Philosophy Now Forum

SpheresOfBalance wrote: ↑Fri Mar 16, 2018 4:20 pmI mean to say that the seriousness with which you talk of things you cannot "know," at least to me, is extremely laughable!

And yet, according to your own theory, you can't "know" if it's laughable or not.

Immanuel: If you claim to know something that you couldn't possibly know, then it is laughable. This is true, even if it turned out that you were in fact correct. The problem for you is that you have no justifiable basis for your knowledge claims.

Science Fan wrote: ↑Fri Mar 16, 2018 5:47 pm Immanuel: If you claim to know something that you couldn't possibly know, then it is laughable.

That would make it laughable for you to laugh at what everyone else might or might not know -- because for sure, you can't "know" that...and not because I say so, but because you do.

IC: That's not true. If someone claims to know what happened beyond a knowledge barrier, then their claim is laughable. That's the claim you are making -- to actually know something that you have no justification for knowing.

Science Fan wrote: ↑Fri Mar 16, 2018 6:34 pm IC: That's not true. If someone claims to know what happened beyond a knowledge barrier, then their claim is laughable. That's the claim you are making -- to actually know something that you have no justification for knowing.

Sorry...I mistook your reply for "Spheres'" reply, since I had just responded to him. I was saying that he, claiming we cannot know anything, cannot know whether or not we know anything.

Still, I'll reply to your response, since I think it's a reasonable one, if true.

So I'll ask you this: what's the "barrier"?

I'll happily grant you that in rare cases a genuine "barrier" can exist. For example, I can see that if you were talking about, say, the size of the cosmos at the present moment, one could genuinely say that was humanly "unknowable," for the simple reason that the universe is continually expanding -- so that by the time you said the measurement (whatever it was) the universe would have become bigger, and your measurement could no longer be true. Fine. That's a good example of an actual knowledge barrier.

But what's the claim you think I'm making that has a "barrier" on it, and what's the "barrier" you perceive to exist there? That's not clear to me at the moment.

When I was religious, I didn't see the free will described in christian theology as compatible with determinism. I harmonized the problem of compatibilism by believing god had something known as inherent omniscience, which is to say that he only knew as much as could be known. I think that's actually a pretty satisfying solution, and I'm fine with it.

If you're trying to make the case that free will works with total omniscience, I think you're just not going to convince many individuals. People have a solid picture of how free will and choice is suppose work, and compatiblism changes the definition that they have in mind, to something that is also just much less appealing.

Sir-Sister-of-Suck wrote: ↑Sun Mar 18, 2018 8:20 pm When I was religious, I didn't see the free will described in christian theology as compatible with determinism. I harmonized the problem of compatibilism by believing god had something known as inherent omniscience, which is to say that he only knew as much as could be known. I think that's actually a pretty satisfying solution, and I'm fine with it.

Compatibilism? I know it, but I've never been able to be satisfied with it. The problem is that it's really just straight Determinism, with free will as a mere appearance or seeming. In that sense, it's not making the two "compatible" at all. One's essentially an illusion, by the terms of the account proposed by Compatibilism itself.

And the second solution you suggest is one of two things "Process Theology" or "Open Theism." In both of these, it is thought that God is not truly omniscient, since the future is presumed to be beyond the ability of God to know, being yet unformed, or God Himself being yet unformed to that stage. But the problem with both is that they need to presuppose a very small kind of "god," one certainly incapable of either providence or prophecy. And the Biblical God is described as fully capable of both. So while both Process Theology and Open Theism fall within the bounds of what is broadly called "Christendom" as marginal theories about possible gods, I think we have good reason not to regard them as compatible with the main currents of Christian theology...and really, as not genuine options for the Christian...even though they would seem to offer "solutions" of a kind to questions about divine foreknowledge.

But I do fully agree with your earlier assessment, that the idea of Determinism is utterly incompatible with the specific terms posited within Christian theology.

If you're trying to make the case that free will works with total omniscience, I think you're just not going to convince many individuals.

