Christian Morality

[Immanuel Can]

There is no Christian morality there is but human morality for morality is a human extension and more properly should be based upon our common biology our common well-being.

But as Hume pointed out, there is nothing that biology "says" morally. I has nothing to offer that equation. And "well-being" is not a fixed thing: it means different things for girl scouts, heroin addicts and serial killers.

Hume was wrong,

Consensus is that he wasn't. His is-ought problem remains unresolved.

If you're unfamiliar with it, how about this article from a past issue of PN? https://philosophynow.org/issues/99/Thoughts_on_Oughts

(It also contains the quotation you asked for, I might add.)

[Peter Holmes]

Hume was wrong,

Consensus is that he wasn't. His is-ought problem remains unresolved.

Agreed - but we don't need to appeal to consensus about the is/ought barrier. A non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion. If a premise or premises don't make a moral assertion, a moral conclusion (X is right/wrong, good/bad) can't logically follow. That's what Hume's argument boils down to.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Hume was wrong,

Consensus is that he wasn't. His is-ought problem remains unresolved.

If you're unfamiliar with it, how about this article from a past issue of PN? https://philosophynow.org/issues/99/Thoughts_on_Oughts

(It also contains the quotation you asked for, I might add.)

Hume's 'no ought from is' [NOFI] was targeted at Christianity's Moral System.
If you agrees Hume was right, then, you accept his condemnation of the Christian's Moral System.

The point was Hume during his time was dealing with a very limited Framework and System of Knowledge and he had arrived at his NOFI conclusion based on limited knowledge which he admitted.
If you read Hume's work thoroughly he readily admitted he was working with a very incomplete knowledge with many of the jigsaw pieces missing especially those of the neurosciences, evolution, psychology, etc.

Thus for anyone to bank too heavily on Hume's NOFI, that is based on bankrupt ideas.

At present we have sufficient knowledge to prove Hume was too hasty and wrong re NOFI relative to his time.
I don't believe Hume [intelligent and rational as he was] will stick to his NOFI if he were to be alive today.

[Peter Holmes]

Hume was wrong,

Consensus is that he wasn't. His is-ought problem remains unresolved.

If you're unfamiliar with it, how about this article from a past issue of PN? https://philosophynow.org/issues/99/Thoughts_on_Oughts

(It also contains the quotation you asked for, I might add.)

Hume's 'no ought from is' [NOFI] was targeted at Christianity's Moral System.
If you agrees Hume was right, then, you accept his condemnation of the Christian's Moral System.

The point was Hume during his time was dealing with a very limited Framework and System of Knowledge and he had arrived at his NOFI conclusion based on limited knowledge which he admitted.
If you read Hume's work thoroughly he readily admitted he was working with a very incomplete knowledge with many of the jigsaw pieces missing especially those of the neurosciences, evolution, psychology, etc.

Thus for anyone to bank too heavily on Hume's NOFI, that is based on bankrupt ideas.

At present we have sufficient knowledge to prove Hume was too hasty and wrong re NOFI relative to his time.
I don't believe Hume [intelligent and rational as he was] will stick to his NOFI if he were to be alive today.

Not so. No amount of knowledge of what is the case can entail a conclusion as to what should be the case. So new knowledge makes no difference. We can and do appeal to facts to explain and justify our moral opinions - but they remain opinions.

[Immanuel Can]

Hume was wrong,

Consensus is that he wasn't. His is-ought problem remains unresolved.

Agreed - but we don't need to appeal to consensus about the is/ought barrier. A non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion. If a premise or premises don't make a moral assertion, a moral conclusion (X is right/wrong, good/bad) can't logically follow. That's what Hume's argument boils down to.

I only meant "consensus of people who know," that is, of philosophers," -- a claim that is easy to justify. Their particular expertise makes them qualified to speak to somebody who is unsure of what the Is-Ought problem is, which is what I was doing at the time. As for you, Peter, I'm sure you already know it.

And yes, that's what Hume's claim boils down to. But let's give P. a generous reading here: in its most generous form, we would have to say that Hume is pointing out that IF an empirical claim can be used to justify a moral one, it would FIRST have to be shown by the moralizer in question that it can -- it's not at all obvious to Hume, or from any secular perspective, that it ever can.

But so far, no secularist moralizer has been able to give reasons why we can even think moralizing is rationally possilble. And three of the major attempts to defeat Hume's claim, along with the reasons for their failure, are explained in the article I suggested.

[Immanuel Can]

Hume's 'no ought from is' [NOFI] was targeted at Christianity's Moral System.

Sorry: that's incorrect.

If you read the quotation, you'll see that. He never makes any condition of religion, either way. Hume was an Atheist. He just thought the claim was obvious in all cases, because for him, no religion was even real.

At present we have sufficient knowledge to prove Hume was too hasty and wrong

I'm sorry to contradict, but that's also false, actually.

