Prove me wrong: there is no God

[Immanuel Can]

Outside our universe NO THING IS OBSERVABLE.

That is quite true, Mike: just as there is no way for us to observe the origins of the universe. But that only speaks to a natural limitation of human knowing, not to the truth or falsity of any proposition

No, NOT a "limitation of human knowing" -- a limitation of knowing by material observation.

Well, yes: but I wasn't assuming you recognize other forms of human knowing, since you didn't say you did. There are, of course, ways of knowing that do not depend on strict Materialism. But Materialists will not recognize any of those.

...if you want to bring in material reality to support the existence of gods, you need to be prepared for the materialist responses.

I've been including them in my comments. But every time I do, you accuse me of telling your you're a Materialist, and you get mad. So it seems I can't get a fair hearing, on that point.

Oh, and BTW -- you haven't repeated your statements about polytheism recently.

That's because it's become clear you aren't even sure about First Cause arguments. So they've stopped being relevant.

If you can ever bring yourself to recognize the necessity of a First Cause, and then a couple of other subsequent arguments, it's possible talk about polytheisms may become relevant again. But right now, that's a third or fourth level question, and we haven't even cleared level one yet.

[MikeNovack]

No, NOT a "limitation of human knowing" -- a limitation of knowing by material observation.

Well, yes: but I wasn't assuming you recognize other forms of human knowing, since you didn't say you did. There are, of course, ways of knowing that do not depend on strict Materialism. But Materialists will not recognize any of those.

NOT "human", you seem to be stuck on that. It's not whether humans are attempting to make an observation across those boundaries.It's that nothing material could cross and return, hence NO SIGNAL.

...if you want to bring in material reality to support the existence of gods, you need to be prepared for the materialist responses.

I've been including them in my comments. But every time I do, you accuse me of telling your you're a Materialist, and you get mad. So it seems I can't get a fair hearing, on that point.

quote="Immanuel Can" post_id=809608 time=1786061643 user_id=9431]
That's because it's become clear you aren't even sure about First Cause arguments. So they've stopped being relevant.

If you can ever bring yourself to recognize the necessity of a First Cause, and then a couple of other subsequent arguments, el one yet.

What do you mean "not sure"? It is LOGIC that you don't seem to grasp. I am willing to discuss on the basis of
"if
axiom1
axiom2
...
axiomN
then
Y

That "if/then" statement, whether it is true or not, does NOT depend on whether all or even any of the axioms are true. True, meaning OUTSIDE the "enclosure". Inside the enclosure, ANY AXIOM YOU LIKE can be written as true to derive Y << upon which the "closure axiom" declares the "if/then" true. Your insistence that I accept all or even any of them as true "outside" is ignoring axiomatic logic.

[Immanuel Can]

No, NOT a "limitation of human knowing" -- a limitation of knowing by material observation.

Well, yes: but I wasn't assuming you recognize other forms of human knowing, since you didn't say you did. There are, of course, ways of knowing that do not depend on strict Materialism. But Materialists will not recognize any of those.

NOT "human", you seem to be stuck on that. It's not whether humans are attempting to make an observation across those boundaries.It's that nothing material could cross and return, hence NO SIGNAL.

...if you want to bring in material reality to support the existence of gods, you need to be prepared for the materialist responses.

I've been including them in my comments. But every time I do, you accuse me of telling your you're a Materialist, and you get mad. So it seems I can't get a fair hearing, on that point.

quote="Immanuel Can" post_id=809608 time=1786061643 user_id=9431]
That's because it's become clear you aren't even sure about First Cause arguments. So they've stopped being relevant.

If you can ever bring yourself to recognize the necessity of a First Cause, and then a couple of other subsequent arguments, el one yet.

What do you mean "not sure"?

I mean you have every reason to be sure, but you insist on not being sure. I don't quite know what to make of that: whether it's difficulty in understanding, or merely obduracy in discussion. I'm loathe to decide, since either alternative throws shade in a particular direction, and throwing shade isn't something I'm interested in doing. But I'm perplexed by your determination not to understand simple logic or basic mathematics, as they apply to the no-infinite-causal-regress point. It seems perfectly obvious, really.

