Alexiev wrote: ↑Wed Oct 09, 2024 4:38 pm
If the choice the individual will make is "determined" (i.e. caused) by his neurons, that does not make it less free.
That depends, completely. If all we mean is that his "neurons" are triggered not by his decision at all, but rather by pre-existing causes, such as material, chemical or physical causes, then it's not free. It's constrained by the physical precursors.
Of course everyone's choices are determined by how and what he or she thinks.
That's not the meaning of "Determinism." Determinism says that "what you think" is irrelevant, completely. Your feeling that you are making a choice is a mere "seeming," and is not at all determinative of what happens or of what you do.
But if we say Joe freely chose to go to the store yesterday, the sentence is coherent and meaningful, even though Joe can no longer choose a different option. This is obvious.
Yes, but it's also trivial, and unrelated to Determinism. That the sentence is coherent doesn't show that it's true. "I rode my unicorn here" is a coherent sentence. It's also clearly false.
Moreover, that Joe cannot choose something different AFTER the course has been set (either by Determinism or choice) is something neither Determinists nor free willians debate at all. What they debate is how Joe made the decision in the first place -- whether as predetermined by prior causes, or as an expression of his personal agency and will.
Of course people have reasons (causes) for making the decisions they make. So what?
Reasons and causes are opposite explanations. A "reason" implies free will, and reducing that to a mere "cause" implies Determinism. They cannot both be true, because Determinism aims at a singular, absolute explanation for every human action, in terms of prior causes. So volition or will, which is what reason would implicate, can play no causal role in a Deterministic account.
When Martin Luther said, "Here I stand and I can do no other" was it his free choice to stand thus?
Yes. Of course.
He was constrained, of course, by his faith, and said that he "could do no other".
He was not saying
he had no other choice. He was only saying
"My conscience is captive to the word of God! To go against conscience is neither right nor safe. I therefore cannot, and I will not recant!" (his words) In other words, he was
declaring his personal choice of honouring the will of God over and against the demands of the Papacy, and over and against even the threat of death. He was obviously not saying, "I can't recant, because I have been predetermined by material forces to do only this," which is what Determinism would require.