compatibilism

[phyllo]

No, just everybody who thinks they can be a Compatibilist. That's a really dumb thing. It shows they have no grasp of either position they claim to "compatiblize," and no grasp of logic.

So yeah, that's super stupid.

Or you are the one who has no grasp of the positions or the logic.

[Flannel Jesus]

I gotta stop getting tempted to feed that troll haha. This post itself is probably feeding him. Whoops.

[Immanuel Can]

No, just everybody who thinks they can be a Compatibilist. That's a really dumb thing. It shows they have no grasp of either position they claim to "compatiblize," and no grasp of logic.

So yeah, that's super stupid.

Or you are the one who has no grasp of the positions or the logic.

Good. So let's see which it really is.

Let's see if anybody can explain the actual mechanics of how something can be 100% predetermined, and also be free.

[Alexiev]

When Martin Luther said, "Here I stand and I can do no other" was it his free choice to stand thus?

Yes. Of course.

He was constrained, of course, by his faith, and said that he "could do no other".

He was not saying he had no other choice. He was only saying "My conscience is captive to the word of God! To go against conscience is neither right nor safe. I therefore cannot, and I will not recant!" (his words) In other words, he was declaring his personal choice of honouring the will of God over and against the demands of the Papacy, and over and against even the threat of death. He was obviously not saying, "I can't recant, because I have been predetermined by material forces to do only this," which is what Determinism would require.

This is clearly incorrect. "I can do no other" clearly states that Luther could not make another choice. Did he mean what he said (or what, acc. to MacCulloch, he didn't say)? I have no idea. But I know what "I can do no other" means in standard English. It means that given the circumstances, he could not possibly make another choice. Other possible choices were available, but it was impossible for him to choose them. Nonetheless, his choice was "free" (unconstrained by others).

[Immanuel Can]

When Martin Luther said, "Here I stand and I can do no other" was it his free choice to stand thus?

Yes. Of course.

He was constrained, of course, by his faith, and said that he "could do no other".

He was not saying he had no other choice. He was only saying "My conscience is captive to the word of God! To go against conscience is neither right nor safe. I therefore cannot, and I will not recant!" (his words) In other words, he was declaring his personal choice of honouring the will of God over and against the demands of the Papacy, and over and against even the threat of death. He was obviously not saying, "I can't recant, because I have been predetermined by material forces to do only this," which is what Determinism would require.

This is clearly incorrect. "I can do no other" clearly states that Luther could not make another choice.

No, that's clearly not the case. Nobody in that room thought that's what he meant. If he had, the Pope could not have condemned him; for how can you condemn somebody for doing what they could not help doing? And the Pope himself...having no volition at all, but only being predetermined by material conditions, would also have had no choice whether or not to condemn Luther. It would have all been set since the Big Bang -- so how could the Pope have asked him to recant?

[Flannel Jesus]

Oh, this is a thinking error babies make. They don't realize that just beause person A thinks or knows something, that person B might think something entirely different. The pope's propensity to hold people responsible would only be based on the pope's beliefs, not Luther's beliefs - but you'd have to be more mentally mature than a literal infant to understand that.

[Alexiev]

Yes. Of course.

He was not saying he had no other choice. He was only saying "My conscience is captive to the word of God! To go against conscience is neither right nor safe. I therefore cannot, and I will not recant!" (his words) In other words, he was declaring his personal choice of honouring the will of God over and against the demands of the Papacy, and over and against even the threat of death. He was obviously not saying, "I can't recant, because I have been predetermined by material forces to do only this," which is what Determinism would require.

This is clearly incorrect. "I can do no other" clearly states that Luther could not make another choice.

No, that's clearly not the case. Nobody in that room thought that's what he meant. If he had, the Pope could not have condemned him; for how can you condemn somebody for doing what they could not help doing? And the Pope himself...having no volition at all, but only being predetermined by material conditions, would also have had no choice whether or not to condemn Luther. It would have all been set since the Big Bang -- so how could the Pope have asked him to recant?