[MikeNovack]

I mean you have every reason to be sure, but you insist on not being sure. I don't quite know what to make of that: whether it's difficulty in understanding, or merely obduracy in discussion. I'm loathe to decide, since either alternative throws shade in a particular direction, and throwing shade isn't something I'm interested in doing. But I'm perplexed by your determination not to understand simple logic or basic mathematics, as they apply to the no-infinite-causal-regress point. It seems perfectly obvious, really.

vyou can have aas true (outsode

Revelation ---- I think I now understand the problem.

When I was describing "the axiom of closure" I neglected to point out that in addition to the "assumed true" axioms inside you also could use (inside) any statement true outside. So ONE source of confusion is that I was listing as axioms "inside" all the ones used in the derivation of "at least one First Cause" EVEN THOUGH willing to consider some of them true "outside". For example, the one "nothing is its own cause" - yeah, I believe that true by the nature of the relation "causes".

YOU consider ALL of them true "outside" so you can derive "there exists at least one First Cause"
<< BTW -- did you realize that we can't show a "First Cause" actually causes anything. All we had was that it wasn't caused by anything else. Names can lead us astray, which is why symbols are better, less misleading. I will also point out that infinite regression does not rule out there being "First Causes" that cause things >>

BUT -- I will NOT commit to all of those axioms as true (outside) because the one ruling out "infinite regression" ISN'T about how "causes" behaves. It's about the realm/reality itself. This is like discussing geometry axioms/postulates for geometries on surfaces of two dimensions. When we include "two points determine exactly one line" and "through a point not on a line exactly one line can be drawn that does not share a point with the first line WE ARE DEFINING THE NATURE OF THE SURFACE. There are other surfaces for which neither of those are true, where instead all lines meet in two points and through any two points either exactly one or else an infinite number of lines can be drawn (nothing in between)

Just like that, whether we can rule out "infinite regression" is not about how the relation causes behaves but about the nature of the "realm". That one I would insist be "inside" and so I can only get "IF there is no infinite regression then there is at least one First Cause (that causes at least one thing)." You apparently believe you can have "there is no infinite regression" as an outside truth EVEN THOUGH YOU KNOW OF EXAMPLES OF INFINITE REGRESSION (the realm of integers, for example).

Do note that allowing infinite regression only prevents deriving "there is at least one First Cause" but not does NOT imply "there are no First Causes" << allowing infinite recursion does not require it >>

Really might be easier if you just thought about the turtles. Lets say you believe as true "outside"
Then earth is supported on the back of a turtle.
A turtle is supported by a turtle (unless a "first turtle")
No turtle is supported by itself
If turtle A is supported by turtle B and turtle B is supported by turtle C then turtle A is supported by turtle C

1) What are you ADDING to conclude "there must be a first turtle"?
2) If you add that, is it enough to conclude "there can be only one first turtle" (what else do you need to add? What possibility as ignored)

To conclude --- I am NOT willing to say "there is at least one first cause" because "there is no infinite regression" isn't OBVIOUSLY true. Can't give you better than "IF there is no infinite regression (for "causes") THEN there exists at least one first cause"

If you find that strange, don't you believe your God extends infinitely back into the past? You believe extending infinitely into the past is possible? yes?

[Immanuel Can]

For example, the one "nothing is its own cause" - yeah, I believe that true by the nature of the relation "causes".

That wasn't how I put it, Mike, nevertheless, what you say here is true: nothing can be its own cause, any more than we can lift ourselves by our own bootstraps.

YOU consider ALL of them true "outside" so you can derive "there exists at least one First Cause"

No, "inside" and "outside" distinctions were yours, actually, not mine. Mathematics is mathematics. Causality is causality. I really don't see the point of your discussion of "inside" and "outside." Maybe you need to make it more clear. It's certainly not obvious.

<< BTW -- did you realize that we can't show a "First Cause" actually causes anything. All we had was that it wasn't caused by anything else.

Actually, we can know that. We find ourselves in the middle of a causal chain. When we know that there's no such thing as an infinite regress of causes, we can be quite certain that something started that chain. We may not know its exact nature from that argument, but we certainly know of its existence, and that it is a "cause" of things.

I will also point out that infinite regression does not rule out there being "First Causes" that cause things >>

You're still missing the point: there is no possibility of any such thing as an infinite regress of causes. Such a thing could never find a starting point. It vanishes infinitely into past eternity. And since there is never any point at which even the first causal prerequisite is ever met, nothing ever starts. There are no causal chains. And we couldn't possibly find ourselves in the middle of any causal sequences. In fact, no physical motion at all would exist. It would never begin.

