Philosophy Now Forum

Since you ignored my post. I'll ask again....

raw_thought wrote:One can define "physicalist" as a person whose belief that everything is physical contradicts itself. However, the physicalist is unaware of the contradiction.

You claim that there are "concepts" such as "materialism", but where and how are these concepts maintained? How and where to they exist? In what form or shape or essence? What is the nature of a 'concept'?
If you want to deny materialism, in what way are you able to sustain such a position? And what is the "you" that is making the point?

Wyman wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:

raw_thought wrote:“If there are no such things as unicorns how can I point out a particular unicorn?”
ME
We can't, because there is no such thing as unicorns.
Ginko
I think you missed my point. I was not arguing for the existence of unicorns. I was drawing an analogy. One cannot believe in concepts if one does not believe in particular concepts.

I think I see what you are getting at now. The universal concept of dog, man and unicorn is the same as the particular concepts of dog, men and unicorns. Is this correct?

No, I think he is just being circular again. He says 'If you speak of a dog, then you are speaking of a particular instance of a universal. You can't speak of particular instances of universals without believing in universals just like you cannot believe in universals and not believe in particular instances of them' But the very first premise assumes everything, as I'd say 'it is not true that if you speak of a dog then you are speaking of a particular instance of a universal, since universals do not exist.'
He can't fathom that anyone would disagree with the truth of his conclusion, which is that universals exist, so he states it as an 'obvious' premise. It is like saying 'I will prove to you that 'Gingkoness' really exists: If you speak of a person named 'Gingko' then you are speaking of a particular instance of something that all instances of Gingkos have in common (even if there is only one) - 'Gingkoness.' You can't speak of 'Gingko' without believing in 'Gingkoness.'

And yet, I'll bet it's never crossed anyone's mind to think of something called 'Gingkoness' until now.

Actually your can. As I said before, acknowledging the use of universal terms is not the same as accepting that universals exist.

Gilbert Ryle's famous example demonstrates this point. We all use universal concepts in every day speech. The case in point is the university student who offers to show his father around the university he is attending. On his guided tour the student show his father the colleges, sporting facilities, library, bookshop, Faculiy of Arts, Rural Science, administration and other offices.

"That's really interesting", says the father. "You have shown me the colleges, library, sporting complexes, various faculties and library, but when are you going to show me, THE UNIVERSITY?"

The category error is believe that such terms as, "university", "government' and "battalion" actually have an existence independent of the particular instances. Just because we use such concepts in everyday speech doesn't mean such entities exist. We acknowledge the use of such precepts on a day to day basis without committing ourselves to their existence.

We might be able to talk in terms of "Ginkgoness" in everyday language, but this is not a commitment to the existence of such a concept.

I am saying that one cannot identity a university if one has no concept of what a university is.
Ironically, a materialist must believe that it is impossible to identify a university, because it is not a physical object. One cannot point at a physical building and say that is a university as Ryle pointed out.
For a materialist there are only neurons firing. They do not refer to anything (matter lacks intentionality. An "on" light switch does not refer to the proposition that the light is on.). Neurons firing do not refer to the concept "university ".

it is impossible to identify a university, because it is not a physical object

That's where I see you as going wrong. What do you mean by 'identify'? You are saying that only physical objects, according to materialists, can be 'identified.' I can talk about unicorns and not think that they exist. If that is 'identifying' a unicorn, so be it. Your conclusion that in order to speak of unicorns, I must accept a separate realm of existence (universals) is the position of one of my favorite philosophers, Plato, and the issue has been debated for 2500 years.

I think Ryle was saying that such attribution of 'existence' to universal concepts constitutes a confusion of applying adjectives and attributes of one category to a separate category where such adjectives are improper - grammatically, semantically, and perhaps metaphysically if you believe that metaphysics is meaningful. To be a consistent nominalist, I think one has to maintain metaphysical neutrality ('ontological relativity' per Quine) all the way down to the fundamental particles of physics. In other words, the buildings of the university do not enjoy a special 'reality' that concepts do not, for instance. That we often call physical objects 'things' or 'objects' that 'exist' is because that is the grammar that has developed naturally over time. A building, of course, can be thought of as a collection of bricks and mortar, then types of molecules, then atoms, and so forth. We speak of each 'level' differently and to attribute characteristics of 'physical objects' to quarks is as wrong as attributing such to 'concepts' - both are category mistakes.