Your conclusions do not follow from your premises. Of course you can condemn someone for doing something when he "can do no other". Why couldn't you? The pope might have been constrained by the facts of the case to find Luther guilty. He was constrained by his faith and by the facts, but he was "free" in that he was not "constrained by external parties". Therefore, by definition, his choice, like Luther's, was freely made.

[Age]

Sorry I meant to ask does doing philosophy help you to confirm or progress ideas or are you mentally immobile with the same ideas.

1. 'I' do NOT 'do philosophy'. 'Philosophy', to me, is some one has, or does not have, and/or is some thing one is showing, or is not showing.

2. I do not present ideas, here, which I am unable to back up with IRREFUTABLE PROOF.

3. When 'i' am CLOSED, then 'i' am mentally immobile with some idea/s.

4. Are there any 'same ideas' that you think or believe 'I' have, here?

5. If yes, then what are they, exactly?

I see what you mean. You and I disagree about the meaning of 'philosophy'.

You are not the only one who thinks philosophy is what you say it is.

It would be nice, though, if you could understand that what philosophy means for some others is that it's an academic discipline with worthwhile practical applications.

What do you mean by if I could understand that what 'philosophy' means for some others is that it is an academic discipline with worthwhile practical applications?

I ALREADY KNEW that to some others 'philosophy' is an academic discipline with worthwhile practical applications.

I ALSO ALREADY KNEW this BECAUSE some human beings pay exorbitant amounts of money to some academic institutions to do what is called 'philosophy classes' or 'philosophy studies'. And, I would hope that they would pay so much money 'there', which could have, obviously, been far better spent in other places, BECAUSE they BELIEVED, or KNEW, that the so-called 'academic discipline' known as 'philosophy' had worthwhile practical applications.

In other words I would hope that they did not choose to do that 'academic discipline' for other reasons because they felt that they had to 'study' some thing just to keep other like their parents happy, for example.

WHY would you have even BEGUN to PRESUME that I could NOT understand that what 'philosophy' means to some is that 'philosophy' is an academic discipline, with worthwhile practical applications?

I ALREADY UNDERSTOOD, and for a while now, that 'philosophy' is an academic discipline, with worthwhile practical applications, to some.

[Immanuel Can]

This is clearly incorrect. "I can do no other" clearly states that Luther could not make another choice.

No, that's clearly not the case. Nobody in that room thought that's what he meant. If he had, the Pope could not have condemned him; for how can you condemn somebody for doing what they could not help doing? And the Pope himself...having no volition at all, but only being predetermined by material conditions, would also have had no choice whether or not to condemn Luther. It would have all been set since the Big Bang -- so how could the Pope have asked him to recant?

Your conclusions do not follow from your premises. Of course you can condemn someone for doing something when he "can do no other".

Actually, consensus among moral philosophers and logicians suggests you cannot. And so does common sense. As Kant put it, "ought implies can." If you do something, you can't ought-to-have-done it." And if you can't not-do something, then there's no possibility of you being blamed for having done it.

The pope might have been constrained by the facts of the case to find Luther guilty.

Only a free agent can be "constrained by facts." Otherwise, he's "constrained by chemical processes," or "constrained by material chains," and the reasons don't change anything. That would be Determinism.

Your problem is that there are two senses of "constrained." One means, "forced into," and the other means, "convinced by burden of the evidence." You've mixed the two, and thus you've completely missed Luther's meaning. The Pope was trying to force him to recant; but Luther was not saying, "I cannot form the words to recant." He certainly could have. Lots of people before him did -- especially under the threat of Inquisitorial torture, which was what hung over Luther's head." No, what Luther was saying was, essentially, "I could frame the words, but I will not." And that would be free will. But nowhere is Determinism apparent in that. So it's no illustration of Compatiblism.