BUT -- I will NOT commit to all of those axioms

It's not an "axiom" inherently. It's just a truth. Once we recognize the truth of it, we can make it into an axiom. But it's not, by definition of what "axiom" means, an axiom until we accept it. Until then, it's just purely the truth.

There are true axioms, and false axioms: their function as axioms is separate from the question of their truth or falsehood. What people believe isn't always true.

But the essential impossibility of an infinite regress of causes is true. Whether or not it will become an axiomatic belief will depend on how you and I respond to the truth.

EVEN THOUGH YOU KNOW OF EXAMPLES OF INFINITE REGRESSION (the realm of integers, for example).

You've again completely missed the argument. I've said it before, but now I'll repeat it: it's that causality makes all the "integers" into prerequisites, each for the ensuing one. It's not merely conceptual integers: it's actual prerequisites in a sequence of causes..

Sure, you can posit integers to infinity. But what you can't do is write them down in consecutive, subsequent order, as if they represent a causal sequence. That's simply impossible. Try it, and you'll see. QED.

At what integer would you begin? -1,000,000? That's not infinity. -1,000,000,000? That isn't infinity. At -1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000? That is not infinity. In fact, by nature of what "infinity" implies, you would never meet a single prerequisite in the sequence. None. Ever. You couldn't. The minute you did, you'd be creating a first integer, and it would no longer mean the same as "infinity."

...don't you believe your God extends infinitely back into the past?

God is not subject to causality. That's what makes him, as the old theologians used to say, the "Primum Mobile," or the "Unmoved Mover," and what I have likewise designated the "First Cause."

That's certainly not ALL He is, but it certainly is ONE OF THE THINGS He is. And this is why Christians and Jews also call him "I Am." He's the only self-existent reality there is. There is no time when He did not exist, no time when He began to exist; in fact, what we know as time itself is one of His creations. But, of course, that's no bar to him instituting a causal sequence, which He certainly does.

In fact, were He part of a causal sequence, then it would be whatever caused Him that was the real "God." And the "God" question would merely have moved back one step, and not been explicated at all.

So no Christian and no Jew believes in "a caused god." That's not what they are claiming at all.

[Will Bouwman]

...an infinite regress doesn't pop a first cause into existence.

That is precisely what I have been saying is the case. There is no such thing as an infinite regress of causes.

Remind me: how does the infinite regress of numbers prove there cannot be an infinite regress of causes?

Nothing cannot have qualities.
Eternal is a quality.
Therefore nothing cannot be eternal

Yep, a flawless syllogism.

Except you have an amphiboly...

Where's that then?

[Immanuel Can]

...an infinite regress doesn't pop a first cause into existence.

That is precisely what I have been saying is the case. There is no such thing as an infinite regress of causes.

Remind me: how does the infinite regress of numbers prove there cannot be an infinite regress of causes?

The numbers are merely placeholders, in this argument. Each one stands for a step in a sequence of causes. That's why it must be stipulated that each integer has to come before the next one: because they're attempting to represent CAUSES, not merely abstract numbers. They're standing in for a real-world phenomenon, causality. Causality is real, observable and ubiquitous with us. Integers, merely as concepts, are not at all evident, nor limited, nor always representative of causality. We're using them to model causality, not mere abstractions.

And that's why, though we can suppose infinite integers, imagine them somewhat, suppose they are possible, and so on, we cannot actually write down integers in sequence, without taking a beginning point. When we use them as representations of causal sequencing, they always, always, always force us to pick a starting point, a first integer, or we can never write anything at all down.

That's as clear as I can make it, I think.

Nothing cannot have qualities.
Eternal is a quality.
Therefore nothing cannot be eternal

Yep, a flawless syllogism.

Except you have an amphiboly...

Where's that then?

I've pointed it out before, but it's the two meanings of the word "nothing." By rule of logic, the meaning you intend by "nothing" must remain stable and fixed throughout an entire syllogism, or the syllogism is rendered invalid. (That's by the Law of Identity and to avoid the fallacy called amphiboly.)

"Nothing cannot have qualities" can mean two things: that "no thing" is without qualities, or that "a nothing" cannot be assigned qualities. It's not at all clear from the ambiguity of that wording which one you mean.

