Absolute vs Relative

[Magnus Anderson]

The word "relative" is generally taken to mean "that which depends on something else". If a thing depends on nothing other than itself, it is said to be "absolute".

There are, however, at least two problems that I see with this definition. Although it may not be wrong, it's vague enough to cause confusion.

1. DEPENDENCE

There are at least two types of dependence: the constitutive and the causal one.

A is constitutively dependent on B if and only if B is at least partially within A. A collection of cars, for example, is constituvely dependent on each of the individual cars it is made of. Its state, in other words, is determined by the state of the individual cars. If we change any of the individual cars, we also change the collection itself.

On the other hand, A is causally dependent on B if and only if the following two conditions are met:

1) A and B are completely separate ( they share nothing in common )

2) there exists at least one state of B that would impose at least one restriction on what A can be

An example would be the state of a light bulb. When the light switch is on, the light bulb is also on. When it's off, the light bulb is off. They are two different, completely separate, things, yet one is causally dependent on the other.

With this in mind, one has to wonder what kind of dependence is necessary for relativity: constitutive, causal or any? I will take a guess that it requires constituve dependence.

2. WHAT'S BEING COMPARED

If a thing is said to be relative if and only if it constitutively depends on something else, and if A constitutively depends on B if and only if B is at least partially within A, then nothing is relative. The word reduces itself to a literal oxymoron, meaning "that which depends on something within itself that is not within itself".

There are two possibilities here: either the necessitated dependence isn't constitutive or what's being compared is not the thing itself. Personally, I think it's the latter.

Let's take a property called "tall" as an example. The question to answer would be: is that a relative or an absolute property?

To answer that question, it's necessary to define the word "tall". Let's consider the following two definitions.

Definition #1:
The word "tall" means "higher than 180cm".

This is obviously a boolean property. It has two possible states: true/yes and false/no. It's also a property of individual human beings. Each person has it and each has exactly one such property. We say that a person is tall if he's higher than 180cm. Otherwise, we say that he is not.

Defined this way, tallness does not depend on anything other than the height of the person it belongs to. Because it does not depend on anything else, we can say it's an absolute property.

Definition #2:
The word "tall" means "higher than the global average".

This is still a boolean property. And it's still a property that is possessed by individual people. Each person has one.

Defined this way, tallness no longer depends merely on the person it belongs to. Now, it also depends on the height of everyone else in the world, specifically, on the average height of the entire human male population. Because it depends on something else, we can say it's a relative property.

Observation:
In both cases, what we're comparing is not the property itself but the thing the property belongs to ( or is associated with. ) If we were to compare the property itself, we'd have to conclude that nothing is relative. But because we're comparing the object it belongs to, we can conclude that tallness in the second sense is relative.

This is what leads me to conclude that the word "relative" means "that which depends on something other than the thing it is associated with".

[FlashDangerpants]

On the other hand, A is causally dependent on B if and only if the following two conditions are met:

1) A and B are completely separate ( they share nothing in common )

2) there exists at least one state of B that would impose at least one restriction on what A can be

An example would be the state of a light bulb. When the light switch is on, the light bulb is also on. When it's off, the light bulb is off. They are two different, completely separate, things, yet one is causally dependent on the other.

I don't think that part works.

If a fist is dependent on the hand, it seems absurd to say that they share nothing in common. They are made of the same four fingers and thumb for instance.

A fist doesn't seem to fit your crieria for constitutive dependency, the relationship is of the dependent type not a costitutive set.

What makes a hand a fist is an arrangement of the hand, not the components of the hand.

[Impenitent]

is absolute zero relative to heat?

-Imp

[Magnus Anderson]

If a fist is dependent on the hand, it seems absurd to say that they share nothing in common. They are made of the same four fingers and thumb for instance.

Assuming the fist and the hand you"re talking about are one and the same thing ( i.e. they are numerically identical ), the fist is constitutively dependent on the hand ( i e. itself. ) There is no causal dependency here.

What makes a hand a fist is an arrangement of the hand, not the components of the hand.

The thing is that they are the same portion of reality, merely named differently.

[Magnus Anderson]

The main thesis of this thread is that a property is relative if and only if its value depends on anything that is not the state of the object it belongs to.

But there is also another important point that I am trying to make here, and that is that subtle variations in definitions can make an otherwise relative property an absolute one.

