The Striving to Survive with Well-Being is an Opinion?

[Skepdick]

And as I've said umpteen +1 times now, all that I use the terms subjective/objective for are LOCATIONS, and there's absolutely nothing else implied by them. The locations in question are (persons') bodies/brains versus other than (persons') bodies/brains. And yes, those are definitely just different physical locations, different configurations of (dynamic relations of) matter.

As a nominalist, do you think that this is the social connotation of the subjective/objective distinction? And if there were no connotational/preferential differences except location then why would philosophers be pursuing objective morality if it is no better or worse than subjective morality?

In a manner of speaking, at least. I wouldn't say that as of yet there's a good reason to believe that machines have any mental qualities. (So in other words, I'm not at all convinced yet of substratum independence or functionalism.)

What would be sufficient to convince you? Seeming as learning how to beat our Chess and Go (games which took us centuries to master) grand-masters in 4 hours isn't enough.

Because those are the sounds/letter strings that I'm attaching to the location-based distinction in question.

Fair. So would you prefer objective morality to subjective morality?

Not at all. I answered "rain." I didn't answer "the concept of rain," or "answering whether it's raining" or anything like that.
I didn't say rain-as-observed. I just said "rain."

That's a lame semantic technicality to argue. A bunch of stuff may have been implicit, not explicit, but the semantics of "It's raining." and "Is it raining? yes" are identical. Monologue vs dialogue. Same scene.

Not that it at all hinges on verification.

Is that so? Can you give me an example of something true that no human has verified/observed?

A lot of physics is just playing with mathematics. (Unfortunately in my opinion.)

Duh. Like a lot of Philosophising is playing with English.

It's semantic engineering.

Yeah, it is. Again, time is just change/motion.

It's not. You can arrest change/motion in a quantum system but you haven't stopped the experience of the scientist (classical system) observing the quantum system being frozen in time. Change/motion has stopped for one thing, but not for the other. Time is a social construct.

If you had no memory (couldn't remember past) there would be no such thing as time.

Quantum Zeno effect.

[Terrapin Station]

This is a pretty big issue, so I'm going to leave things with just this first part for the moment:

As a nominalist, do you think that this is the social connotation of the subjective/objective distinction? And if there were no connotational/preferential differences except location then why would philosophers be pursuing objective morality if it is no better or worse than subjective morality?

Right. So subjective/objective, "in themselves," do not amount to anything other than a locational distinction.

However, there are upshots to the locational distinction.

One upshot is that if the location of a phenomenon is simply a persons' mind (their brain functioning in particular ways), so that we're only talking about how someone feels about something and that's it, then they can't get the phenomenon "wrong." That is, they can't fail to "match" what's really the case in the objective world. This is notably different than something like making an utterance about the moon's composition. There's something one can "match" or fail to "match" there, because there's a moon that exists independently of persons, and if they're trying to make a statement about what it's made out of, they can get that wrong. With a phenomenon that turns out to be only how they feel about something, the only way they can get that "wrong," that is, the only way they can fail to match what is the case, is by some sort of cognitive confusion about how they feel, where they could feel any way imaginable.

[Skepdick]

Right. So subjective/objective, "in themselves," do not amount to anything other than a locational distinction.

However, there are upshots to the locational distinction.

Upshots are preferences/biases, no?

One upshot is that if the location of a phenomenon is simply a persons' mind (their brain functioning in particular ways), so that we're only talking about how someone feels about something and that's it, then they can't get the phenomenon "wrong."

Why are you using the word "only" when you refer to measuring feelings? Isn't the "wrongness" of murder measuring precisely a person's feeling of abhorrence of the act?

That is, they can't fail to "match" what's really the case in the objective world.

Why does it have to "match what's really the case in the objective world"?

The objective and subjective worlds are just different physical locations. Why do you prefer some locations more than others?

This is notably different than something like making an utterance about the moon's composition. There's something one can "match" or fail to "match" there, because there's a moon that exists independently of persons, and if they're trying to make a statement about what it's made out of, they can get that wrong.

But morality is not about statements. It's about undesirable state of affairs. And if I get the composition of the moon "wrong" - there's no consequence to that unless I am the guy running NASA's moon mission. I just don't know what the Moon's made of, but I am not applying my knowledge so who cares?

There's nothing morally-wrong with being factually-wrong.

With a phenomenon that turns out to be only how they feel about something, the only way they can get that "wrong," that is, the only way they can fail to match what is the case, is by some sort of cognitive confusion about how they feel, where they could feel any way imaginable.