That might turn out to be so; but if it is so, then I think that a little careful thought will show that the fault is on the part of the "individuals" in question. As I think I have argued sufficiently earlier, there's no straight and easy line from either creative omnipotence or foreknowledge to Determinism. But even were that not so, as you point out, Determinism itself is flatly denied by basic Biblical theology itself. So in sum, I think we have an answer to the OP, either from logic, from sociology, or from theology -- and in all cases, the answer is "No."

People have a solid picture of how free will and choice is suppose work, and compatiblism changes the definition that they have in mind, to something that is also just much less appealing.

I think it might be even more basic than that. Rather than having a "solid picture," I think what most people have is an active practice of behaving as if Determinism is not true. And that makes perfect sense, because nobody can actually live as a practical Determinist.

In fact, one of the noteworthy things about Determinism is that even those people who profess to believe in it most ardently always fail to live, in practical terms, as if it's true at all. They keep acting as if their choices change things, as if decisions matter, as if their "self" is distinct from others and their environmental influences, as if people can be persuaded to believe or disbelieve, and so on. They save Determinism for those few moments when they're arguing only in pure theoretical suppositions, or when they don't want to seem responsible for something they've done or been. In real life, they inevitably act like it's just not true. They may hold it in their "head" beliefs; but the beliefs they actualize with their hearts and hands are the opposite.

In short, if nobody can ever actually live consistently as a Determinist, then just how sensible can that idea really be? I think the answer is, "Not very."

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Mar 19, 2018 12:54 amAnd the second solution you suggest is one of two things "Process Theology" or "Open Theism." In both of these, it is thought that God is not truly omniscient, since the future is presumed to be beyond the ability of God to know, being yet unformed, or God Himself being yet unformed to that stage. But the problem with both is that they need to presuppose a very small kind of "god," one certainly incapable of either providence or prophecy. And the Biblical God is described as fully capable of both.

I don't think that's actually the case, because the limitation would be a logical one and not of practicality. If you agree that god can't create something that contradicts itself, like a married bachelor or a stick with one end, and you don't see that as a flaw in his ability, than I think it's the same deal with inherent omniscience, if we can accept that free will is indeed impossible with total omniscience. But I think you make a good point that total omniscience may be needed to have predicted the biblical prophecies. Although the concept of destiny comes to mind, where certain events are bound to happen but not all the choices leading up to them.

So while both Process Theology and Open Theism fall within the bounds of what is broadly called "Christendom" as marginal theories about possible gods, I think we have good reason not to regard them as compatible with the main currents of Christian theology...and really, as not genuine options for the Christian...even though they would seem to offer "solutions" of a kind to questions about divine foreknowledge.

That sounds like a pretty subjective litmus test. The debate on whether god has inherent omniscient or total omniscience seems like a pretty nuanced caveat as far as I can tell, and I doubt the bible ever covers in explicit detail. But I'm sensing the main issue you have with it is that you see it as a flaw and limitation placed on god in order to accommodate someone's understanding of philosophy in another regard. I don't see that as much different as something like old-earth creationism, but again I don't believe inherent omniscience is describing a true limitation. If we assume it's impossible to know the actions of a free willed individual, it's as much a flaw as his inability to do any logical contradiction.

As I think I have argued sufficiently earlier, there's no straight and easy line from either creative omnipotence or foreknowledge to Determinism. But even were that not so, as you point out, Determinism itself is flatly denied by basic Biblical theology itself. So in sum, I think we have an answer to the OP, either from logic, from sociology, or from theology -- and in all cases, the answer is "No."

I'm a bit confused on where you stand. You believe that god can determine anything, but you don't consider yourself a determinist? Sorry, I actually haven't been following your discussion in this thread. I'll have to go back and check it out later.

