Rorty - No Mind-Independent Reality

[Terrapin Station]

One simple way it's a mess is something you've parroted more or less but won't address: if it's not possible to observe the external world (and more or less as it is), then one can't claim to (a) not be at least an epistemological solipsist, and (b) be capable of observing other people to see what they say about the world, in order to talk about consensuses, community, etc.

That sounds like a comment made by somebody who hasn't read Rorty. And your lack of understanding is demonstrated.

There's a gap between observing the world and expressing one's observations in language. How does one go from observations to theories?
In order to address this you need a theory of theorising. Oooops! You are now circling the drain!

For example you have observed me. And then you have developed a theory about me. And your theory about me is that I am an "epistemic solipsist".
How have you established a relationship between those words and me?

1. Do you have a theory of how you've arrived at that theory? No you don't!
2. Your theory about me is wrong. I am not an epistemic solipsist. In fact, take all of the philosophical positions as defined in books, encyclopaedias and libraries around the world. I am not any of those either. My philosophy is the rejection of philosophy. You can't represent me in language - you should probably stop wasting your time trying.

As luck would have it, followers of Rorty are now developing Anti-representationalism as Neopragmatism and Global Expressivism

From Lecture 1

Rorty claims:
....
• But his further, still more radical, claim is that since representation has defined modern
philosophy, jettisoning it is jettisoning philosophy, since he sees philosophy since Kant as
just “whatever Kant did.” If we can’t do that anymore (since we can’t have the concept
of representation) then we will just have moved to a new sort of discipline.

We first have to get past that either we can observe the world external to us (and more or less as it really is) or we cannot (at least know if we can). Are you saying that Rorty would say that we can observe the world external to us (and more or less as it really is)?

[Skepdick]

We first have to get past that either we can observe the world external to us (and more or less as it really is) or we cannot (at least know if we can).

We don't. You do.

If I can - then I can.
If I can't - then I can't
If I can but it's not "the way it really is - then I can't observe the way the world really is.
If I can and it is the way it really is - then I can observe the way the world really is.

Neither of those possibilities carry any implication that affect the way I conduct myself.

Are you saying that Rorty would say that we can observe the world external to us (and more or less as it really is)?

I am saying that Rorty would say you are an idiot for concerning yourself with the question.

[Terrapin Station]

We first have to get past that either we can observe the world external to us (and more or less as it really is) or we cannot (at least know if we can).

We don't. You do.

If I can - then I can.
If I can't - then I can't
If I can but it's not "the way it really is - then I can't observe the way the world really is.
If I can and it is the way it really is - then I can observe the way the world really is.

Neither of those possibilities carry any implication that affect the way I conduct myself.

Are you saying that Rorty would say that we can observe the world external to us (and more or less as it really is)?

I am saying that Rorty would say you are an idiot for concerning yourself with the question.

So you don't think Rorty had a view on this?

[Skepdick]

So you don't think Rorty had a view on this?

He could've had a view.
He could have had no view.

He's dead now.

Whichever one was the case carries no implication as to the way I conduct myself at this present moment.

Perhaps he would've said "Look at this idiot! That's precisely the irresolvable oscillation between skepticism and foundationalism"

But he's dead so he couldn't have said it. So I will say it instead.

Look at this idiot. He can't navigate around the irresolvable conflict between skepticism and foundationalism.

[Terrapin Station]

So you don't think Rorty had a view on this?

He could've had a view.
He could have had no view.

He's dead now.

Whichever one was the case carries no implication as to the way I conduct myself at this present moment.

Perhaps he would've said "Look at this idiot! That's precisely the irresolvable oscillation between skepticism and foundationalism"

But he's dead so he couldn't have said it. So I will say it instead.

Look at this idiot. He can't navigate around the irresolvable conflict between skepticism and foundationalism.

I thought that Rorty was the topic, not you. Oh well.

[Skepdick]

I thought that Rorty was the topic, not you. Oh well.

Then talk to Rorty.