I don't understand why you have this bias towards "matching what is the case". The state of a quantum system could be any way imaginable - until we measure it.

Is it morally wrong to get things factually wrong? If not - why does it matter if I say that the Moon is made out of cheese?

Because it isn't made of cheese? So fucking what!

[Terrapin Station]

Right. So subjective/objective, "in themselves," do not amount to anything other than a locational distinction.

However, there are upshots to the locational distinction.

Upshots are preferences/biases, no?

?? No. Upshots are something that is (or will be) the case given that something else is the case.

For example, if you have a bunch of a trees on a hillside, and then a major volcanic eruption occurs a mile away. An upshot is that those trees are going to be destroyed (ceteris paribus).

Why are you using the word "only" when you refer to measuring feelings?

"Only"="Not something else in addition to this."

Why does it have to "match what's really the case in the objective world"?

It doesn't have to. It's just that you can't match what it's like in the objective world if there is no such thing in the objective world. A lot of people want it to be the case that one can get moral dispositions wrong, so that one should have a different moral disposition than one has. (That's not my view, but it's the way a lot of people feel.)

The objective and subjective worlds are just different physical locations. Why do you prefer some locations more than others?

I don't. I'm explaining to you the common motivation for wanting moral edicts to be objective, since that's what you'd asked about.

But morality is not about statements. It's about undesirable state of affairs. And if I get the composition of the moon "wrong" - there's no consequence to that unless I am the guy running NASA's moon mission. I just don't know what the Moon's made of, but I am not applying my knowledge so who cares?

It's simply a matter of whether it's possible to get it wrong in that sense or not.

I don't understand why you have this bias towards "matching what is the case".

Again, I don't. You asked why anyone cares whether morality is objective. This is why they care. They want to be able to declare that other people are wrong (in this sense) in their moral dispositions, where this all comes back to them wanting to control other people, being intolerant, wanting to be able to sanction or punish them in various ways, etc. For example, they might claim that it's objectively wrong for gays to marry, thus if you feel that gays should be able to marry, you don't simply have a different opinion, you're "objectively wrong," you're "objectively immoral," you should be discriminated against (along with gays who they won't allow to marry), etc.--they can feel righteous in forcing things to be the way they want them to be. That's the sort of thing that's a motivation for this. It's not MY view. I'm just explaining why anyone cares.

It's also very tied up with religious views, and part of the effort to control there is to say that people aren't just "objectively wrong," "objectively immoral," etc. but they're going to Hell if they say/do certain things.

[Skepdick]

For example, if you have a bunch of a trees on a hillside, and then a major volcanic eruption occurs a mile away. An upshot is that those trees are going to be destroyed (ceteris paribus).

What does the word "upshot" add to your example? If you take it out you are conveying exactly the same chain of events.

I don't. I'm explaining to you the common motivation for wanting moral edicts to be objective, since that's what you'd asked about.

Wanting moral edicts to be objective suggests a preference, right? Implicitly "objectivity" has qualities that are desirable that "subjectivity" doesn't.

if it didn't you couldn't prefer one over the other.

It's simply a matter of whether it's possible to get it wrong in that sense or not.

Ok, but in the overarching moral sense of "wrongness" getting something factually wrong is never as wrong as murdering somebody.

Unless your factual error leads to people dying.

They want to be able to declare that other people are wrong (in this sense) in their moral dispositions, where this all comes back to them wanting to control other people, being intolerant, wanting to be able to sanction or punish them in various ways, etc. For example, they might claim that it's objectively wrong for gays to marry, thus if you feel that gays should be able to marry, you don't simply have a different opinion, you're "objectively wrong," you're objectively immoral, you should be discriminated against (along with gays who they won't allow to marry), etc.--they can feel righteous in forcing things to be the way they want them to be. That's the sort of thing that's a motivation for this. It's not MY view. I'm just explaining why anyone cares.

It's also very tied up with religious views, and part of the effort to control there is to say that people aren't just objectively wrong, objectively immoral, etc. but they're going to Hell if they say/do certain things.

OK, so from that perspective you've just described do you think that murder is wrong? Not in the "is abortion murder" way. In the "Go next door and whack your neighbour for some spare cash" kind of way? Or do you think we shouldn't want to control people from doing that?

Is it not "objectively wrong" ( in the way that scientists, not philosophers use that term - standardised measurement units) that murder is wrong?

[Terrapin Station]

For example, if you have a bunch of a trees on a hillside, and then a major volcanic eruption occurs a mile away. An upshot is that those trees are going to be destroyed (ceteris paribus).