You see such nominal relativity, I think, as fundamentally absurd. Perhaps you are right that it is 'all or nothing' - that is, if universals don't exist, then neither do buildings. But then we'll spend a long time arguing over what the word 'exists' means. I think you're using the word 'identify' as something like 'conferring existence onto.'

raw_thought wrote:Do materialists believe that concepts are physical and tangible?
If I understood everything about Einstein's brain,would I understand Relativity?
His brain had something to do with it of course, but his particular set of experiences probably had more to do with it.

Does a light switch in the "on" position know that the light is on?
The concept "book" does not refer to an object that has a specific size,shape,weight,language,title or any quantified property. * If only physical objects exist,then the concept "book" is meaningless because it does not refer to a physical object.
If knowledge is only a physical pattern, does that mean that a book that no one ever reads knows something?
* In other words a book can be any size,weight...etc.

Isn't that last bit, just part of the concept of books.

concept[ kon-sept]
noun
1. a general notion or idea; conception.
2. an idea of something formed by mentally combining all its characteristics or particulars; a construct.
3. a directly conceived or intuited object of thought.
...................................................................-dictionary.reference.com-

So basically, to define something it is.

Ginkgo wrote: "That's really interesting", says the father. "You have shown me the colleges, library, sporting complexes, various faculties and library, but when are you going to show me, THE UNIVERSITY?"

The category error is believe that such terms as, "university", "government' and "battalion" actually have an existence independent of the particular instances. Just because we use such concepts in everyday speech doesn't mean such entities exist. We acknowledge the use of such precepts on a day to day basis without committing ourselves to their existence.

We might be able to talk in terms of "Ginkgoness" in everyday language, but this is not a commitment to the existence of such a concept.

Obviously the same problem goes for 'faculty" as much as "university". It is also conceptual.

When you get right down to it, all things being conceived in the mind, even hard rocks that you can kick, are also conceptual.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

Ginkgo wrote: "That's really interesting", says the father. "You have shown me the colleges, library, sporting complexes, various faculties and library, but when are you going to show me, THE UNIVERSITY?"

The category error is believe that such terms as, "university", "government' and "battalion" actually have an existence independent of the particular instances. Just because we use such concepts in everyday speech doesn't mean such entities exist. We acknowledge the use of such precepts on a day to day basis without committing ourselves to their existence.

We might be able to talk in terms of "Ginkgoness" in everyday language, but this is not a commitment to the existence of such a concept.

Obviously the same problem goes for 'faculty" as much as "university". It is also conceptual.

When you get right down to it, all things being conceived in the mind, even hard rocks that you can kick, are also conceptual.

Thanks for point out the error.

Wyman wrote:

it is impossible to identify a university, because it is not a physical object

That's where I see you as going wrong. What do you mean by 'identify'? You are saying that only physical objects, according to materialists, can be 'identified.' I can talk about unicorns and not think that they exist. If that is 'identifying' a unicorn, so be it. Your conclusion that in order to speak of unicorns, I must accept a separate realm of existence (universals) is the position of one of my favorite philosophers, Plato, and the issue has been debated for 2500 years.

I think Ryle was saying that such attribution of 'existence' to universal concepts constitutes a confusion of applying adjectives and attributes of one category to a separate category where such adjectives are improper - grammatically, semantically, and perhaps metaphysically if you believe that metaphysics is meaningful. To be a consistent nominalist, I think one has to maintain metaphysical neutrality ('ontological relativity' per Quine) all the way down to the fundamental particles of physics. In other words, the buildings of the university do not enjoy a special 'reality' that concepts do not, for instance. That we often call physical objects 'things' or 'objects' that 'exist' is because that is the grammar that has developed naturally over time. A building, of course, can be thought of as a collection of bricks and mortar, then types of molecules, then atoms, and so forth. We speak of each 'level' differently and to attribute characteristics of 'physical objects' to quarks is as wrong as attributing such to 'concepts' - both are category mistakes.

You see such nominal relativity, I think, as fundamentally absurd. Perhaps you are right that it is 'all or nothing' - that is, if universals don't exist, then neither do buildings. But then we'll spend a long time arguing over what the word 'exists' means. I think you're using the word 'identify' as something like 'conferring existence onto.'

Yes, I think your have summed it up very well.

The word "exists" can be a problem.

Ginkgo wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

Ginkgo wrote: "That's really interesting", says the father. "You have shown me the colleges, library, sporting complexes, various faculties and library, but when are you going to show me, THE UNIVERSITY?"

The category error is believe that such terms as, "university", "government' and "battalion" actually have an existence independent of the particular instances. Just because we use such concepts in everyday speech doesn't mean such entities exist. We acknowledge the use of such precepts on a day to day basis without committing ourselves to their existence.

We might be able to talk in terms of "Ginkgoness" in everyday language, but this is not a commitment to the existence of such a concept.

