compatibilism

[Atla]

You said compatibilsm was listed as an alternative to determinism and free will. That's literally not what that list you just posted says.

It is a view on free will, not an alternative to free will. And determinism isn't even an option on there. Believe it or not, "no free will" isn't a synonym for determinism. You can believe there's no free will and also not believe in determinism, and also you can believe that the universe is deterministic and believe in free will (that's called Compatibilism).

So no, it's not an alternative to free will and determinism. It's a position about free will and its relationship to determinism. That's what you got wrong.

Then it would be even more nonsensical - the options have like little to nothing to do with each other. What's your favourite animal: animal, or the sun, or the idea that friendship is compatible with life?

Libertarianism is *also* a position about free will and its relationship to determinism - specifically, there is free will, and determinism must be false. Compatibilism is, there is free will, and determinism doesn't have to be false. You regularly speak as if 'libertarian free will' is a synonym for 'free will', and it's a big reason why you're misinterpreting the options.

Libertarian free will IS a synonym for free will. You're the one who pretends it isn't.

[Flannel Jesus]

Libertarian free will IS a synonym for free will. You're the one who pretends it isn't.

Okay, well then I guess that solves this thread for you. You've cracked it, you get the big prize

so for the rest of us for which libertarian free will *isn't* a synonym for free will, we'll continue without you.

[Atla]

Libertarian free will IS a synonym for free will. You're the one who pretends it isn't.

Okay, well then I guess that solves this thread for you. You've cracked it, you get the big prize

so for the rest of us for which libertarian free will *isn't* a synonym for free will, we'll continue without you.

Sure, continue with your sophistry.

[Immanuel Can]

Compatibilism is, there is free will, and determinism doesn't have to be false.

Easy to say. Far too easy. And Compatiblists say it. But do they have any justification in saying it?

Exactly how is it possible to make sense of that claim? It doesn't become true just because they say it, obviously. So maybe you can make sense of it for us: show us that free will can exist while Determinism isn't thereby made false. For any ordinary usage would imply that's impossible.

[Flannel Jesus]

Compatibilism is, there is free will, and determinism doesn't have to be false.

Easy to say. Far too easy. And Compatiblists say it. But do they have any justification in saying it?

Exactly how is it possible to make sense of that claim? It doesn't become true just because they say it, obviously. So maybe you can make sense of it for us: show us that free will can exist while Determinism isn't thereby made false. For any ordinary usage would imply that's impossible.

Once again you butt yourself into a conversation about *the meaning of options* and start demanding I make sense of it for you.

It's okay if it doesn't make sense to you. I offered to show you why I think what I think, the first time you acted like a complete buffoon and said "no! proof, now!" as if you're entirely allergic to conversation and talking things through, and you only speak in syllogisms. The second time, I got one post into my train of thought and you lost interest.

It already makes sense to Atla, he just calls that thing that makes sense "non-philosophical free will". He has a concept of free will, he uses that concept to justify the idea of holding people respondible, he believes that concept is compatible with determinism - he just doesn't realize that's literally what compatibilists are doing. He thinks he's doing something smarter somehow.

[Belinda]

Thanks for your thoughtful , serious, and interesting reply

You're welcome, B.

he was also a real historical person.

Yes, I'm sure Lewis would agree.

Christianity itself arose mostly from its roots in Jewish culture especially since the ideas of the Old Testament Prophets.

Here, Lewis might not agree. He would concede what you say is true but point out, mebbe, this is the circumstance into which God chose to interpose Himself. He, Lewis, might say Christianity itself was not the product of its time but was and is God's counter to that time and this time too.

Puddlegum's speech quoted by yourself fits my idea of how people need to personify their aspirations. Even if JC, or Aslan if preferred, did not exist we would need to invent him. All I ask is that the moral code as laid down by JC in the Sermon on the Mount is attended to, and that Aslan ,or JC, not a magical fairy godmother but who said the good life was a dangerous fight against fearful odds.

Myself, I prefer, even as a non-Christian, to take Lewis's work as it is. And as it is is as Lewis described: Aslan is Christ, the second person of the trinity. And upon that narrative fact all the Narnia tales rest.

“Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and one’s foes will be members of one’s own household” (Matthew 10:34-36).

Yes, despite being an observant jew, he was quite willing to upset the applecart, wasn't he?