But additional problems also appear. The first one is what we call a "truism," which means something so obvious it doesn't add any value to state it at all; essentially, all it implies is that things have qualities. So what? The second, though, is even more problematic, because it syntactically treats the word "nothing" as if it designated a noun, which is a thing. So it's telling us that there's a thing called "nothing," which cannot have qualities. But obviously, a "nothing" is the opposite of what we mean by "thing," and can't be used as a noun. There is no such thing, in fact, as "a nothing." Nothingness is the unrestricted and undefined condition of the absence of a/any thing. Nothing more can be said about it. One cannot predicate anything about "nothing," except the absence it signifies.

Can I make it simpler? Maybe.

A "cat" is a noun. It's a thing. You can draw a picture of a cat on a mat. But if I ask you to draw "a nothing" on a mat, you don't know exactly what to draw. You can draw the mat, of course, because that is a thing. But how is an impartial observer to know what is missing from the mat, merely by looking at the picture? How can he guess that you're trying to represent the absence of a cat -- as opposed to the absence of an emu, the absence of an aqualung, or the absence of a quantity surveyor? He cannot. The absence on the mat tells provides him with no indicator of anything at all. He doesn't know what's missing. He can't.

In the same way, you can't tell people anything about "nothing," except that none of many possible things is present. You also can't predicate anything of that "nothing," because it has no particular identity or character. Thus, to say "eternal is a quality," and then to predicate anything of that, requires you to predicate something of a word that is utterly incapable of predication.

That's complicated, perhaps, and requires you to understand a little about linguistic structuring. I apologize for that. But I think it's the most precise way to indicate the fallacy that your syllogism contains.

[MikeNovack]

You're still missing the point: there is no possibility of any such thing as an infinite regress of causes. Such a thing could never find a starting point. It vanishes infinitely into past eternity. And since there is never any point at which even the first causal prerequisite is ever met, nothing ever starts. There are no causal chains. And we couldn't possibly find ourselves in the middle of any causal sequences. In fact, no physical motion at all would exist. It would never begin.

You are being dense. You are (in effect) saying if it has a starting point it has a starting point.

You do NOT have to go back into infinite eternity to have an infinite number of instants (unless you want another assumption of time being quantized). You have event at instant x causes event at instant y, x < y (x is before y). Let y = 1/n and x = 1/(n+1) and let n be the natural numbers > 0. Isn't event x always before event y? (so could be its cause). Do we ever run out of x's to be the cause of the y's? Which is "first x"? There isn't one, right (because there is no last natural number).

I have no objection to your taking "no infinite regression" as assumption Z and then concluding "if Z then there is at least one first cause". I strongly object to your claim that I have to take Z as a truth. WHERE did our other assumptions abut how "causes" behaves rule out the "regression" I described above?

Your notion that a "first cause" has to cause anything is the result of the NAME attached to a FC, "a thing x for which no y exists such that y = C(x)". When written in symbols, you would be less certain you could derive "if x is a FC, then there exists a y such that x = C(y)"

Look IC, there are plenty of free on-line course in symbolic logic. I strongly suggest.

I can TRY to put this in words for you. If you use this "argument from causes" to derive "at least one god" (in the causal chains) why do you think could show could not be "gods" out there completely disconnected from our material reality (have nothing to do with "cause" in our universe). Do you imagine the existence of a "thing which has no cause" means that thing HAS TO BE in a causal chain (that you could derive this?)

[Immanuel Can]

You're still missing the point: there is no possibility of any such thing as an infinite regress of causes. Such a thing could never find a starting point. It vanishes infinitely into past eternity. And since there is never any point at which even the first causal prerequisite is ever met, nothing ever starts. There are no causal chains. And we couldn't possibly find ourselves in the middle of any causal sequences. In fact, no physical motion at all would exist. It would never begin.

You are being dense. You are (in effect) saying if it has a starting point it has a starting point.

No, I'm saying if a causal sequence has no starting point, it cannot start.

But we are in a causal sequence.

Igitur, there was a starting point.

[MikeNovack]

No, I'm saying if a causal sequence has no starting point, it cannot start.
But we are in a causal sequence.
Igitur, there was a starting point.

"if a casual sequence has no starting point then it cannot start" is perfectly true. But it is our assumption about "no infinite regression" used to show had a start. Remember, we had assumptions about "causes" to eliminate "rings" (a ring has no start) << we used "no thing is its own cause" and "if a is the cause of b and b is the cause of c then a is the cause of c" >>

But I want to first address your puzzlement when I claimed "the derivation of first cause(s) does not allow us to conclude that a "first cause" causes anything". I am saying that your puzzlement comes from the NAME assigned, that a poor/unfortunate choice of name led you to conclude something BASED ON THE NAME.