Sir-Sister-of-Suck wrote: ↑Mon Mar 19, 2018 4:59 am

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Mar 19, 2018 12:54 amAnd the second solution you suggest is one of two things "Process Theology" or "Open Theism." In both of these, it is thought that God is not truly omniscient, since the future is presumed to be beyond the ability of God to know, being yet unformed, or God Himself being yet unformed to that stage. But the problem with both is that they need to presuppose a very small kind of "god," one certainly incapable of either providence or prophecy. And the Biblical God is described as fully capable of both.

I don't think that's actually the case, because the limitation would be a logical one and not of practicality. If you agree that god can't create something that contradicts itself, like a married bachelor or a stick with one end, and you don't see that as a flaw in his ability, than I think it's the same deal with inherent omniscience, if we can accept that free will is indeed impossible with total omniscience. But I think you make a good point that total omniscience may be needed to have predicted the biblical prophecies. Although the concept of destiny comes to mind, where certain events are bound to happen but not all the choices leading up to them.

The debate actually keys on an issue of philosophical metaphysics: what is the nature of "the future," rather than per se, the question of what is the nature of God. But only certain answers about the nature of the future square with Biblical Theology. As you rightly point out, if God has knowledge of the future, and if God has ability to intervene to produce a particular future, then both facts would seem to argue strongly against either the "Open Theist" view, namely, that the future is not a foreknowable entity, even by means of divine omniscience, or the "Process Theology" view that their god is, so to speak, expanding or growing into the future as it unfolds. In either case, the future becomes indeterminate; and this solves the Determinism issue, maybe; but it does nothing for prophecy or future providential action, as I was suggesting before.

What we can safely say is that neither Open Theism nor Process Theology describe a god capable of acting in the specific ways described in the Biblical record...and that's my real reason for saying that...

So while both Process Theology and Open Theism fall within the bounds of what is broadly called "Christendom" as marginal theories about possible gods, I think we have good reason not to regard them as compatible with the main currents of Christian theology...and really, as not genuine options for the Christian...even though they would seem to offer "solutions" of a kind to questions about divine foreknowledge.

That sounds like a pretty subjective litmus test.

It's not, as you see. I think it's pretty clear that neither of the two is coherent with the Biblical record. And, from a sociological perspective -- pure demographics, if you will -- both are very recent innovations in historical thought, and neither represents the professed beliefs of a significant percentage of the people who even today call themselves Christians.

So I would say that the case would have to be strongly made by someone if that were going to change, even in future. For now, and based on history, I think it's actually a pretty difficult point to contest.

The debate on whether god has inherent omniscient or total omniscience seems like a pretty nuanced caveat as far as I can tell, and I doubt the bible ever covers in explicit detail.

Not as a philosophical topic, no. But it is "covered" by implication of things like foreknowledge, omniscience, prophecy and providence; which, as you are doubtless aware, are very thoroughly covered. Someone would need to explain why these major themes don't square with the idea of a necessarily-undefinable future, as per Open Theism or Process Theology.

But I'm sensing the main issue you have with it is that you see it as a flaw and limitation placed on god in order to accommodate someone's understanding of philosophy in another regard.

Not quite. As I'm suggesting, we have strong reasons to believe that the Bible does not describe the future as unfolding with the particular dynamics posited by Open Theism or Process Theology. If we can't meet that challenge, then we'd be faced with the prospect of having to either stick with the Biblical record, or reject the Biblical account in favour of a particular philosophical theory we wished to hold for reasons of our own. But if we do the latter, then it has to be pretty clear that at least in part, we're (by definition) departing the realm of Christian theology.

I don't see that as much different as something like old-earth creationism, but again I don't believe inherent omniscience is describing a true limitation. If we assume it's impossible to know the actions of a free willed individual, it's as much a flaw as his inability to do any logical contradiction.

Again, I don't think we have to assume it's impossible to know the actions of a free-willed individual. For to "know" something is not the same as to "make it happen." Those are two very distinct concepts, as you can see very easily.

If I were able to foreknow that you would respond to this message, it would not entail that I made you say whatever you said. Those would be different issues, no matter how complete or accurate my foreknowledge might turn out to be. You're still free.