If "the applecart" is the Roman Empire, I don't think Jesus would have attempted such a monumental task. There is a theory that Jesus was in cahoots with the Jewish freedom fighters, but I think what Jesus meant by bringing a sword is that living the good life hard work and involves big sacrifices.

[Atla]

Compatibilist Reinterpretation?

Compatibilists argue that free will can exist even if determinism is true. Their conception of free will is often defined in terms of the ability to act according to one's own desires and rational deliberations, without external coercion or compulsion. In this sense, compatibilists focus on freedom as voluntariness and authentic self-expression, rather than absolute metaphysical freedom to have acted otherwise in an identical situation.

This has led some critics, especially incompatibilists (both libertarians and hard determinists), to argue that compatibilists have shifted or "watered down" the original concept of free will. They claim that the original or traditional notion of free will involves a robust form of freedom, which includes the genuine ability to do otherwise—often called the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). According to this view, if an agent could not have chosen differently in an identical situation, then they do not have "free will" in the full sense.

It's okay if you water down a concept, but then don't present it as an option in the original debate, because it isn't.

[phyllo]

They claim that the original or traditional notion of free will involves a robust form of freedom, which includes the genuine ability to do otherwise—often called the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). According to this view, if an agent could not have chosen differently in an identical situation, then they do not have "free will" in the full sense.

Nobody has this sort of free-will. Not even the free-willers.

In the same situation, they are going to make the same choice. They are not going to choose differently because they have no reason to choose differently.

Let's say that exactly the same situation exists twice and the free-willer selects a different option each time.

Which choice represented the will of the person? How can they have two different wills in the same situation? One of the choices must be the preferred option.

[phyllo]

If "the applecart" is the Roman Empire, I don't think Jesus would have attempted such a monumental task. There is a theory that Jesus was in cahoots with the Jewish freedom fighters, but I think what Jesus meant by bringing a sword is that living the good life hard work and involves big sacrifices.

It means that what he is proposing goes against the conventional wisdom and the standards of society.

Some people are going to disagree. They are going to uphold the standard and they are going to be in conflict with Jesus and his followers. That includes members of your own family.

[Flannel Jesus]

They claim that the original or traditional notion of free will involves a robust form of freedom, which includes the genuine ability to do otherwise—often called the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). According to this view, if an agent could not have chosen differently in an identical situation, then they do not have "free will" in the full sense.

Nobody has this sort of free-will. Not even the free-willers.

In the same situation, they are going to make the same choice. They are not going to choose differently because they have no reason to choose differently.

Let's say that exactly the same situation exists twice and the free-willer selects a different option each time.

Which choice represented the will of the person? How can they have two different wills in the same situation? One of the choices must be the preferred option.

I think the wording is kind of weird - do you include the full state of the "will" or agent in question when you say "situation"? I assume you would, but the wording leaves that ambiguous. If you don't include the full state of the agent, then even if determinism is true, as long as a slightly changed agent is in that identical situation, a different decision could happen.

But if the state of the agent is included then yeah, I agree with what you're saying here.

[Atla]

They claim that the original or traditional notion of free will involves a robust form of freedom, which includes the genuine ability to do otherwise—often called the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). According to this view, if an agent could not have chosen differently in an identical situation, then they do not have "free will" in the full sense.

Nobody has this sort of free-will. Not even the free-willers.

In the same situation, they are going to make the same choice. They are not going to choose differently because they have no reason to choose differently.

Let's say that exactly the same situation exists twice and the free-willer selects a different option each time.

Which choice represented the will of the person? How can they have two different wills in the same situation? One of the choices must be the preferred option.

Doesn't matter what our take is, point is this is what "the" free will debate is about.

[phyllo]

Why would the agent be different?

If the situation is the same, then the agent must be the same.

[phyllo]

Doesn't matter what our take is, point is this is what "the" free will debate is about.

I guess that only your take matters.

[Flannel Jesus]

Why would the agent be different?

If the situation is the same, then the agent must be the same.

That would be my natural understanding, but I can imagine that some people would separate "situation" from "the agent in that situation" and leave a sliver of room for some confusion there.

[Atla]

Doesn't matter what our take is, point is this is what "the" free will debate is about.

I guess that only your take matters.

We can use your take too. Well since now words can mean anyth fshlfj asdfjsd fgsdlkfj sdjklfjsdlkf sdljflsdjf.