[Age]

No, that's clearly not the case. Nobody in that room thought that's what he meant. If he had, the Pope could not have condemned him; for how can you condemn somebody for doing what they could not help doing? And the Pope himself...having no volition at all, but only being predetermined by material conditions, would also have had no choice whether or not to condemn Luther. It would have all been set since the Big Bang -- so how could the Pope have asked him to recant?

Your conclusions do not follow from your premises. Of course you can condemn someone for doing something when he "can do no other".

Actually, consensus among moral philosophers and logicians suggests you cannot. And so does common sense. As Kant put it, "ought implies can." If you do something, you can't ought-to-have-done it." And if you can't not-do something, then there's no possibility of you being blamed for having done it.

What can been seen here, again, is the word 'consensus' is used when one thinks or believes that using that word will 'work' for them and/or in their favor, but the 'consensus' word will be rejected when one thinks or believes that by using that word will 'work' for or in the favor of 'the other' and/or 'their position'.

The pope might have been constrained by the facts of the case to find Luther guilty.

Only a free agent can be "constrained by facts." Otherwise, he's "constrained by chemical processes," or "constrained by material chains," and the reasons don't change anything. That would be Determinism.

Your problem is that there are two senses of "constrained." One means, "forced into," and the other means, "convinced by burden of the evidence." You've mixed the two, and thus you've completely missed Luther's meaning. The Pope was trying to force him to recant; but Luther was not saying, "I cannot form the words to recant." He certainly could have. Lots of people before him did -- especially under the threat of Inquisitorial torture, which was what hung over Luther's head." No, what Luther was saying was, essentially, "I could frame the words, but I will not." And that would be free will. But nowhere is Determinism apparent in that. So it's no illustration of Compatiblism.

What can be seen here is that when these people in the days when this was being written had A BELIEF, then just very simple things like 'free will', 'determinism' and/or 'compatiblism' there would be disagreement, and, in turn, "a side" or 'a position' picked or chosen, which was then fought for.

There was, OBVIOUSLY, NO 'either/or' "side" nor 'position' here, but because these ones were HOLDING DISTORTED BELIEFS they ended up BELIEVING, ABSOLUTELY, that there was some "side" and/or 'position' here, to take, and, literally, 'to keep'.

[Alexiev]

Your problem is that there are two senses of "constrained." One means, "forced into," and the other means, "convinced by burden of the evidence." You've mixed the two, and thus you've completely missed Luther's meaning. The Pope was trying to force him to recant; but Luther was not saying, "I cannot form the words to recant." He certainly could have. Lots of people before him did -- especially under the threat of Inquisitorial torture, which was what hung over Luther's head." No, what Luther was saying was, essentially, "I could frame the words, but I will not." And that would be free will. But nowhere is Determinism apparent in that. So it's no illustration of Compatiblism.

If ought implies can, Martin Luther (according to his famous quote) was not making a moral decision, because he "could do no other".

Yet I think he was freely making a moral choice, constrained not by external parties, but by his own faith and conscience. We are all so constrained, but that does not make our choices less "free". The evidence "causes" (forces) us to make particular choices, as does our biology, our education, and our culture. So, in that sense, these things are "causally deterministic". The "burden of the evidence" can force a decision (given rationality, and "beyond a reasonable doubt"). Why does that not constitute a "cause"?

p.s. It's a matter of perspective. Although a choice (like Luther's) may be constrained by facts, the temperament or training of the chooser, etc. etc., they can still be described as "free choices", because it SEEMS that some other course of action could have been taken. In this respect, the freedom of choice resembles the gambler guessing whether the ace of spades will be dealt. It seems to him there is a 1/52 chance, although, of course, the order of the deck is predetermined. The phrase "freedom oi choice" refers to this non-omniscient perspective. An omniscient God knows what choices we will make, so there is no possibility of our "doing other". But that doesn't make the choice less free, or less of a choice.

