Humanist Ethics

[Immanuel Can]

Let's say that's true. Let me give you that in some circumstances, it will turn out to be an advantage to the "fit" to cooperate with the pack.

What about when it isn't?

So what are you saying?

Nothing anybody doesn't already know: that sometimes, being good is what you want to do, and sometimes, being bad pays better. That's why ethics are necessary.

[MikeNovack]

The proof is in the pudding. Darwinian "fitness" means reproductive fitness. The fittest prove their fitness by succeeding in leaving more descendants.

The "social darwinists" are using fittest/survival of the fittest to mean something entirely different.

[Immanuel Can]

The proof is in the pudding. Darwinian "fitness" means reproductive fitness. The fittest prove their fitness by succeeding in leaving more descendants.

The "social darwinists" are using fittest/survival of the fittest to mean something entirely different.

I thought you said you thought "fit" meant "rich"? Of course, it doesn't. It means "most likely to survive," and reproduction is bound to be part of that, since non-survivers don't procreate, but access to resources, triumph over threats, leadership authority...lots of other things are factored into any account of "fittest" in a social context. It's clearly not merely reproduction, although that is certainly implicated.

Social Darwinism is nothing other than the every general application of Darwinian dynamics to social interactions.

Here's Britannica on that:

"social Darwinism, the theory that human groups and races are subject to the same laws of natural selection as Charles Darwin perceived in plants and animals in nature. According to the theory, which was popular in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the weak were diminished and their cultures delimited while the strong grew in power and cultural influence over the weak. Social Darwinists held that the life of humans in society was a struggle for existence ruled by “survival of the fittest,” a phrase proposed by the British philosopher and scientist Herbert Spencer.

The social Darwinists—notably Spencer and Walter Bagehot in England and William Graham Sumner in the United States—believed that the process of natural selection acting on variations in the population would result in the survival of the best competitors and in continuing improvement in the population. Societies were viewed as organisms that evolve in this manner."

[phyllo]

Let's say that's true. Let me give you that in some circumstances, it will turn out to be an advantage to the "fit" to cooperate with the pack.

What about when it isn't?

So what are you saying?

Nothing anybody doesn't already know: that sometimes, being good is what you want to do, and sometimes, being bad pays better. That's why ethics are necessary.

Are humanists saying that ethics isn't necessary?

Seriously, who knows what you're going on about.

[Immanuel Can]

So what are you saying?

Nothing anybody doesn't already know: that sometimes, being good is what you want to do, and sometimes, being bad pays better. That's why ethics are necessary.

Are humanists saying that ethics isn't necessary?

Of course not. They know ethics are necessary. They just don't know how to ground or rationally defend any.

[phyllo]

Just endlessly repeating your nonsense doesn't make it true.

[Immanuel Can]

Just endlessly repeating your nonsense doesn't make it true.

Oh? You think they can ground their ethics?

Great! Go right ahead and explain how they manage that.

[phyllo]

Just endlessly repeating your nonsense doesn't make it true.

Oh? You think they can ground their ethics?

Great! Go right ahead and explain how they manage that.

That's what I've been doing for 11 pages now.

And mostly, you give trivial rejections in response.

Why don't you tell us what you would consider a legitimate 'grounding of ethics'.

[Immanuel Can]

Just endlessly repeating your nonsense doesn't make it true.

Oh? You think they can ground their ethics?

Great! Go right ahead and explain how they manage that.

That's what I've been doing for 11 pages now.

Then I guess you haven't understood the task. It's to answer the question, "Why?"

I think we can agree that any supposed "ethic" that yields no answers at all about moral matters isn't really an "ethic" at all. And one that does is a candidate for the right ethic, at least.

So let us test: precisely why is it wrong for a Humanist to own a slave? Or, on the other hand, if it's right for a Humanist to do so, precisely why is that?

[phyllo]

Oh? You think they can ground their ethics?

Great! Go right ahead and explain how they manage that.

That's what I've been doing for 11 pages now.