But if you think it's so, then give us the proof. You will be considered the greatest moral philosopher of the 20th and 21st centuries, if you can pull that off.

Go ahead.

[Peter Holmes]

Consensus is that he wasn't. His is-ought problem remains unresolved.

Agreed - but we don't need to appeal to consensus about the is/ought barrier. A non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion. If a premise or premises don't make a moral assertion, a moral conclusion (X is right/wrong, good/bad) can't logically follow. That's what Hume's argument boils down to.

I only meant "consensus of people who know," that is, of philosophers," -- a claim that is easy to justify. Their particular expertise makes them qualified to speak to somebody who is unsure of what the Is-Ought problem is, which is what I was doing at the time. As for you, Peter, I'm sure you already know it.

And yes, that's what Hume's claim boils down to. But let's give P. a generous reading here: in its most generous form, we would have to say that Hume is pointing out that IF an empirical claim can be used to justify a moral one, it would FIRST have to be shown by the moralizer in question that it can -- it's not at all obvious to Hume, or from any secular perspective, that it ever can.

But so far, no secularist moralizer has been able to give reasons why we can even think moralizing is rationally possilble. And three of the major attempts to defeat Hume's claim, along with the reasons for their failure, are explained in the article I suggested.

Understood. But I disagree with the conclusion that, if morality is not objective - if there are no moral facts - then 'moralising' is rationally impossible. That simply doesn't follow. Happy to explain, if you don't understand why.

And, meanwhile, if (as you agree) an is can't entail an ought, then no actual or putative facts about a creator god, or its nature, or what it thinks is morally right and wrong, can entail a moral conclusion. And this is why theistic moral objectivism is question-begging.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's why theistic (such as Christian) moral objectivism is misguided. The argument is this:

Agent X says/believes action Y is morally wrong OR Action Y is inconsistent with the nature of agent X; therefore action Y is morally wrong.

If, as I assume everyone can see, this is a fallacy, then the identity of agent X - even if it can be demonstrated - is irrelevant. Nuff said.

[Immanuel Can]

Agreed - but we don't need to appeal to consensus about the is/ought barrier. A non-moral premise can't entail a moral conclusion. If a premise or premises don't make a moral assertion, a moral conclusion (X is right/wrong, good/bad) can't logically follow. That's what Hume's argument boils down to.

I only meant "consensus of people who know," that is, of philosophers," -- a claim that is easy to justify. Their particular expertise makes them qualified to speak to somebody who is unsure of what the Is-Ought problem is, which is what I was doing at the time. As for you, Peter, I'm sure you already know it.

And yes, that's what Hume's claim boils down to. But let's give P. a generous reading here: in its most generous form, we would have to say that Hume is pointing out that IF an empirical claim can be used to justify a moral one, it would FIRST have to be shown by the moralizer in question that it can -- it's not at all obvious to Hume, or from any secular perspective, that it ever can.

But so far, no secularist moralizer has been able to give reasons why we can even think moralizing is rationally possilble. And three of the major attempts to defeat Hume's claim, along with the reasons for their failure, are explained in the article I suggested.

Understood. But I disagree with the conclusion that, if morality is not objective - if there are no moral facts - then 'moralising' is rationally impossible. That simply doesn't follow. Happy to explain, if you don't understand why.

I should have put it this way: "rational moralizing is impossible." That means that irrational pseudo-moralizing, such as creating an ethic particular to a society or to a group or to only one person, is possible; but it is impossible to defend rationally why anybody at all should be obligated to that ethic -- including the person who invented it.

And, meanwhile, if (as you agree) an is can't entail an ought, then no actual or putative facts about a creator god, or its nature, or what it thinks is morally right and wrong, can entail a moral conclusion.

That's ALMOST right. But if it's not carefully explained, it's wrong.

The mere fact that, say, a nameless, faceless, identityless Supreme Being -- a mere "Cosmic Force" or "Deistic Absentee" -- exists would never warrant the conclusion that such a Being has a moral preference as necessary. For argument's sake, It might not have any specific purposes, intentions or trajector in mind for us at all. That's possible...but even then, not certain. But what would be true is that even IF such an entity had a moral preference, we would not know what it was.

However, if the God identified with the One spoken of in the Bible is the Supreme Being, then objective morality does exist.

[Immanuel Can]

Here's why theistic (such as Christian) moral objectivism is misguided. The argument is this:
Agent X says/believes action Y is morally wrong OR Action Y is inconsistent with the nature of agent X; therefore action Y is morally wrong.

An action can be wrong in compatible senses.

It can be primarily wrong because it is contrary to the nature of God, and still be wrong because it is also contrary to His expressed will, and also wrong because it is contrary to the teleological purposes for which we were created, and even wrong because unfruitful to human flourishing...all of the above...and thus, objectively wrong for multiple reasons. We could even add that people could (sociologically) imagine that action Y was objectively wrong, and be right about that, even though their assent was no part of the cause of its being wrong.

There's nothing at all illogical about saying all of those things.