The example presented in the opening post is probably one of the simplest. The word "tall" is normally taken to denote a relative property. And that's true insofar the word means something along the lines of, "having height that is above the global average". But if we replace "the global average" with any fixed height such as "180cm", the property suddenly becomes absolute, since it no longer depends on anything that is not the property bearer. Such conceptual drifts are common, and those who do not recognize them can be easily, though not necessarily intentionally, fooled.

This ties neatly into my thread pertaining to whether or not morality is objective.

The distinction between objective and subjective is a related but a different one. The word "subjective", like the word "relative", signifies dependence, but unlike the word "relative", which is about dependence on anything that is not the property bearer, the word "subjective" is specifically about dependence on minds.

Through small adjustments, one and the same concept can be easily transformed from being objective to being subjective, and vice versa. This can create the situation where one and the same word, beside having multiple clearly distinct meanings, aslo has many different but very closely related meanings, some of which make the concept objective, and some of which make it subjective.

Take the word "color", for example. Are colors objective or subjective? Well, it depends on how you define the word. I have identified at least 3 differenet concepts of color that are used by people.

1) Color qua quale ( subjective )
2) Color qua light wavelength ( objective )
3) Color qua type of surface ( objective )

Interestingly, in everyday use, the word "color" is most commonly used in the third sense, to describe the type of surface the object has. This is evident in the fact that a wall is red even in the absence of all light and when the color quale it creates in the minds of the observers is close to being black; or when a different color is projected on the wall, making it look non-red. Yet, a lot of people continue to insist that colors are necessarily subjective.

[FlashDangerpants]

This ties neatly into my thread pertaining to whether or not morality is objective.

I think you might want to double-check your link there Magnus. That's a crazy thread of VA using AI to complain about you.

[FlashDangerpants]

If a fist is dependent on the hand, it seems absurd to say that they share nothing in common. They are made of the same four fingers and thumb for instance.

Assuming the fist and the hand you"re talking about are one and the same thing ( i.e. they are numerically identical ), the fist is constitutively dependent on the hand ( i e. itself. ) There is no causal dependency here.

What makes a hand a fist is an arrangement of the hand, not the components of the hand.

The thing is that they are the same portion of reality, merely named differently.

The parts of the hand are the same parts when it is not a fist as when it is a fist. The change of state into a fist has similar requirements for coming into being as that light bulb's on state, but it uses the same components it is made out of and therefore cannot meet your lack of commonality criteria.

[Walker]

is absolute zero relative to heat?

-Imp

One could say that absolute zero is relative to motion.
Motion generates heat.
Molecules move and those little atoms never stop.
Fast thoughts get hot as a Dostoevsky fever.

The ceiling for motion is light speed.
The ceiling for stillness is absolute zero.
Mass limitations, however
Storage for Absolute is the freezer.

The only way for electrons light years apart to simultaneously affect one another is to bypass the ceiling. How else, other than mind …

[Magnus Anderson]

This ties neatly into my thread pertaining to whether or not morality is objective.

I think you might want to double-check your link there Magnus. That's a crazy thread of VA using AI to complain about you.

Oh my! I stand corrected. He gave it the same title.

This is my thread:
viewtopic.php?t=40173

[Impenitent]

is absolute zero relative to heat?

-Imp

One could say that absolute zero is relative to motion.
Motion generates heat.
Molecules move and those little atoms never stop.
Fast thoughts get hot as a Dostoevsky fever.

The ceiling for motion is light speed.
The ceiling for stillness is absolute zero.
Mass limitations, however
Storage for Absolute is the freezer.

The only way for electrons light years apart to simultaneously affect one another is to bypass the ceiling. How else, other than mind …

then the only thing at absolute zero is absolute nothing...

the universe continues to expand and the band played on...

-Imp

[Magnus Anderson]

The parts of the hand are the same parts when it is not a fist as when it is a fist. The change of state into a fist has similar requirements for coming into being as that light bulb's on state, but it uses the same components it is made out of and therefore cannot meet your lack of commonality criteria.

