Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Jul 02, 2023 7:25 pm
I agree with nearly everything you say.
Ah, Peter again.
Have you got a solution to the Frege-Geach "boo" problem? I haven't seen one, or even an answer...
Hello, Peter?
From your continued reticence, I can only take it that you've no answer to the Frege-Geach problem. In which case, I think you've got a serious problem for describing morality as "subjective." And that is, that if you go for that, you're unable to describe morality at all...at least, not in any coherent terms that would fit anything that most people associate with morality.
Is that right? Or do you have a syllogism to offer? Just asking, before deciding. If you've got it, I'd sure be interested in seeing it.
I posted this sometime ago. No response from PH then.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jul 03, 2023 2:27 am
Hello, Peter?
From your continued reticence, I can only take it that you've no answer to the Frege-Geach problem.
This is not my area, as you probably know, but I watched a video about this "Frege-Geach Problem ", and it seems to me that it only highlights a problem with language, and doesn't do anything to reveal any truth about morality, or what right and wrong are.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jul 03, 2023 2:27 am
Hello, Peter?
From your continued reticence, I can only take it that you've no answer to the Frege-Geach problem.
This is not my area, as you probably know, but I watched a video about this "Frege-Geach Problem ", and it seems to me that it only highlights a problem with language, and doesn't do anything to reveal any truth about morality, or what right and wrong are.
Sorry - been a bit tied up of late.
I agree with Harbal. Mistaking what we say for the way things are was part of Frege's original (and important) 'turn to language' - which the later Wittgenstein realised.
I need to spend more time on the supposed Frege-Geach problem, to work out exactly where it goes wrong. But I'm pretty sure that 'meaning is use' and 'logic deals with language, not reality' will be at the heart of it.
Just a teaser, though. Does it make sense to say that the assertion 'X is beautiful' has a truth-value, and if so, why? For example, what could falsify it?
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jul 03, 2023 2:27 am
Hello, Peter?
From your continued reticence, I can only take it that you've no answer to the Frege-Geach problem.
This is not my area, as you probably know, but I watched a video about this "Frege-Geach Problem ", and it seems to me that it only highlights a problem with language, and doesn't do anything to reveal any truth about morality, or what right and wrong are.
It is an extremely technical problem, but it only applicable if you believe that the semantic content of the phrase "it was wrong of you to steal that money" is identical to the semantic content of "you stole that money" accompanied by a frown*. They have to be fully interchangeable because the second is the actual meaning of the first. That interchangeability is the Frege part of FG. The sematic indentity between the moral statement that expresses a cognisable proposition and an underlying "true meaning" of itself isn't cognisable is required for the FG to have anything to do Fregean substitutions to.
Pete has never expressed a non cognitivist argument once that I have read. Me and IWP at least have been curous once or twice as to what his active theory would be, but his position appears to be that he doesn't need an active theory. He's been sat there for years challenging people to show how a collection of factual premises could imply a moral conclusion (which is another way of stating the is-ought problem) and nobody has passed that test, I belive he takes the view that he doesn't need anything more than this for his streamlined purposes.
* That's from Ayer, which is one of the more prominent branches of the ol' non-cog tree. In his version of NC the cognisable statement (the truth apt part) is a mirage and underneath we are just expressing emotions which are not the product of nor the inputs for truth apt statements. Alternative non cognitivist theories exist, but for this purpose they all do that same sort of switcheroo with the meanings. Which is the absolutely only reason Frege-Geach is a problem for any of them.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jul 03, 2023 9:55 am
I need to spend more time on the supposed Frege-Geach problem, to work out exactly where it goes wrong. But I'm pretty sure that 'meaning is use' and 'logic deals with language, not reality' will be at the heart of it.
Do you remember when Vagina Aqualung went through that phase of calling us 'bastard logical-positivists'? That happened because he read about the LP influence on moral philosophy. Non-congitivism via A.J.Ayer (simple version) and Carnap (more of a rumour than a theory) is the thing he was failing to understand that week.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jun 23, 2023 4:45 pm
cognitivism and non-cognitivism -- Peter Holmes' view fitting into the latter category.