[Belinda]

Unrelated to your conversations with Age, I'm curious what your thoughts are on free will and compatibilism.

Thank you FJ. Absolute free will does not exist, neither anatomically nor supernaturally, so absolute free will can't be compatible with anything.

Thank you for your reply.

What would qualify it as 'absolute'? And what about non-absolute free will? Can non-absolute free will be compatible with determinism, or anything else?

I don't think there is any non-absolute free will either. I think that 'free will' is a confusing expression . Much better to ask how people and/or other animals decide what to do next. Or maybe simply ask how free we are.

[Flannel Jesus]

Thank you FJ. Absolute free will does not exist, neither anatomically nor supernaturally, so absolute free will can't be compatible with anything.

Thank you for your reply.

What would qualify it as 'absolute'? And what about non-absolute free will? Can non-absolute free will be compatible with determinism, or anything else?

I don't think there is any non-absolute free will either. I think that 'free will' is a confusing expression . Much better to ask how people and/or other animals decide what to do next. Or maybe simply ask how free we are.

OK fair enough, thanks for your perspective.

[Belinda]

1. 'I' do NOT 'do philosophy'. 'Philosophy', to me, is some one has, or does not have, and/or is some thing one is showing, or is not showing.

2. I do not present ideas, here, which I am unable to back up with IRREFUTABLE PROOF.

3. When 'i' am CLOSED, then 'i' am mentally immobile with some idea/s.

4. Are there any 'same ideas' that you think or believe 'I' have, here?

5. If yes, then what are they, exactly?

I see what you mean. You and I disagree about the meaning of 'philosophy'.

You are not the only one who thinks philosophy is what you say it is.

It would be nice, though, if you could understand that what philosophy means for some others is that it's an academic discipline with worthwhile practical applications.

What do you mean by if I could understand that what 'philosophy' means for some others is that it is an academic discipline with worthwhile practical applications?

I ALREADY KNEW that to some others 'philosophy' is an academic discipline with worthwhile practical applications.

I ALSO ALREADY KNEW this BECAUSE some human beings pay exorbitant amounts of money to some academic institutions to do what is called 'philosophy classes' or 'philosophy studies'. And, I would hope that they would pay so much money 'there', which could have, obviously, been far better spent in other places, BECAUSE they BELIEVED, or KNEW, that the so-called 'academic discipline' known as 'philosophy' had worthwhile practical applications.

In other words I would hope that they did not choose to do that 'academic discipline' for other reasons because they felt that they had to 'study' some thing just to keep other like their parents happy, for example.

WHY would you have even BEGUN to PRESUME that I could NOT understand that what 'philosophy' means to some is that 'philosophy' is an academic discipline, with worthwhile practical applications?

I ALREADY UNDERSTOOD, and for a while now, that 'philosophy' is an academic discipline, with worthwhile practical applications, to some.

But what you mean by 'philosophy' and what most others mean by 'philosophy' are so different that discussions are at cross purposes.

[Immanuel Can]

Your problem is that there are two senses of "constrained." One means, "forced into," and the other means, "convinced by burden of the evidence." You've mixed the two, and thus you've completely missed Luther's meaning. The Pope was trying to force him to recant; but Luther was not saying, "I cannot form the words to recant." He certainly could have. Lots of people before him did -- especially under the threat of Inquisitorial torture, which was what hung over Luther's head." No, what Luther was saying was, essentially, "I could frame the words, but I will not." And that would be free will. But nowhere is Determinism apparent in that. So it's no illustration of Compatiblism.

If ought implies can, Martin Luther (according to his famous quote) was not making a moral decision, because he "could do no other".

That would be the case, if Determinism were true. And moreover, there would be no such thing as a "moral decision" for anybody -- not just for Luther.

Good thing it's not true.

Yet I think he was freely making a moral choice,...

Then you're not a Determinist...or a Compatibilist.