So, "nuff not said."

[Peter Holmes]

Here's why theistic (such as Christian) moral objectivism is misguided. The argument is this:
Agent X says/believes action Y is morally wrong OR Action Y is inconsistent with the nature of agent X; therefore action Y is morally wrong.

An action can be wrong in compatible senses.

It can be primarily wrong because it is contrary to the nature of God, and still be wrong because it is also contrary to His expressed will, and also wrong because it is contrary to the teleological purposes for which we were created, and even wrong because unfruitful to human flourishing...all of the above...and thus, objectively wrong for multiple reasons. We could even add that people could (sociologically) imagine that action Y was objectively wrong, and be right about that, even though their assent was no part of the cause of its being wrong.

There's nothing at all illogical about saying all of those things.

So, "nuff not said."

Here are your non sequiturs, which, as you know, are illogical.

This action is [contrary to the nature/expressed will/teleological purposes of a god]/[unfruitful to human flourishing]; therefore this action is (objectively) morally wrong.

And, since an action can't be objectively morally wrong, whether people imagine it to be so is irrelevant.

Back to the drawing board.

[Immanuel Can]

Here are your non sequiturs, which, as you know, are illogical.

This action is [contrary to the nature/expressed will/teleological purposes of a god]/[unfruitful to human flourishing]; therefore this action is (objectively) morally wrong.

And, since an action can't be objectively morally wrong...

There's your unfounded assumption. You don't KNOW that an action cannot be objectively wrong. You're just presuming it.

So your criticism is circular: essentially, it reads as, "An action cannot be objectively morally wrong, because an action cannot be objectively morally wrong."

, whether people imagine it to be so is irrelevant.

Yes, I said that human sociology is no grounds for objective morality. On that, we agree. What I said, though, was that if a society believed in a particular morality, that it did not mean they were the grounds for it, nor that it failed to be objective simply because they believed in it.

Now, those are non-sequiturs. But I see you agree with that point, too -- no sociologizing of morality. So we don't need to debate that. I had thought maybe you'd go there. You didn't.

[Peter Holmes]

Here are your non sequiturs, which, as you know, are illogical.

This action is [contrary to the nature/expressed will/teleological purposes of a god]/[unfruitful to human flourishing]; therefore this action is (objectively) morally wrong.

And, since an action can't be objectively morally wrong...

There's your unfounded assumption. You don't KNOW that an action cannot be objectively wrong. You're just presuming it.

So your criticism is circular: essentially, it reads as, "An action cannot be objectively morally wrong, because an action cannot be objectively morally wrong."

, whether people imagine it to be so is irrelevant.

Yes, I said that human sociology is no grounds for objective morality. On that, we agree. What I said, though, was that if a society believed in a particular morality, that it did not mean they were the grounds for it, nor that it failed to be objective simply because they believed in it.

Now, those are non-sequiturs. But I see you agree with that point, too -- no sociologizing of morality. So we don't need to debate that. I had thought maybe you'd go there. You didn't.

Do you agree that what you claimed, as follows, is a non sequitur?

This action is [contrary to the nature/expressed will/teleological purposes of a god]/[unfruitful to human flourishing]; therefore this action is (objectively) morally wrong.

[Immanuel Can]

Do you agree that what you claimed, as follows, is a non sequitur?

This action is contrary to the nature/expressed will/teleological purposes of [God]; therefore this action is (objectively) morally wrong.

No, that's completely correct.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Hume's 'no ought from is' [NOFI] was targeted at Christianity's Moral System.

Sorry: that's incorrect.

If you read the quotation, you'll see that. He never makes any condition of religion, either way. Hume was an Atheist. He just thought the claim was obvious in all cases, because for him, no religion was even real.

Read the passage only??? that would be insulting one's own intellectual competence.

To reflect high intellectual competency and integrity one must consider Hume's principle in the context of his whole work and the state of knowledge specific to his time.
Hume was an atheist and the dominant religion within his environment then was Christianity.
Hume critiqued 'miracles' and the self [soul] very strongly and these are critical elements of Christianity.
As such when Hume condemned NOFI, his main target [besides others in general] was the divine moral oughts [from a God out of nowhere] of Christianity which would have been sounded and surrounded him in every corner of life then.

At present we have sufficient knowledge to prove Hume was too hasty and wrong

I'm sorry to contradict, but that's also false, actually.

What is your justifications?
Hume was a empiricist thus heavily empirical inclined.
Hume's inclinations in terms of morality was towards sentiments [emotions] rather than reason.
Currently we have loads of empirical evidence to support the moral basis is from evolution and within the brain [neurosciences].

[/quote]But if you think it's so, then give us the proof. You will be considered the greatest moral philosopher of the 20th and 21st centuries, if you can pull that off.
Go ahead.
[/quote]
I have not provided the full proof but have laid down the model and principles [& clues] of a moral model that is based on empirical evidences and philosophical reasonings.