Is he a non-cognitivist? He doesn't strike me as any such thing.
How may times does Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes have to repeat that moral claims have no truth-value; or reject the truthfulness of the premise "Murder is wrong" before he strikes you as a non-cognitivist?
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jun 23, 2023 4:45 pm
cognitivism and non-cognitivism -- Peter Holmes' view fitting into the latter category.
Is he a non-cognitivist? He doesn't strike me as any such thing.
How may times does Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes have to repeat that moral claims have no truth-value; or reject the truthfulness of the premise "Murder is wrong" before he strikes you as a non-cognitivist?
You don't understand the issue any better than VA or IC does. Non-cognitivists are just one among the multiple sets of people who dispute those things. It would be like labelling mister Can a muslim on the grounds that he believes in a single God and Muslims are people who believe there is one and only on God.
You would need to get Pete to commit to a position on why there is no truth value here and he would have to base his answer on the claim that moral language simply represents emotions or something non cognisable of that general type in order for Pete to be an actual non-cog rather than any other type of moral skeptic. And the Frege-Geach problem only applies to Non-cogs among all those groups.
This shit shouldn't take you fucks this long to get to grips with, it's simple stuff.
Yes yes. It's always your understanding that's "right" and everybody else's understanding that's "wrong".
You genuinely don't understand this issue.
Of course. As I already pointed out - the only "genuine" understanding on this issue (or any other) is yours.
That's why philosophers (you included) are idiots. Beyond a self-congratulatory circle-jerk you can't actually ground anyting. Not even your own (mis?)understanding.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jul 03, 2023 2:27 am
Hello, Peter?
From your continued reticence, I can only take it that you've no answer to the Frege-Geach problem.
This is not my area, as you probably know, but I watched a video about this "Frege-Geach Problem ", and it seems to me that it only highlights a problem with language, and doesn't do anything to reveal any truth about morality, or what right and wrong are.
It is an extremely technical problem, but it only applicable if you believe that the semantic content of the phrase "it was wrong of you to steal that money" is identical to the semantic content of "you stole that money" accompanied by a frown*. They have to be fully interchangeable because the second is the actual meaning of the first. That interchangeability is the Frege part of FG. The sematic indentity between the moral statement that expresses a cognisable proposition and an underlying "true meaning" of itself isn't cognisable is required for the FG to have anything to do Fregean substitutions to.
Pete has never expressed a non cognitivist argument once that I have read. Me and IWP at least have been curous once or twice as to what his active theory would be, but his position appears to be that he doesn't need an active theory. He's been sat there for years challenging people to show how a collection of factual premises could imply a moral conclusion (which is another way of stating the is-ought problem) and nobody has passed that test, I belive he takes the view that he doesn't need anything more than this for his streamlined purposes.
* That's from Ayer, which is one of the more prominent branches of the ol' non-cog tree. In his version of NC the cognisable statement (the truth apt part) is a mirage and underneath we are just expressing emotions which are not the product of nor the inputs for truth apt statements. Alternative non cognitivist theories exist, but for this purpose they all do that same sort of switcheroo with the meanings. Which is the absolutely only reason Frege-Geach is a problem for any of them.
I don't see how any of this philosophical gymnastics establishes anything about morality and moral values. The terms right or wrong only have meaning within a specific context, or set of conditions. So the statement, killing is wrong, on its own has no truth value. A certain type of killing is legally wrong, because it contravenes a particular criminal law. If that law were abolished, then that form of killing would no longer be wrong in a legal context. So when someone says, such and such a killing is wrong, we can reach for a law book and confirm it, but we can only confirm that it is wrong in relation to a specific set of rules. We can't do that with moral right and wrong, because there is no rule book to measure them against. Anyone could write such a book, of course, but it wouldn't have any authority behind it, like crininal law does. So when anyone says that something is morally wrong, it is only wrong according to that person's own moral rule book, but it might not be wrong according to yours or mine.
, but I watched a video about this "Frege-Geach Problem ", and it seems to me that it only highlights a problem with language, and doesn't do anything to reveal any truth about morality, or what right and wrong are.