I will try to do this strictly in words, since you don't have symbolic logic.

Early on in the "derivation from the nature of causality" we made some definitions (assigned names). We said things were of two kinds, things that had a cause to which we assigned the NAME "ordinary thing" and things which did not have a cause to which we assigned the NAME "first cause". Then after taking as true "at least one ordinary thing exists" plus things about the relation "causes" which we considered true, PLUS "there cannot be infinite regression of causes" << which you consider obviously true and I consider conditional >> derived "there exists at least one "first cause".

So it bothered you when I said this derivation did not let us conclude that a "first cause" causes anything. IT'S THE NAME.

When we assigned the names "ordinary thing" and "first cause" those choices were arbitrary. We could have used names "orthing" and "urthing". NOW after we derive (using the ASSUMPTION no infinite regression) that a causal chain starts with an "urthing" are you still as bothered by the claim "there can exist an "urthing" that is not the cause of anything?" That we have not shown "if there is an "urthing" then there is an "orthing" such that this "urthing" is the cause of that "orthing".

You can't derive anything from an assigned name.

[Immanuel Can]

No, I'm saying if a causal sequence has no starting point, it cannot start.
But we are in a causal sequence.
Igitur, there was a starting point.

"if a casual sequence has no starting point then it cannot start" is perfectly true.

Now you've got it. This means supposing a past-infinite origin for the universe is logically and mathematically absurd. QED.

We said things were of two kinds, things that had a cause to which we assigned the NAME "ordinary thing" and things which did not have a cause to which we assigned the NAME "first cause".

"We" didn't say that. You are, just now. There is, in fact, only one possible "thing" that does not have a cause: that would be the First Cause. Now, you can unpack that different ways, because the argument tells you no more than that. But that's where the buck stops, on the First Cause argument.

So it bothered you when I said this derivation did not let us conclude that a "first cause" causes anything. IT'S THE NAME.

No, that's not the case; it's the failure of logic entailed in that claim that is the issue here.

When we speak of something as the "First Cause," we're not blowing smoke. And we're not merely naming, far less applying words that could have been replaced with nonsense syllables. We're applying a description of function. We're speaking of something that is the very "first," and precipitates a "causal" chain. That's not merely a name. That's an identification of the role that Entity plays in the entire history of the universe...far from arbitrary, and certainly not nonsense.

[osgart]

Then is God the complete initiator of his own cause and effect? God must move to act, and to create thus cause and effect are necessary for a God to do anything at all.

Secondly how is God timeless?

[osgart]

Lastly, what is stopping the universe from being a perpetual, self referential loop. Replace God with universe, and the universe is the self existent thing that produces contingencies that come and go.

[Immanuel Can]

Then is God the complete initiator of his own cause and effect?

No. Rather, God is outside of the chain of cause and effect. He is, as the phrase goes, the "Uncaused Cause." He initiates the chain, but is not subject to its terms. And it's in this sense that the First Cause is also caused the "Unmoved Mover": He moved things, but was Himself unmoved by other things. One can never speak of the First Cause being "caused" to do something, therefore.

Secondly how is God timeless?

I think we covered this. But it was earlier in this discussion, if I recall.

One definition of "time" is "the interval it takes to traverse two points, or to move between two states of being." That is, it takes time to move from point A to point B, and it takes time for A to morph or decay into B.

But if this is right, then time does not exist until matter exists. There is no interval between points, when there are not at least two points, and not some space upon which they are imposed. And there is no interval between states when nothing is changing or morphing, either. So prior to the creation of matter, there is no way to speak of there being time.

God, then, is the Creator of, not the subject of time. He has existed without time, and if this universe and all the matter in it should end, God would still exist. In that sense, and in others, God is "timeless." He exists perpetually, and without cause, and without subjection to change. As the Torah says, "I, the Lord your God, change not."

[Immanuel Can]

Lastly, what is stopping the universe from being a perpetual, self referential loop. Replace God with universe, and the universe is the self existent thing that produces contingencies that come and go.

Again, we have covered this. We've been talking about the inescapable necessity of a First Cause. You'll have to go back and trace the debate, I think, if you want to pick up the objections we've already dealt with. This is certainly one of the first we dispatched.