...I'm a bit confused on where you stand. You believe that god can determine anything, but you don't consider yourself a determinist? Sorry, I actually haven't been following your discussion in this thread. I'll have to go back and check it out later.

That's because I don't believe God "determines" it. To "determine" (analytically speaking) is the expression we use to designate when someone causes or makes a thing to happen, contrary to all other forces and possibilities. To "foreknow" is different, because it does not imply any role in causation or making something come about.

Again, it's like that I may foreknow with accuracy that one day the coach of Manchester United will be fired. But when it happens, if it does, it will have nothing to do with me or my prediction. Other people will fire him, and I likely will be nowhere near any of them when it happens. So we might say I accurately "foreknow" that, but I do not "predetermine" it.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Mar 19, 2018 5:10 pmThe debate actually keys on an issue of philosophical metaphysics: what is the nature of "the future," rather than per se, the question of what is the nature of God. But only certain answers about the nature of the future square with Biblical Theology. As you rightly point out, if God has knowledge of the future, and if God has ability to intervene to produce a particular future, then both facts would seem to argue strongly against either the "Open Theist" view, namely, that the future is not a foreknowable entity, even by means of divine omniscience, or the "Process Theology" view that their god is, so to speak, expanding or growing into the future as it unfolds. In either case, the future becomes indeterminate; and this solves the Determinism issue, maybe; but it does nothing for prophecy or future providential action, as I was suggesting before.

What we can safely say is that neither Open Theism nor Process Theology describe a god capable of acting in the specific ways described in the Biblical record...and that's my real reason for saying that...

I think the christian who believes in inherent omniscience would then just take the position of something like 'skeptical theism', where they admittedly don't know the exact logistics of how it works, but it's still a position they take based on a perceived contradiction between free-will and a pre-ascertained future. Unless you have an axiom to show how inherent omniscience is necessarily inconsistent with his ability to predict the prophecies, and I'm not sure you do have such an argument, because you don't sound completely sure. Where and why skeptical theism works, is because it considers any argument which hinges on an inability to conceive how something would work as 'argument from ignorant'. This is to say that just because you don't understand how inherent omniscience would work in his prediction of biblical prophecies, does not mean that it does not work.

It's not, as you see. I think it's pretty clear that neither of the two is coherent with the Biblical record. And, from a sociological perspective -- pure demographics, if you will -- both are very recent innovations in historical thought, and neither represents the professed beliefs of a significant percentage of the people who even today call themselves Christians.

I don't think it's a topic a lot of christians even think about. But I still don't think it's a big deal unless it's used to fundamentally change biblical accounts, and not just speculation behind them.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Sir-Sister-of-Suck wrote: I don't see that as much different as something like old-earth creationism, but again I don't believe inherent omniscience is describing a true limitation. If we assume it's impossible to know the actions of a free willed individual, it's as much a flaw as his inability to do any logical contradiction.

Again, I don't think we have to assume it's impossible to know the actions of a free-willed individual. For to "know" something is not the same as to "make it happen." Those are two very distinct concepts, as you can see very easily.

Well I was asking you to play devil's advocate for the sake of demonstrating how it's not exactly a limitation or flaw in his ability.

Sir-Sister-of-Suck wrote: ↑Mon Mar 19, 2018 8:37 pm I think the christian who believes in inherent omniscience would then just take the position of something like 'skeptical theism', where they admittedly don't know the exact logistics of how it works, but it's still a position they take based on a perceived contradiction between free-will and a pre-ascertained future.

I think that's quite true...they do take that kind of strategy, in many cases. There's usually the pious roll of the eyes first, and then words like, "Well, it's a profound mystery, isn't it?"