Oh. Wait. He's dead.

[Terrapin Station]

I thought that Rorty was the topic, not you. Oh well.

Then talk to Rorty.

I did on a few occasions.

[Skepdick]

I thought that Rorty was the topic, not you. Oh well.

Then talk to Rorty.

I did on a few occasions.

Great!

So we get to play a game where we both pretend that Rorty would have said the things we are saying.

In his absence I'll pretend that Rorty would've agreed with me, and you'll pretend that Rorty would've agreed with you.
I'll assert that I am right and you are wrong. And you'll assert the same, from your perspective.

No wonder Rorty thinks philosophy needs to be junked And I agree.

[Terrapin Station]

Then talk to Rorty.

I did on a few occasions.

Great!

So we get to play a game where we both pretend that Rorty would have said the things we are saying.

In his absence I'll pretend that Rorty would've agreed with me, and you'll pretend that Rorty would've agreed with you.
I'll assert that I am right and you are wrong. And you'll assert the same, from your perspective.

No wonder Rorty thinks philosophy needs to be junked And I agree.

I didn't say anything about what he said to me.

It might be a worthwhile discussion if you want to address what he said and what there's a record of, but you don't seem to really want to do that, at least not in the context of what I'm asking.

[Skepdick]

It might be a worthwhile discussion of you want to address what he said and what there's a record of, but you don't seem to really want to do that, at least not in the context of what I'm asking.

And what do you propose we do with this record?

Given that Rorty is not here to stop us from misinterpreting/misunderstanding his words?

[Terrapin Station]

It might be a worthwhile discussion of you want to address what he said and what there's a record of, but you don't seem to really want to do that, at least not in the context of what I'm asking.

And what do you propose we do with this record?

Given that Rorty is not here to stop us from misinterpreting/misunderstanding his words?

How about just getting to what he said first?

[Skepdick]

How about just getting to what he said first?

Given all the possible hermeneutics, which hermeneutic do you think we should use towards "getting to what he said" ?

[Terrapin Station]

How about just getting to what he said first?

Given all the possible hermeneutics, which hermeneutic do you think we should use towards "getting to what he said" ?

Retyping (or copy-pasting if possible) quotes would work.

[Skepdick]

How about just getting to what he said first?

Given all the possible hermeneutics, which hermeneutic do you think we should use towards "getting to what he said" ?

Retyping (or copy-pasting if possible) quotes would work.

Oh. OK.

The drama of an individual human life, or of the history of humanity as
a whole, is not one in which a preexistent goal is triumphantly reached or
tragically not reached. Neither a constant external reality nor an unfailing interior source' of inspiration forms a background for such dramas.
Instead, to see one's life, or the life of one's community, as a dramatic
narrative is to see it as a process of Nietzschean self-overcoming. The
paradigm of such a narrative is the life of the genius who can say of the
relevant portion {)f the past, "Thus I willed it," because she has found a
way to describe that past which the past never knew, and thereby found a
self to be which her precursors never knew was possible.

[Skepdick]

How about just getting to what he said first?

Given all the possible hermeneutics, which hermeneutic do you think we should use towards "getting to what he said" ?

Retyping (or copy-pasting if possible) quotes would work.

I have suggested that the only criterion which will draw
this line is indubitability-that closeness to the Inner Eye
which permits Descartes to say (in a sentence which would
have astonished Isabella and antiquity) that "nothing is
easier for the mind to know than itself."34 But this may
seem strange, since the obvious Cartesian candidate for
such a mark would seem to be non-spatiality. Descartes insists over and over again that we can separate mind from
"extended substance," thereby viewing it as nonextended
substance. Further, the first and most common-sensical rebuttal offered to contemporary philosophers who suggest
that pains might be identical with brain processes is drawn
straight from Descartes: viz., pains "in" amputated limbs
are nonspatial-the argument being that if they had any
spatial location they would be in an arm, but since there
is no arm, they must be of a quite different ontological sort.