...

You could do that, but as you can see, I didn't answer the way you thought I would. So if you rush ahead, you'd be pursuing an argument we're not actually having. My suggestion would be to wait.

I'll wait for you.

Immanuel Can

To say that, if morality is subjective - a matter of judgement - we can't 'know' what is good or bad - if, say, slavery is right or wrong - is to assume that there is indeed something to be known, something with regard to which we can exercise our judgement - something that objectively settles whether slavery is good or bad. An objective (factual and falsifiable) assertion makes a claim about something of some kind.

Please can you explain what that is? And by all means define your ontology first, to contextualise your explanation. It would be exciting to know what you think it is that makes a moral assertion objective, given your ontology.

Me too , Peter. I am a fan of the later Wittgenstein whose theory of meaning endorses social reality to the exclusion of any other reality including the several scientific realities, religious authority and religious Authority, and political authorities.

It's that second, moderating, clause that I wrote; that is what applies to Humpty Dumpty in Alice in Wonderland. It's the boss who defines what meanings we live by, the boss being, in a free society, the social body itself. Thus in Soviet Russia the state was able to redefine for instance what mental illness was, as the Soviet Russian state was the boss there. Let's be very protective of our free thinkers all over the world who support democracy. Let's be even more protective of artists, journalists, authors, philosophers, and playwrites who are avant garde .

"Free thinkers": we need to identify those correctly , as media giants can imitate and traduce and be in league with politicians and commerce.

I'm of the same political persuasion as yourself, Peter. I trust that equality of opportunity is the minimal goal we should aim for politically, and I include foreign countries in that equality as it's a small world.

BTW, maybe it's not supernatural order of existence that is a bad idea, but rather the idea that the supernatural order of existence is more authoritative regarding the natural world and moralities than is our natural existence.There are even laughable characters who claim to be definitive of that Authority, and I don't mean Jesus who said that God alone is good.
Or Muhammad who said that he was repeating what God's angel had told him.

Hi, Belinda.

How delightful to come across a fellow Wittgensteinian - or at least someone who's interested in his ideas.

After many years of reading and trying to understand the 'Investigations' and the other later texts, and what he went through to overcome his misconceptions in the 'Tractatus', I wrote a sort-of exercise manual - 'Wittgenstein in Practice' - applying his later approach in very short meditations on supposed philosophical problems. If you're interested, it's at: http://www.peasum.co.uk/427994308 - free access.

It's been a pleasure to discuss things with you.

Re: Is morality objective or subjective?

I believe morality is a complex but still biologically built-in mechanism; and it has socially developed acquired features.

Calling it objective or subjective from my point of view is redundant.

By the definitions of 'objective' and 'subjective', a moral assertion expresses a judgement, so it's subjective - a matter of judgement, belief or opinion - rather than factual. I think that's very important, and it informs any discussion of the nature of morality.

Immanuel Can wrote:

----we only need morals when what we want to do, and what we should do are different things. That happens often enough; but when it doesn't, we have no need to consult morality at all...we are fine just doing what we want.

No, only very arrogant individuals think we are fine doing just what we want. The normal modern social conscience harbours a divine discontent.

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Jul 14, 2018 12:18 pm Immanuel Can wrote:

----we only need morals when what we want to do, and what we should do are different things. That happens often enough; but when it doesn't, we have no need to consult morality at all...we are fine just doing what we want.

No, only very arrogant individuals think we are fine doing just what we want. The normal modern social conscience harbours a divine discontent.

Whether the discontent is divine or not is a moot question.

But the assumption that our motives - and so moral judgements - are necessarily selfish and self-absorbed - that needs challenging.

I wonder where that assumption comes from.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Jul 14, 2018 7:42 am Immanuel Can

To say that, if morality is subjective - a matter of judgement - we can't 'know' what is good or bad - if, say, slavery is right or wrong - is to assume that there is indeed something to be known, something with regard to which we can exercise our judgement - something that objectively settles whether slavery is good or bad. An objective (factual and falsifiable) assertion makes a claim about something of some kind.

Please can you explain what that is? And by all means define your ontology first, to contextualise your explanation. It would be exciting to know what you think it is that makes a moral assertion objective, given your ontology.

That's sort of the reverse of the OP problem, isn't it? Your assumption in the OP was that we all know that morality is merely subjective. My entire effort in questioning that has been to see if you had a reason -- any reason at all -- that lay behind your claim that we all just know this.

It seems there was no certainty in that claim at all, which leaves us with two options: 1) That morality may be objective or may be subjective, but you don't actually know which it is, or 2) That morality is objective, and you can know that it is.

You're going to note in this answer that I am not asserting that you must believe anthropogenic narrative 2. I do, of course; but I'm quite committed to freedom of conscience. I believe a man should never say more than he has reason to believe is true. Consequently, I'm content not to attempt to force you against your will to position 2. Indeed, if your basic ontology, your anthropogenic narrative is narrative #1, it would be unreasonable for me to force you there. I don't want to ask you to go beyond what you believe is real. But I do think that reflection ought to make you back off your initial certainty about morality being subjective, as articulated in the OP -- evidently there are insufficient reasons for that confidence.

However, we might also note that really, there is no certainty that anthropogenic narrative #1 is true either. And there are plenty of folks (apparently, about 92-96% of the world's population, depending how one reckons) who don't believe anthropogenic narrative #1 at all. And there are plenty of counter arguments, the agreement of atheists on them not being required. Were there irrefutable reasons to settle this dispute in favour of narrative #1, then the (roughly) 4% of atheists in this world would surely offer them; but manifestly they cannot. And there the matter rests at the moment.

Assuming, then, that your ontology is reflected in narrative #1, I'm content if your OP were revised to reflect the actual level of certainty that's possible to a person in position 1), which I take real situation to be. There is, after all, no certainty that morality is subjective; and if it were subjective, then essentially, it would be nothing anyway.

Subjectivism is rationally bound to become moral Nihilism, at least among those to actually believe it and follow it through to its inevitable consequence. Therefore, if a person believes in morality AT ALL, and he or she wishes to remain rational in that belief, he is she is obligated to regard it as objective. This still leaves the possibility of denying the existence of morality, of course. But what it eliminates is the delusion that moral subjectivism is a kind of rational possibility.

In short, if we are going to discuss morality at all, it can never be as if it were merely subjective. That's rationally incoherent.

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Jul 14, 2018 12:18 pm No, only very arrogant individuals think we are fine doing just what we want. The normal modern social conscience harbours a divine discontent.

"Divine"?

You're now a Theist?

There's nothing "arrogant" about one doing something she wants to do, if the thing she wants to do is morally clear. It's not immoral of you to choose vanilla ice cream over chocolate, to comb your hair back or to comb it up, or to vacation in Majorca or Cannes, if you have the means and the will to any of these things. These are not obviously moral matters. You're just doing what you want. That's all.

But when you want to vacation in Majorca, but would have to steal the money from your employer in order to afford it, well, that's a moral matter.

That's my only point there.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Jul 14, 2018 1:50 pm
But the assumption that our motives - and so moral judgements - are necessarily selfish and self-absorbed - that needs challenging.

I trust you were not (quite wrongly of course) attributing the above statement to me, by some sort of implication. I certainly did not say it.