What does the word "upshot" add to your example? If you take it out you are conveying exactly the same chain of events.

Sometimes upshots aren't very obvious. That's just a very simple example of what they are.

Wanting moral edicts to be objective suggests a preference, right? Implicitly "objectivity" has qualities that are desirable that "subjectivity" doesn't.

Sure, wanting that is a preference, and to someone with the preference, then yes, obviously that means it has qualities that are desirable to them.

Ok, but in the overarching moral sense of "wrongness" getting something factually wrong is never as wrong as murdering somebody.

I wouldn't know how to quantify that. It's just a different sense of "wrong" than the moral sense.

OK, so from that perspective you've just described do you think that murder is wrong? Not in the "is abortion murder" way. In the "Go next door and whack your neighbour for some spare cash" kind of way? Or do you think we shouldn't want to control people from doing that?

How many times do I need to answer that I feel that murder is morally wrong?

I also feel that we need to separate people who have demonstrated that they'd continue to commit murders, though I don't at all agree with the way the prison system is presently instantiated. I'd do something very different if I were king.

My feelings about this stuff are subjective, obviously. It's not something that one can get right or wrong (in the sense of matching or failing to match what the world is like).

Is it not "objectively wrong" ( in the way that scientists, not philosophers use that term - standardised measurement units) that murder is wrong?

Without arguing about whether scientists use the term that way, no, it's not objectively wrong. And if we try to argue that a consensus makes it objectively wrong, we're forwarding the argumentum ad populum fallacy.

It doesn't need to be objectively wrong for anything. Our subjective dispositions are good enough. We can subjectively decide, in concert with each other, where enough of us, with enough power to enact this can do so, that people who'll continue to commit murders need to be separated from the rest of society (so that they don't continue to commit murders).

[Skepdick]

I wouldn't know how to quantify that. It's just a different sense of "wrong" than the moral sense.

I do. Which of these two scenarios would triggers more "abhorence" (or a negative emotion) in you?

A. Me getting the composition of the Moon wrong.
B. Me murdering somebody.

Is factual wrongness more abhorrent than murder? Yes.

1 bit of information.

You can (almost always) produce a ranked list....

How many times do I need to answer that I feel that murder is morally wrong?

As many times as you go towards the fuzzy/uncertainties before we've established that there are certain things that aren't all that morally hazy.

My feelings about this stuff are subjective, obviously. It's not something that one can get right or wrong (in the sense of matching or failing to match what the world is like).

Note how you are defaulting to the notion of "factual wrongness" even in the context of murder.

Why do you keep defaulting this sense of "wrongness" if the moral standard is more important in the grander scheme of things?

Without arguing about whether scientists use the term that way, no, it's not objectively wrong. And if we try to argue that a consensus makes it objectively wrong, we're forwarding the argumentum ad populum fallacy.

I am not arguing that the consensus makes it wrong. I am pointing out that there is consensus in the system on how to measure/judge the matter.

Water boils at 100 degrees celsius. What makes water boil at 100 degrees celsius is an argumentum ad populum fallacy! Otherwise known as "standardisation".

Look at all these argumentum ad populum fallacies.

It doesn't need to be objectively wrong for anything. Our subjective dispositions are good enough.

Ok, but I am not arguing semantics. I am pointing out that the current state of affairs (as it has been with regards to murder for the last 3000+ years) sufficiently satisfies the scientific notion of "standardised measurement".

We can subjectively decide, in concert with each other, where enough of us, with enough power to enact this can do so, that people who'll continue to commit murders need to be separated from the rest of society (so that they don't continue to commit murders).

Oh, you mean like we have standards bodies in science and we collectively decide on various social norms? Yeah

[Terrapin Station]

I do. Which of these two scenarios would triggers more "abhorence" (or a negative emotion) in you?

A. Me getting the composition of the Moon wrong.
B. Me murdering somebody.

For me, it depends on your relationship to me, the relationship of the murdered person to me, and the exact scenario/context.

My feelings about this stuff are subjective, obviously. It's not something that one can get right or wrong (in the sense of matching or failing to match what the world is like).

Note how you are defaulting to the notion of "factual wrongness" even in the context of murder.

Just stressing what's the case in the context of the typical gist of these debates (not just with respect to communicating with you); other people could be reading this, we're on a philosophy board, etc.

Why do you keep defaulting this sense of "wrongness" if the moral standard is more important in the grander scheme of things?

Do you mean "standard" in the sense of a consensus? I don't think that consensuses are more important when it comes to morality.