Obviously the same problem goes for 'faculty" as much as "university". It is also conceptual.

When you get right down to it, all things being conceived in the mind, even hard rocks that you can kick, are also conceptual.

Thanks for point out the error.

I didn't mean it to point out an error as such, but a way of thinking about the subject. Everything we know about is understood through categories of various sorts, whilst this does not deny materialism, it put the idea in a context.

Raw-thought wants to suggest that this contradicts materialism, but has still to answer my question about how his concepts are maintained.

Concepts (for a materialist) are misnomers. There are no universals, only neurons firing. I find it ironic that a materialist must use concepts ( something he cannot believe in) to express his position.
Yes, I understand Ryle's analogy. It does not apply here.
Meaning is dependent on consciousness. Matter lacks intentionality. A piece of matter cannot refer to another piece of matter.
NOTE!!! I am not saying that consciousness creates reality. I am saying that it is the foundation of meaning. For example, the letters in this post are meaningless until my ( or your) consciousness gives them meaning ( according to the rules of referring in English). Yes, one could translate these letters into Spanish ( or whatever language one wants) but one would only get more meaningless ink patterns until consciousness intervenes. The ink pattern "blanco" is just as meaningless as the ink pattern " white" until consciousness intervenes.

I do not know how I can understand concepts. All I know is that I do. I am aware of what the concept "dog" means. I also know that my understanding is more then just neurons firing.* A materialist must say ( since matter cannot refer) that "dog" is and only is an ink pattern that makes certain of my neurons fire up.
* I am not saying that neurons firing does not facilitate my understanding. I am saying that I understand the concept "dog" however, I do not know what neurons are firing. "concepts" and "neurons firing" are not two words for the same thing, like "bachelor" and "unmarried man".

raw_thought wrote:Concepts (for a materialist) are misnomers. There are no universals, only neurons firing. I find it ironic that a materialist must use concepts ( something he cannot believe in) to express his position.
Yes, I understand Ryle's analogy. It does not apply here.
Meaning is dependent on consciousness. Matter lacks intentionality. A piece of matter cannot refer to another piece of matter.
NOTE!!! I am not saying that consciousness creates reality. I am saying that it is the foundation of meaning. For example, the letters in this post are meaningless until my ( or your) consciousness gives them meaning ( according to the rules of referring in English). Yes, one could translate these letters into Spanish ( or whatever language one wants) but one would only get more meaningless ink patterns until consciousness intervenes. The ink pattern "blanco" is just as meaningless as the ink pattern " white" until consciousness intervenes.

I think this is the point Ryle is making because you appear to have created a dualist theory as a criticism of materialism. You have a dichotomy where it is not needed.

Are you thinking the visualization of a triangle is an example of qualia?

raw_thought wrote:Concepts (for a materialist) are misnomers. There are no universals, only neurons firing. I find it ironic that a materialist must use concepts ( something he cannot believe in) to express his position.
Yes, I understand Ryle's analogy. It does not apply here.
Meaning is dependent on consciousness. Matter lacks intentionality. A piece of matter cannot refer to another piece of matter.
NOTE!!! I am not saying that consciousness creates reality. I am saying that it is the foundation of meaning. For example, the letters in this post are meaningless until my ( or your) consciousness gives them meaning ( according to the rules of referring in English). Yes, one could translate these letters into Spanish ( or whatever language one wants) but one would only get more meaningless ink patterns until consciousness intervenes. The ink pattern "blanco" is just as meaningless as the ink pattern " white" until consciousness intervenes.

You keep saying this, but as I and others have said, this is a caricature. A misconception repeated, is not more truthful.
You still have not addressed my question.


You claim that there are "concepts" such as "materialism", but where and how are these concepts maintained? How and where to they exist? In what form or shape or essence? What is the nature of a 'concept'?
If you want to deny materialism, in what way are you able to sustain such a position? And what is the "you" that is making the point?
What happens to those concepts when you die? How are they transmitted?

Yes, the visualized triangle is an example of qualia.
I do not have to explain what concepts are when I say that "neurons firing does not equal the concept "beauty" etc.
Similarly, if there is a emu in a room (and I do not know what an emu is), I can still say that it is not an elephant.

raw_thought wrote:Yes, the visualized triangle is an example of qualia.
I do not have to explain what concepts are when I say that "neurons firing does not equal the concept "beauty" etc.
Similarly, if there is a emu in a room (and I do not know what an emu is), I can still say that it is not an elephant.

Of course you don't 'have to' explain anything. The question is, why won't you? We will start to think that you don't know what a concept or a quale is if you cannot describe it.