What is Scientific Realism?

[Veritas Aequitas]

You are ignorant of what scientific realism and critical realism entail, and your whole vision of the realism/anti-realism debate is impaired.

In the above Conde Lucanor claimed I am ignorant of what is Scientific Realism, but I believes he is the one who is ignorant of what is Scientific Realism proper.

It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that scientific realism is characterized differently by every author who discusses it, and this presents a challenge to anyone hoping to learn what it is.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

So what is Scientific Realism proper?

Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences.
This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively as forms of scientific antirealism.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

In order to be clear about what realism in the context of the sciences amounts to, and to differentiate it from some important antirealist alternatives, it is useful to understand it in terms of three dimensions:

• 1. a metaphysical (or ontological) dimension;
  2. a semantic dimension; and
  3. an epistemological dimension.

Metaphysically, realism is committed to the mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences. This idea is best clarified in contrast with positions that deny it.

Semantically, realism is committed to a literal interpretation of scientific claims about the world.

Epistemologically, realism is committed to the idea that theoretical claims (interpreted literally as describing a mind-independent reality) constitute knowledge of the world.
-ibid

This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively as forms of scientific antirealism.
-ibid

The differences between Scientific Realism vs Scientific AntiRealism is highly contentious.
Thus just because one is clinging on to Scientific Realism, one like Conde Lucanor cannot claim he has the absolute truth and the Scientific Anti-Realists are wrong or ignorant.

If you are a Scientist Realist why make you claim Scientific Anti-Realism [specify which] is not tenable?

Views?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Note the following;

An intriguing question then emerges as to whether disputes surrounding realism and anti-realism are resolvable in principle, or whether, ultimately, internally consistent and coherent formulations of these positions should be regarded as irreconcilable but nonetheless permissible interpretations of scientific knowledge (Chakravartty 2017; Forbes forthcoming).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scie ... ieDialPara

I believe, in contrast to Scientific Anti-Realism [Kantian], Scientific Realism as defined and explained above is not ultimately realistic nor tenable.

[uwot]

Do you not see the irony in citing this:

It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that scientific realism is characterized differently by every author who discusses it, and this presents a challenge to anyone hoping to learn what it is.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

and then saying this?

So what is Scientific Realism proper?

Without making any claim to be definitive, a scientific realist is just someone who believes a philosophical explanation for a scientific fact. A stock example is the scientific fact that planets go round the sun. One popular explanation is that the sun (and the planets) warp spacetime. Any physicist will tell you there are alternative explanations, but as long as you do the sums right, it doesn't matter which, if any, you happen to believe.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Do you not see the irony in citing this:

It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that scientific realism is characterized differently by every author who discusses it, and this presents a challenge to anyone hoping to learn what it is.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

and then saying this?

So what is Scientific Realism proper?

What is wrong with that?

For example, it is said that the definition of philosophy is the same as the number of people who attempt to define.
So we must ask, what is philosophy-proper then?

Whether there is philosophy-proper or Scientific Realism proper is then open for discussions and debates, and people can decide whatever they think is convincing or just reject all the points raised.

Without making any claim to be definitive, a scientific realist is just someone who believes a philosophical explanation for a scientific fact. A stock example is the scientific fact that planets go round the sun. One popular explanation is that the sun (and the planets) warp spacetime. Any physicist will tell you there are alternative explanations, but as long as you do the sums right, it doesn't matter which, if any, you happen to believe.

If you read the article, there are various and contrasting views on what is Scientific Realism by different sets of philosophers.
So we need to review which set is holding the proper definition of what is Scientific Realism.

[uwot]

...it is said that the definition of philosophy is the same as the number of people who attempt to define.
So we must ask, what is philosophy-proper then?

Why do you think that will reduce the number of definitions?

Whether there is philosophy-proper or Scientific Realism proper is then open for discussions and debates, and people can decide whatever they think is convincing or just reject all the points raised.

How many of the people who define philosophy will surrender that definition, and agree with whatever anyone else says is 'philosophy-proper'? Do you not think there might be those who, disputing whatever definition of philosophy-proper you and your like minded souls arrive at, will insist that it's not proper philosophy-proper?

So we need to review which set is holding the proper definition of what is Scientific Realism.

Only if you happen to be a semantic realist. Which I'm not.

[Veritas Aequitas]

...it is said that the definition of philosophy is the same as the number of people who attempt to define.
So we must ask, what is philosophy-proper then?