The problem I see with them doing that is simply this: that few things are really genuine closed mysteries -- things we simply cannot know, and upon which we can never make any progress. The danger of expanding that category too far is that it simply shuts down further thought and inquiry. And without thought and inquiry, neither logic nor science, nor even common sense can do any further work. On the other hand, I would submit to you that perhaps the intuition that things are, so to speak, "not adding up" may not signal the presence of some kind of impenetrable mystery at all, but rather the presence of a logical contradiction or of a fallacy in suppositions. And my suggestion would be that before we right off the free-will / Determinism debate as permanently unsolvable, we ought to have a darn good look at it. Because I really have come to suspect it's not so impenetrable as the Determinists would wish us to assume, and I have come to suspect that sometimes they just want us to stop inquiring lest their whole house of cards should perhaps collapse of its own irrationality. It's that bad as a set of suppositions, I think.

Unless you have an axiom to show how inherent omniscience is necessarily inconsistent with his ability to predict the prophecies, and I'm not sure you do have such an argument, because you don't sound completely sure.

Actually, I did not argue that. I argued that omniscience (i.e. exhaustive foreknowledge) has no logical, necessary impact on the question of Determinism. And I definitely didn't say that omniscience is not required for prophecy or providence; I think it is. I just said that Determinism was unnecessary for those.

Where and why skeptical theism works, is because it considers any argument which hinges on an inability to conceive how something would work as 'argument from ignorant'. This is to say that just because you don't understand how inherent omniscience would work in his prediction of biblical prophecies, does not mean that it does not work.

Actually, what you've posed there is, technically speaking, a perfect exemplar of the argumentum ad ignorantium. (See http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/ignorance.html) If we "don't understand how it would work," then we NEITHER understand that it would NOR that it wouldn't -- logically speaking, we'd be in no position to believe or disbelieve in it at all.

But I think it's not nearly so complicated as all that. For there are some evidences, at least of an indicative, sociological and experiential kind, that significantly call into question any hasty confidence in Determinism as fact. And I've suggested that the performative impossibility of being a practicing Determinist is one of those strong indicative refutations. Another would be the universal intuition, and practice, of making choices as if they have a causal relation to the world; how do we even account for such an intuition, if Determinism were true? Rationally speaking, we would then have to dismiss it as entirely illusory; but existentially and sociologically, we don't find a single person able to do that.

So while Determinism may be the kind of argument that lacks any means of being completely disproved as an idea, that well may mean no more than that it fails Karl Popper's test, and so remains as beyond verification as of falsification -- in short, that it's not a scientifically tenable idea at all, but rather a sort of "faith" position, in the worse and loosest sense of that term, a gratuitous position adopted in defiance of any evidence.

I don't think it's a topic a lot of christians even think about. But I still don't think it's a big deal unless it's used to fundamentally change biblical accounts, and not just speculation behind them.

Well, for example, Calvinists think about it a lot. And there are quite a few of them. They tend to be the folks who are first to adopt the strategy of claiming "it's a profound mystery" whenever they're pushed hard on the logic of it.

Sir-Sister-of-Suck wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote: Again, I don't think we have to assume it's impossible to know the actions of a free-willed individual. For to "know" something is not the same as to "make it happen." Those are two very distinct concepts, as you can see very easily.

Well I was asking you to play devil's advocate for the sake of demonstrating how it's not exactly a limitation or flaw in his ability.

Right. Foreknowledge is about what one knows. Determinism is about what one forces or makes to come about. So long as we keep those concepts distinct, I don't think there's a problem. One knows many things that one does not force to come about. So could God.

The only difference between our foreknowledge and His would be that His is far more complete than ours. But that fact does nothing to the dynamic: it's still just a form of knowing, not of making happen.

Immanuel Can wrote:...

Right. Foreknowledge is about what one knows. Determinism is about what one forces or makes to come about. So long as we keep those concepts distinct, I don't think there's a problem. One knows many things that one does not force to come about. So could God.

The only difference between our foreknowledge and His would be that His is far more complete than ours. But that fact does nothing to the dynamic: it's still just a form of knowing, not of making happen.