I am not arguing that the consensus makes it wrong. I am pointing out that there is consensus in the system on how to measure/judge the matter.

Okay, but there's no normative weight to that in my opinion when we're talking about morality.

Water boils at 100 degrees celsius. What makes water boil at 100 degrees celsius is an argumentum ad populum fallacy! Otherwise known as "standardisation".

I'd say, "What makes it the case that conventionally we name the boiling point '100 degrees celsius' . . . " And that's not the argumentum ad populum fallacy stated that way, because the one thing that consensuses determine is the consensus/the convention/what most people say.

We can subjectively decide, in concert with each other, where enough of us, with enough power to enact this can do so, that people who'll continue to commit murders need to be separated from the rest of society (so that they don't continue to commit murders).

Oh, you mean like we have standards bodies in science and we collectively decide on various social norms? Yeah

No, I don't mean like that. I'm saying the above descriptively, for one, and two, it need not be more than one or a couple people deciding this.

[Skepdick]

For me, it depends on your relationship to me, the relationship of the murdered person to me, and the exact scenario/context.

In context there's always the "if you murdered Hitler I wouldn't care". The point about moral rules is that they are context-free.

So context-free, it's really weird for me to imagine how I could be more abhorred by you getting something factually wrong, than I'd be abhorred by you murdering anyone. Even if I don't have any relationship to them.

Just stressing what's the case in the context of the typical gist of these debates (not just with respect to communicating with you); other people could be reading this, we're on a philosophy board, etc.

So it's rather peculiar to me that (especially) on a philosophy board the nominal meaning of "wrong" carries no moral connotation.

Seems a mix-up of priorities.

Do you mean "standard" in the sense of a consensus? I don't think that consensuses are more important when it comes to morality.

I mean in the relative importance of concerns.

I think reducing/preventing murder is more important than getting the composition of the Moon right.

Okay, but there's no normative weight to that in my opinion when we're talking about morality.

In as much as morality has an upside - can you really say that? "Normative weight" is just about any mechanism that prevents an immoral outcome.

I'd say, "What makes it the case that conventionally we name the boiling point '100 degrees celsius' . . . " And that's not the argumentum ad populum fallacy stated that way, because the one thing that consensuses determine is the consensus/the convention/what most people say.

And I would say that we named the murdering wrong. Or we named "immoral killings" murder. Potato potatoh.

No, I don't mean like that. I'm saying the above descriptively, for one, and two, it need not be more than one or a couple people deciding this.

The number of deciders is largely irrelevant to the number of tacit participants who don't vehemently oppose the decision.

How many people decided that murder is wrong? Certainly not all 8 billion. Direct democracy doesn't really scale. Yet.

[Terrapin Station]

In context there's always the "if you murdered Hitler I wouldn't care". The point about moral rules is that they are context-free.

Most aren't context-free for me.

And I don't just mean murdering someone like Hitler. There are tons of murders committed every day. Most don't affect me very strongly, even if I hear a bit of detail about them.

Someone I know arguing something like "The moon is made of green cheese," though, where they're serious and they're really arguing about it, is going to bother me more, especially if it's an adult who should know better and I'd ever need to rely on them for anything. In that situation, there's a serious problem of some sort there with someone I'm close to, someone I might need to rely on. Heck, it even irks me a bit when people do this sort of thing on boards like this, even though I don't personally know those folks and I don't have to rely on them directly. Whether it's that folks have serious mental or developmental problems, or whether they're trolling/just trying to be difficult to the extent that some people are is bothersome about the human condition/human nature in general; it's troublesome for the prospect of trying to build any sort of better world. It's a pretty serious problem either way, whether it's indicative of mental issues or just broader personality issues.

Do you mean "standard" in the sense of a consensus? I don't think that consensuses are more important when it comes to morality.

I mean in the relative importance of concerns.

That doesn't tell me anything about what "standard" connotes, though.

In as much as morality has an upside - can you really say that?

Yes. There's little that I feel more strongly about than the pet peeve of people tending to take what a crowd is doing as a normative to follow. It's the old "If everyone were jumping off a bridge . . ." You don't do something because other people are doing or saying it. If you're doing something in line with other people, it's because you've independently evaluated it and decided that it's a good idea, or simply because you feel the same way.

When we're talking about something objective, a consensus, if it's arrived at via independent investigation, can help cement knowledge of what's the case. The consensus does not make something the case, however.

If we're talking about something that's just opinions/how people feel, a consensus--again, if arrived at via independent assessments--can help us learn about how most people in whatever context are . . . which can be useful for interacting with and catering to those people, but it doesn't tell us that we should agree with them just because most of them feel however they do.