Why do you think that will reduce the number of definitions?

Whether there is philosophy-proper or Scientific Realism proper is then open for discussions and debates, and people can decide whatever they think is convincing or just reject all the points raised.

How many of the people who define philosophy will surrender that definition, and agree with whatever anyone else says is 'philosophy-proper'? Do you not think there might be those who, disputing whatever definition of philosophy-proper you and your like minded souls arrive at, will insist that it's not proper philosophy-proper?

So we need to review which set is holding the proper definition of what is Scientific Realism.

Only if you happen to be a semantic realist. Which I'm not.

Re the definitions of philosophy, the number of definitions will definitely fall into certain common categories.
When the definitions are open to more debates and discussions, there will eventually be lesser and lesser, and most likely down to two [or three] main factions.
Eventually we will reach what Physicists had done i.e. reducing infinite variety of physical down to the subatomic particles, then to the Higgs Boson.
I am confident of this trend given that I believe 'philosophizing' is an inherent impulse in ALL humans [dormant in most, active in some].

In the case of the SEP article re Scientific Realism, the author claimed at present, there are a wide variety of definitions of 'what is Scientific Realism'.
As it is a natural propensity of all humans to seek patterns and reduce them to simplicity, thus he had attempted to determine what is Scientific Realism proper. That is his views which is open for critique and discussion.

[uwot]

Re the definitions of philosophy, the number of definitions will definitely fall into certain common categories.
When the definitions are open to more debates and discussions, there will eventually be lesser and lesser, and most likely down to two [or three] main factions.

Such as realist and anti-realist. We've been here for 2500 years and human nature is unlikely to change. There are people who believe we can know The Truth, others who insist that human creativity is such that it can always generate alternative explanations, and those who aren't really bothered and will just go with whatever has been proven to work, or just happens to be the case. This roughly equates to rationalism, empiricism and pragmatism, which in science is mathematics, experiment and instrumentalism; in ethics it's deontology, consequentialism and normative ethics. Every branch of philosophy has it's own version, because every branch of philosophy is done by people.
Here again is an article I wrote for the magazine which goes into more detail: https://philosophynow.org/issues/133/Ph ... _Millennia

[Veritas Aequitas]

Re the definitions of philosophy, the number of definitions will definitely fall into certain common categories.
When the definitions are open to more debates and discussions, there will eventually be lesser and lesser, and most likely down to two [or three] main factions.

Such as realist and anti-realist. We've been here for 2500 years and human nature is unlikely to change. There are people who believe we can know The Truth, others who insist that human creativity is such that it can always generate alternative explanations, and those who aren't really bothered and will just go with whatever has been proven to work, or just happens to be the case. This roughly equates to rationalism, empiricism and pragmatism, which in science is mathematics, experiment and instrumentalism; in ethics it's deontology, consequentialism and normative ethics. Every branch of philosophy has it's own version, because every branch of philosophy is done by people.
Here again is an article I wrote for the magazine which goes into more detail: https://philosophynow.org/issues/133/Ph ... _Millennia

Whatever is Scientific, it must conform to the conditions and requirement of the Scientific Framework and Systems [i.e. methods, assumptions, peer review, etc.]. The main division in science is either Speculative [theory] [BB, black holes, etc.] or Empirical Verification.

The contention re Scientific Realism is based on what assumptions do the various Scientists undertake. There are various assumptions, e.g. uniformity of the Universe but what is on issue here is whether the Scientist assumes the realist or anti-realist position.
However this issue has no real impact on Science-proper.
For example, Newton's position would be realist as grounded on God, so what! this has no impact on his "scientific" theories at all as long as what is relevant conform the requirements of the scientific FSK.

What can be commented is grounding on a God is based on an illusion and impossibility while realism [philosophical] is also illusory and very unrealistic ultimately.

[uwot]

Whatever is Scientific, it must conform to the conditions and requirement of the Scientific Framework and Systems [i.e. methods, assumptions, peer review, etc.].

So you are a realist about the 'Scientific Framework and Systems' despite concluding that "realism [philosophical] is also illusory and very unrealistic ultimately."

The main division in science is either Speculative [theory] [BB, black holes, etc.] or Empirical Verification.

You've left out what many would argue is the defining feature of science, which is its application. Speculations about "BB, black holes, etc" make no difference to how one builds a rocket - is that what you mean by "Science-proper"?