But if it is 'foreknowledge' of the future then something has to be determining that it happens otherwise this 'God' of yours is not omniscient as it could not happen in contrast to this 'foreknowledge' and presumably the Christian theist want's their 'god' to be omniscient. Also if there is a determiner elsewhere then this 'God' of yours is also not Omnipotent either as if it wants 'foreknowledge' then it can't alter the future as as you say 'it' is not the cause of things coming about.

Sir-Sister-of-Suck wrote: ↑Mon Mar 19, 2018 8:37 pm I think the christian who believes in inherent omniscience would then just take the position of something like 'skeptical theism', where they admittedly don't know the exact logistics of how it works, but it's still a position they take based on a perceived contradiction between free-will and a pre-ascertained future.

A further thought: both Open Theism and Process Theology only become attractive explanations if we are thinking of a 'god' who is bound to linear time in the way we are. In other words, we are projecting our finitude onto the Supreme Being, and saying, "If He were unable to see the future, as we are, He would have to predetermine it, not just foreknow it, or He'd fail to be in control of the situation. Something might then happen to Him as it happens to us...that He would fail to foresee correctly."

Ironically, I've noticed that both Open Theists and Process Theologians want to say that God is still, in some sense, omnipotent and omniscient. So their solution is essentially to deny the existence of the future itself, or at least to redescribe futurity as a thing which simply has a nature such that it cannot be foreknown by anyone or anything -- either because it's a not-yet-real thing, or because the 'god' in question only develops along with the development of that thing we call the future. So they say something like "God knows as much as He can be expected to know, but not things that are yet-to-be. Of those, He has only exhaustive knowledge of the historical factors that will eventually produce the future, but not factual knowledge of the future itself."

Of course, this still leaves them with the problems not just in foreknowledge, but in prophecy and providence. But they have (somewhat unsatisfactory) work-arounds for those, such as, "Maybe God knows all the causal factors preceding a future event, so we can still speak of Him as being omniscient, even though the future is unknowable." I think that doesn't work very well, since it would imply that God could not know what to predict until all the causal factors were already in place. So it's awkward and implausible, at best.

A much simpler solution exists, and not surprisingly, it's widespread in historical Christian theology. Namely, that God is not a time-bound, finite creature such as we are: He's the transcendent One. And as such, all moments in time are present to His knowledge at all times.

Now, interestingly, scientific deduction would also back this up...not that it is used to "prove God," here, but in that what it shows it that time itself is a contingent, created entity, not some kind of eternal verity. We know that time is contingent, because it's actually a descriptor of linear finitude -- of the pace of change in matter; the rate of cosmic entropy, really. In a genuinely eternal and unchanging universe, the term "time" would not refer to anything at all. Change is the sine qua non of time. And change only happens when what we know as "matter" exists.

If you think about it carefully, you realize that historically, time, space and matter have to have come into existence at the same moment -- matter, because something has to actually come exist in order for us to speak of anything existing; space, because there has to be a place or extension for the matter to occupy, if we're going to speak of it existing; and time, because without time there's no "when" the matter can exist in the space, so we could also then not speak of anything existing. So if time, space and matter come into existence at the same instant, then whatever entity accounts for the beginning of space, time and matter must exist beyond all three, in order to be what Leibniz would have called a "sufficient reason" kind of explanation for their existence. Traditionally, that is the situation ascribed to God -- He is said to be above all that.

But here we find a solution. If God is not confined in His consciousness to the time-space-matter complex like we finite beings are, then there is no longer the slightest difficulty in speaking of Him foreknowing the future, and knowing it accurately. So to speak, He would have "seen what was coming already," having "been there" even as He was also here (we call this "omnipresence"). In His transcendent position, He would retain the option of interfering in the causal chain leading up to an event, if He so wished -- and we might speak of that as a "miracle," since it would stand in defiance of our ordinary expectations of routine mechanical causality. But the Bible doesn't describe God as directly interfering with every event, so it seems obvious that He most often retains and practices the option of allowing human beings to drive forward on their free will and the ordinary rules of cause-and-effect in almost every situation -- miracles are, by definition, rare. But at no point does He knowledge of what those humans will choose to do have to be anything less than perfect. They are still fully free, and He is still completely knowledgeable about how they will exercise their freedom.

