What is morality?

[Gary Childress]

Not by Shakespeare. Maybe by yourself, it's a generalization. But it's certainly not a "truism."
This is backward. The things that are in the world, and indeed, the world itself, are contingent beings. That means that they aren't necessarily only the way they are; they could have been otherwise than they are. They're also temporal, which means they begin and perish within time. And as such, they are not capable of being the meaning of their own existence, nor can a conscious being that appears only after-the-fact of their existence assign them a meaning that is objective or true. If they have a meaning, it's given by something that creates these contingent, temporal entities -- or they have none at all, and the pronouncements of "conscious beings" that happen after that are not meanings in any binding, truthful or inherent sense at all.

Human beings are also contingent and temporal. They cannot be the source of their own meaning, anymore than the physical world can.

Life forms are the only source of meaning in the world.

As I've already pointed out, that's impossible if all the life forms that exist are temporal and contingent...as secularism insists.

experience is meaning

Amoebas experience things. Are you suggesting that amoebas therefore must be generators of meaning? If so, it seems you've dropped your definition of "meaning" to something so low it's meaningless.

What "meaning" would you say an amoeba experiences? Let's be specific.

If an amoeba experiences suffering when another organism kills it, does that mean an amoeba doesn't generate meaning? Or do amoebas really "experience" the same things in the same way that we do?

[Immanuel Can]

Life forms are the only source of meaning in the world.

As I've already pointed out, that's impossible if all the life forms that exist are temporal and contingent...as secularism insists.

experience is meaning

Amoebas experience things. Are you suggesting that amoebas therefore must be generators of meaning? If so, it seems you've dropped your definition of "meaning" to something so low it's meaningless.

What "meaning" would you say an amoeba experiences? Let's be specific.

If an amoeba experiences suffering when another organism kills it, does that mean an amoeba doesn't generate meaning? Or do amoebas really "experience" the same things in the same way that we do?

What is your definition of "meaning," then? Merely the ability to feel pain?

[Gary Childress]

As I've already pointed out, that's impossible if all the life forms that exist are temporal and contingent...as secularism insists.

Amoebas experience things. Are you suggesting that amoebas therefore must be generators of meaning? If so, it seems you've dropped your definition of "meaning" to something so low it's meaningless.

What "meaning" would you say an amoeba experiences? Let's be specific.

If an amoeba experiences suffering when another organism kills it, does that mean an amoeba doesn't generate meaning? Or do amoebas really "experience" the same things in the same way that we do?

What is your definition of "meaning," then? Merely the ability to feel pain?

I think meaning is what a living being with consciousness gives or brings to the world that is not also true of non-living things (which don't bring or give the world anything other than their non-living selves). I think it sets living beings with consciousness apart from non-living things. Am I wrong?

[Immanuel Can]

If an amoeba experiences suffering when another organism kills it, does that mean an amoeba doesn't generate meaning? Or do amoebas really "experience" the same things in the same way that we do?

What is your definition of "meaning," then? Merely the ability to feel pain?

I think meaning is what a living being with consciousness gives or brings to the world that is not also true of non-living things (which don't bring or give the world anything other than their non-living selves). I think it sets living beings with consciousness apart from non-living things. Am I wrong?

Again, what is your definition of "meaning"? I can't really answer until I understand what it is you are asserting.

[Gary Childress]

What is your definition of "meaning," then? Merely the ability to feel pain?

I think meaning is what a living being with consciousness gives or brings to the world that is not also true of non-living things (which don't bring or give the world anything other than their non-living selves). I think it sets living beings with consciousness apart from non-living things. Am I wrong?

Again, what is your definition of "meaning"? I can't really answer until I understand what it is you are asserting.

When you ask for a "definition" of meaning, what sort of answer are you looking for that would count as a "definition"? I mean, I told you what I think "meaning" is. I said it's something a living being with consciousness gives or brings to the world that is not also true of non-living things. Is that not true? Do conscious beings not bring or give meaning to the world? Do non-living things give meaning to anything?

[Immanuel Can]

I think meaning is what a living being with consciousness gives or brings to the world that is not also true of non-living things (which don't bring or give the world anything other than their non-living selves). I think it sets living beings with consciousness apart from non-living things. Am I wrong?

Again, what is your definition of "meaning"? I can't really answer until I understand what it is you are asserting.

When you ask for a "definition" of meaning, what sort of answer are you looking for that would count as a "definition"?