Are you sure they are the same parts? And in what sense? We often treat numerically distinct portions of reality as if they are different states of the same thing. There's no problem with that, but by doing that, they don't cease to be numerically distinct. Let's take one and the same hand at two different points in time t1 and t2. Let's say that, at t1, it's an open hand, and at t2, it's a fist. The open hand and the fist are numerically distinct entities ( two things rather than one and the same thing; they have different identities rather than the same identity. ) Even if they were qualitatively identical ( i.e. completely the same in content ), they still would be numerically distinct. And there's no overlap between them. What exists at one point in time is completely separate from what exists at another point in tme.

[FlashDangerpants]

The parts of the hand are the same parts when it is not a fist as when it is a fist. The change of state into a fist has similar requirements for coming into being as that light bulb's on state, but it uses the same components it is made out of and therefore cannot meet your lack of commonality criteria.

Are you sure they are the same parts? And in what sense? We often treat numerically distinct portions of reality as if they are different states of the same thing. There's no problem with that, but by doing that, they don't cease to be numerically distinct. Let's take one and the same hand at two different points in time t1 and t2. Let's say that, at t1, it's an open hand, and at t2, it's a fist. The open hand and the fist are numerically distinct entities ( two things rather than one and the same thing; they have different identities rather than the same identity. ) Even if they were qualitatively identical ( i.e. completely the same in content ), they still would be numerically distinct. And there's no overlap between them. What exists at one point in time is completely separate from what exists at another point in tme.

Are you suggesting that a thumbnail in one place - as part of a hand slapping somebody for instance - would not be the same thumbnail if the hand were arranged into a fist and punching the same person?

Seems like a pathway to mereological nihilism if you ask me. I'm not automatically opposed, but I would say it is the same bathwater irrespective of whether the baby as been removed from said bath before the water is thrown out.

[Magnus Anderson]

Are you suggesting that a thumbnail in one place - as part of a hand slapping somebody for instance - would not be the same thumbnail if the hand were arranged into a fist and punching the same person?

Seems like a pathway to mereological nihilism if you ask me. I'm not automatically opposed, but I would say it is the same bathwater irrespective of whether the baby as been removed from said bath before the water is thrown out.

I am merely saying that you at one point in time and you at another point in time are numerically distinct portions of reality. That does not mean they are not different phases of the same being -- yourself -- but it does mean that they are two separate, non-overlapping, portions of reality.

For one portion of reality to causally determine the state of another, they must not completely overlap each other ( i.e. they must not be numerically identical, one and the same portion of reality. ) If A and B refer to the same portion of reality, e.g. to the state of your being at the same point in time, then A cannot causally determine B ( but it can do so constitutively. ) But if A and B are two different states of the same being ( e.g. you at one point in time, and you at another ), then A can causally determine B, because they are numerically distinct entities, despite our language making it look like they are not.

[FlashDangerpants]

Are you suggesting that a thumbnail in one place - as part of a hand slapping somebody for instance - would not be the same thumbnail if the hand were arranged into a fist and punching the same person?

Seems like a pathway to mereological nihilism if you ask me. I'm not automatically opposed, but I would say it is the same bathwater irrespective of whether the baby as been removed from said bath before the water is thrown out.

I am merely saying that you at one point in time and you at another point in time are numerically distinct portions of reality. That does not mean they are not different phases of the same being -- yourself -- but it does mean that they are two separate, non-overlapping, portions of reality.

For one portion of reality to causally determine the state of another, they must not completely overlap each other ( i.e. they must not be numerically identical, one and the same portion of reality. ) If A and B refer to the same portion of reality, e.g. to the state of your being at the same point in time, then A cannot causally determine B ( but it can do so constitutively. ) But if A and B are two different states of the same being ( e.g. you at one point in time, and you at another ), then A can causally determine B, because they are numerically distinct entities, despite our language making it look like they are not.

I don't understand what the word 'numeric' is doing in this passage?

Either it's the same hand whether it is arranged as a fist or a slap, or it is somehow not the same hand. The hand is comprised of one thumb, four fingers and so on. Those either are, or else they are not the same objects irrespective of precise spacial location at given times in the history of the universe. The fingers are made of atoms that are in one position if the hand becomes a fist and in a slightly different one if it becomes a slap.

If they stop being the same atoms, fingers and thumbs etc only on the basis of locality, then so does everything else, and there is no such thing as continuity for any complex object composed of many parts that might be arranged in more than one way.

The light switch moves when it switched into the on position. Does it become a different switch in that act?

[popeye1945]

Imperfections and change are the only absolutes.