Again, no Determinism follows.

Though we humans can experience only in linear time and mechanical causality, we might think God had to play by those rules too. But there's no reason to suppose that an Entity that transcends time, space and material causal chains would be bound to the same rules as we experience; after all, He allegedly invented those rules, did He not? At least, that's what Christians believe, as you know; I don't know if you do or not, so I won't presume.

So this is my proposal: maybe our fault is in thinking in linear, human terms, and trying to figure out how the Supreme Being would have to play by those same terms. That might just be the biggest possible non-sequitur: it does not follow that because something is impossible to we finite beings, it's impossible to God. We can't know the future, sure; but is that sufficient reason for us to presume He doesn't? The Bible seems to think He knows it all.

And I guess that's the issue: is the Bible describing the reality about God, or is it not?

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Mar 20, 2018 2:42 amOf course, this still leaves them with the problems not just in foreknowledge, but in prophecy and providence. But they have (somewhat unsatisfactory) work-arounds for those, such as, "Maybe God knows all the causal factors preceding a future event, so we can still speak of Him as being omniscient, even though the future is unknowable." I think that doesn't work very well, since it would imply that God could not know what to predict until all the causal factors were already in place. So it's awkward and implausible, at best.

A much simpler solution exists, and not surprisingly, it's widespread in historical Christian theology. Namely, that God is not a time-bound, finite creature such as we are: He's the transcendent One. And as such, all moments in time are present to His knowledge at all times.

Well, the unawkward and plausible thing you have to believe is that god doesn't make choices, because that would involve a change in the almighty mental state;

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Mar 20, 2018 2:42 amAnd change only happens when what we know as "matter" exists.

Anyway; by some process, well, not process quite, because process involves change, but somehow or other god was/is aware of every possible configuration of all the sub-atomic particles in the universe; their past and future states, at least in our terms; how each configuration would pan out with regard to the beliefs and actions of, not only every human being that has or will ever live, but every conceivable human being (females: 2million eggs at birth. males: 250 million sperm per ejaculation. multiply by billions of us) Not only does he know all this, he also knows what would happen if he were to exercise

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Mar 20, 2018 2:42 am...the option of interfering in the causal chain leading up to an event, if He so wished.

for every possible moment in every possible universe. Well, that's omniscience for you.
So, knowing all of this, god in his infinite wisdom and loveliness creates this universe. The one in which the vast majority of human beings that are born, burn for eternity because the only way to prevent that is to surrender your critical faculties to a book that only a tiny proportion have actually read, and no two people can agree on. He knows who is going to read the book, who will prostate themselves in a way he finds pleasing and who will perform the cerebral chicanery necessary to believe that god knows exactly what you are going to do, but it is not predetermined.
Mr Can, you are free to believe all of that if it pleases you, and as your god has evidently furnished you with the requisite simpering credulity, I can see why it would, but to insist that anyone who does not accept your version is irrational, is to invite derision.

Arising_uk wrote: ↑Mon Mar 19, 2018 9:45 pm....if it is 'foreknowledge' of the future then something has to be determining that it happens otherwise this 'God' of yours is not omniscient as it could not happen in contrast to this 'foreknowledge' and presumably the Christian theist want's their 'god' to be omniscient.

God/'God', knows everything within my mind, and I, not being particularly special, believe it knows everything within in ALL our minds. Our minds, our brains, are like a giant network of databases to this entity. Does that make it omniscient? No. Do I believe God is omniscient? No.

I do believe God/'God' knows everything about our reality apart from it's distant progression through time (in other words, it can know some of the future, but not all of it.)

Christianity is NOT compatible with determinism, to the same extent that free-will is not compatible with determinism.