Well, in your last comment, your definition seemed to be that "meaning" equals the ability to feel pain. I find that inadequate as a definition, for obvious reasons; so I'm assuming you have something more precise and convincing.

But perhaps you don't. Either way, you can say.

[Gary Childress]

Again, what is your definition of "meaning"? I can't really answer until I understand what it is you are asserting.

When you ask for a "definition" of meaning, what sort of answer are you looking for that would count as a "definition"?

Well, in your last comment, your definition seemed to be that "meaning" equals the ability to feel pain. I find that inadequate as a definition, for obvious reasons; so I'm assuming you have something more precise and convincing.

But perhaps you don't. Either way, you can say.

I think pain is a meaning, but it doesn't "equal" all meaning. There are other meanings living beings can give to the world besides pain. I gave you my definition of meaning. Again, meaning is what a living being brings or gives to the world that a non-living being does not bring or give.

[Immanuel Can]

When you ask for a "definition" of meaning, what sort of answer are you looking for that would count as a "definition"?

Well, in your last comment, your definition seemed to be that "meaning" equals the ability to feel pain. I find that inadequate as a definition, for obvious reasons; so I'm assuming you have something more precise and convincing.

But perhaps you don't. Either way, you can say.

I think pain is a meaning, but it doesn't "equal" all meaning.

No, I think pain is just pain. To have a "meaning," a phenomenon has to signify something. Philosophers of language are pretty much unanimous on that. An amoeba is not capable of knowing any signification; it doesn't even have the body parts necessary so to do. So for it, pain must be just pain...not "meaningful" in any semiotic sense.

...meaning is what a living being brings or gives to the world that a non-living being does not bring or give.

That's so vague as to impart no "meaning" to the word "meaning." It could as easily describe physicality or locomotion, which only living beings "bring" or "give" to the world.

[Gary Childress]

Well, in your last comment, your definition seemed to be that "meaning" equals the ability to feel pain. I find that inadequate as a definition, for obvious reasons; so I'm assuming you have something more precise and convincing.

But perhaps you don't. Either way, you can say.

I think pain is a meaning, but it doesn't "equal" all meaning.

No, I think pain is just pain. To have a "meaning," a phenomenon has to signify something. Philosophers of language are pretty much unanimous on that. An amoeba is not capable of knowing any signification; it doesn't even have the body parts necessary so to do. So for it, pain must be just pain...not "meaningful" in any semiotic sense.

...meaning is what a living being brings or gives to the world that a non-living being does not bring or give.

That's so vague as to impart no "meaning" to the word "meaning." It could as easily describe physicality or locomotion, which only living beings "bring" or "give" to the world.

OK, would this be a more adequate definition of meaning:

Meaning is that which a living being that is conscious and able to signify something else brings to the world that other beings which are not conscious or not able to signify something do not.

[Immanuel Can]

I think pain is a meaning, but it doesn't "equal" all meaning.

No, I think pain is just pain. To have a "meaning," a phenomenon has to signify something. Philosophers of language are pretty much unanimous on that. An amoeba is not capable of knowing any signification; it doesn't even have the body parts necessary so to do. So for it, pain must be just pain...not "meaningful" in any semiotic sense.

...meaning is what a living being brings or gives to the world that a non-living being does not bring or give.

That's so vague as to impart no "meaning" to the word "meaning." It could as easily describe physicality or locomotion, which only living beings "bring" or "give" to the world.

OK, would this be a more adequate definition of meaning:

Meaning is that which a living being that is conscious and able to signify something else brings to the world that other beings which are not conscious or not able to signify something do not.

Awkward, but still problematic, too.

You'll have to explain how a contingent and temporal being can be right when he assigns or signifies a "meaning" of something. The rocks and trees where there before you and I arrived; how is it that we get to say what the "meaning" of their being there would be? Didn't we come far too late to be the "meaning" of the rocks and trees that pre-existed us?

[Gary Childress]

No, I think pain is just pain. To have a "meaning," a phenomenon has to signify something. Philosophers of language are pretty much unanimous on that. An amoeba is not capable of knowing any signification; it doesn't even have the body parts necessary so to do. So for it, pain must be just pain...not "meaningful" in any semiotic sense.


That's so vague as to impart no "meaning" to the word "meaning." It could as easily describe physicality or locomotion, which only living beings "bring" or "give" to the world.

OK, would this be a more adequate definition of meaning:

Meaning is that which a living being that is conscious and able to signify something else brings to the world that other beings which are not conscious or not able to signify something do not.