Then I guess you haven't understood the task. It's to answer the question, "Why?"

I think we can agree that any supposed "ethic" that yields no answers at all about moral matters isn't really an "ethic" at all. And one that does is a candidate for the right ethic, at least.

So let us test: precisely why is it wrong for a Humanist to own a slave? Or, on the other hand, if it's right for a Humanist to do so, precisely why is that?

Thanks for that 'nothing' reply.

What's the legitimate grounding of the answer to "Why?"?

[Immanuel Can]

That's what I've been doing for 11 pages now.

Then I guess you haven't understood the task. It's to answer the question, "Why?"

I think we can agree that any supposed "ethic" that yields no answers at all about moral matters isn't really an "ethic" at all. And one that does is a candidate for the right ethic, at least.

So let us test: precisely why is it wrong for a Humanist to own a slave? Or, on the other hand, if it's right for a Humanist to do so, precisely why is that?

Thanks for that 'nothing' reply.

So you can't do the test? You can't answer even one simple question about Humanist ethics? Really?

Then on what basis do we call what Humanists are doing "ethics" at all? It can't even answer the most simple moral dilemma for us. And surely there's little more obvious, in conventional moralizing anyway, than that slavery is wrong -- most of us in the West will intuitively recognize it, even if it remains dubious in the rest of the world.

If it can't teach us even that, what can Humanist ethics teach us?

[Iwannaplato]

Then I guess you haven't understood the task. It's to answer the question, "Why?"

I think we can agree that any supposed "ethic" that yields no answers at all about moral matters isn't really an "ethic" at all. And one that does is a candidate for the right ethic, at least.

So let us test: precisely why is it wrong for a Humanist to own a slave? Or, on the other hand, if it's right for a Humanist to do so, precisely why is that?

Thanks for that 'nothing' reply.

So you can't do the test? You can't answer even one simple question about Humanist ethics? Really?

Then on what basis do we call what Humanists are doing "ethics" at all? It can't even answer the most simple moral dilemma for us. And surely there's little more obvious, in conventional moralizing anyway, than that slavery is wrong -- most of us in the West will intuitively recognize it, even if it remains dubious in the rest of the world.

If it can't teach us even that, what can Humanist ethics teach us?

Love the way you left out his clarifying question (and obviously then did not answer it). Then moved from Phyllo's opting not to do something at a specific juncture in a specific conversation with a specific person, you, to the conclusion that this demonstrates Humanism cannot answer your question.

doesn't ----> can't
one person in a specific part of a longer dialogue doesn't ----> humanism can't

Show us how the Christian shows to another Christian it is wrong to own a slave? You can do it in the Slavery thread, since it would be more on topic there.

[Immanuel Can]

Thanks for that 'nothing' reply.

So you can't do the test? You can't answer even one simple question about Humanist ethics? Really?

Then on what basis do we call what Humanists are doing "ethics" at all? It can't even answer the most simple moral dilemma for us. And surely there's little more obvious, in conventional moralizing anyway, than that slavery is wrong -- most of us in the West will intuitively recognize it, even if it remains dubious in the rest of the world.

If it can't teach us even that, what can Humanist ethics teach us?

doesn't ----> can't
one person in a specific part of a longer dialogue doesn't ----> humanism can't

Great! You think that's unfair. So you must be assuming YOU can. You must believe Humanism has some kind of defense, and he's merely choosing not to offer it, but that he could.

I don't mind if you answer, or if he does. I'll take anybody's answer.

Go ahead.

But if you can't, and he can't...then how do you have any reason to think ANYBODY can defend Humanist ethics logically?

P.S. -- Of course I'm ignoring the et tu quoque fallacy. None of that will help out Humanism, if Humanism can't do it. So it's irrelevant for the present question. I'll be happy to get to it later, if I can ever get a recognition out of you that Humanism is incoherent on its own terms.

[Iwannaplato]

viewtopic.php?p=802371#p802371

[Immanuel Can]

viewtopic.php?p=802371#p802371

Yep. See the same answer there.