Awkward, but still problematic, too.

You'll have to explain how a contingent and temporal being can be right when he assigns or signifies a "meaning" of something. The rocks and trees where there before you and I arrived; how is it that we get to say what the "meaning" of their being there would be? Didn't we come far too late to be the "meaning" of the rocks and trees that pre-existed us?

Why can't a contingent and temporal being be right when they assign meaning to something? Is there some scientific law that says contingent and temporal beings cannot assign the "right" meaning to anything?

[Immanuel Can]

OK, would this be a more adequate definition of meaning:

Meaning is that which a living being that is conscious and able to signify something else brings to the world that other beings which are not conscious or not able to signify something do not.

Awkward, but still problematic, too.

You'll have to explain how a contingent and temporal being can be right when he assigns or signifies a "meaning" of something. The rocks and trees where there before you and I arrived; how is it that we get to say what the "meaning" of their being there would be? Didn't we come far too late to be the "meaning" of the rocks and trees that pre-existed us?

Why can't a contingent and temporal being be right when they assign meaning to something? Is there some scientific law that says contingent and temporal beings cannot assign the "right" meaning to anything?

Well, there's logic to it.

If I appear after-the-fact, how can I be the source of the meaning of the facts after which I appeared? That doesn't make sense. Our timeline is linear. I can't be the assigner of meaning, any more than I can be the reason for my own birth.

But can people be right? Yes, if the meaning they "assign" is the same meaning as the thing in question actually already "has." But they can't create meaning out of thin air. It has to have a basis, and that basis does not come from the one who perceived the meaning.

[Gary Childress]

Awkward, but still problematic, too.

You'll have to explain how a contingent and temporal being can be right when he assigns or signifies a "meaning" of something. The rocks and trees where there before you and I arrived; how is it that we get to say what the "meaning" of their being there would be? Didn't we come far too late to be the "meaning" of the rocks and trees that pre-existed us?

Why can't a contingent and temporal being be right when they assign meaning to something? Is there some scientific law that says contingent and temporal beings cannot assign the "right" meaning to anything?

Well, there's logic to it.

If I appear after-the-fact, how can I be the source of the meaning of the facts after which I appeared? That doesn't make sense. Our timeline is linear. I can't be the assigner of meaning, any more than I can be the reason for my own birth.

But can people be right? Yes, if the meaning they "assign" is the same meaning as the thing in question actually already "has." But they can't create meaning out of thin air. It has to have a basis, and that basis does not come from the one who perceived the meaning.

You are there when a landslide occurs. You may give it the meaning that it was "horrible". If no one before you said landslides are "horrible," would you be unable to think it was "horrible"?

[Immanuel Can]

Why can't a contingent and temporal being be right when they assign meaning to something? Is there some scientific law that says contingent and temporal beings cannot assign the "right" meaning to anything?

Well, there's logic to it.

If I appear after-the-fact, how can I be the source of the meaning of the facts after which I appeared? That doesn't make sense. Our timeline is linear. I can't be the assigner of meaning, any more than I can be the reason for my own birth.

But can people be right? Yes, if the meaning they "assign" is the same meaning as the thing in question actually already "has." But they can't create meaning out of thin air. It has to have a basis, and that basis does not come from the one who perceived the meaning.

You are there when a landslide occurs. You may give it the meaning that it was "horrible".

That's not a "meaning." It's just an emotional reaction.

So first you said that "meaning" meant "ability to feel pain." Now you say it also means "ability to have an emotional reaction"?

[Gary Childress]

Well, there's logic to it.

If I appear after-the-fact, how can I be the source of the meaning of the facts after which I appeared? That doesn't make sense. Our timeline is linear. I can't be the assigner of meaning, any more than I can be the reason for my own birth.

But can people be right? Yes, if the meaning they "assign" is the same meaning as the thing in question actually already "has." But they can't create meaning out of thin air. It has to have a basis, and that basis does not come from the one who perceived the meaning.

You are there when a landslide occurs. You may give it the meaning that it was "horrible".

That's not a "meaning." It's just an emotional reaction.

So first you said that "meaning" meant "ability to feel pain." Now you say it also means "ability to have an emotional reaction"?

No, I said meaning is something a living being adds to the world that non-living beings do not. I then qualified it further essentially saying certain living beings (those capable of adding meaning) add meaning but not all living beings add meaning. What are you disagreeing with. It's pretty much tautology.