And I would say that we named the murdering wrong.

That might work if "wrong" didn't have all of these other connotations in that context.

For the boiling point of water, it wouldn't make any difference if we named it "523 notches Purpleplex" instead.

If we were saying that "Murder is purpleplex"--in other words "Purpleplex" is just another name we're going to attach to "murder," that tells us nothing else connotatively, right? But that's not what you're doing with the word "wrong" there. So "wrong" isn't just a name for that. Otherwise "purpleplex" would be just as good.

[Skepdick]

Most aren't context-free for me.

And I don't just mean murdering someone like Hitler. There are tons of murders committed every day. Most don't affect me very strongly, even if I hear a bit of detail about them.

There's no way in hell you have "context" on the thousands of murders that take place around the world every day.

Nobody has that much time, never mind give-a-fuck to maintain sanity. But the point is that we think murder is such a bad thing, we've gone and written laws, social institutions like courts and police etc. We pay taxes to cover for the salaries of policemen, judges, prosecutors etc. We focus on addressing the systemic social issues ( child abuse, poverty, inequality all the things we've found to be causal factors). We actively work towards minimising murder.

Some of us directly participate in that function of society. When we say "X ought not happen" we most often mean "lets use some of our social capital to prevent X". We are talking about economics/investment/policy decisions - not mere localised emotions.

Someone I know arguing something like "The moon is made of green cheese," though, where they're serious and they're really arguing about it is going to bother me more, especially if it's an adult who should know better and I'd ever need to rely on them for anything. In that situation, there's a serious problem of some sort there with someone I'm close to, someone I might need to rely on.

And so you are interested in their psychological well-being. And you are directly participating towards improving that situation.

At the individual scale you are doing what's within your control. At the social scale - we are doing what's within our control.

That doesn't tell me anything about what "standard" connotes, though.

Connotes people agreeing to uphold a set of social norms.

Yes. There's little that I feel more strongly about than the pet peeve of people tending to take what a crowd is doing as a normative to follow.

Even when the crowd is generally doing the right thing?

For the boiling point of water, it wouldn't make any difference if we named it "523 notches Purpleplex" instead.

If we saying that "Murder is purpleplex"--in other words "Purpleplex" is just another name we're going to attach to "murder," that tells us nothing else connotatively, right? But that's not what you're doing with the word "wrong" there. So "wrong" isn't just a name for that. Otherwise "purpleplex" would be just as good.

And for the "wrongness/immorality of murder", it wouldn't make any difference if we named it "The Greatest Blessing From God" if we kept punishing murderers and throwing them in prison.

[Terrapin Station]

There's no way in hell you have "context" on the thousands of murders that take place around the world every day.

I explained part of the context I'm talking about already: it depends on the relationship of the people in question to me, whether I'd need to rely on the person for anything, and so on.

Some of us directly participate in that function of society. When we say "X ought not happen" we most often mean "lets use some of our social capital to prevent X". We are talking about economics/investment/policy decisions - not mere localised emotions.

Sure, but what you asked me about was "Which . . . triggers more 'abhorence' (or a negative emotion) in you?"

I answered that honestly.

Connotes people agreeing to uphold a set of social norms.

Thanks for answering. I don't think that upholding a set of social norms is a worthwhile endeavor in itself. I'm in favor of upholding things that I agree with, things that I think are a good idea. The reason for that would never be because it's a social norm.

Yes. There's little that I feel more strongly about than the pet peeve of people tending to take what a crowd is doing as a normative to follow.

Even when the crowd is generally doing the right thing?

You're not doing whatever it is in that case because you're taking what the crowd is doing as a normative to follow. You're doing it because you feel it's the right thing to do.

And for the "wrongness/immorality of murder", it wouldn't make any difference if we named it "The Greatest Blessing From God" if we kept punishing murderers and throwing them in prison.

Right, but that's not the same as the boiling water scenario. We're not saying anything about what anyone should do with the boiling water. We just mentioned the name/conventional measurement for it as such.

[Skepdick]

Sure, but what you asked me about was "Which . . . triggers more 'abhorence' (or a negative emotion) in you?"

I answered that honestly.

Fair. There's probably distinction to be drawn between abhorrence and concern/care.

Thanks for answering. I don't think that upholding a set of social norms is a worthwhile endeavor in itself. I'm in favor of upholding things that I agree with, things that I think are a good idea. The reason for that would never be because it's a social norm.

Obviously. You aren't upholding it because it's a social norm. It's a social norm because you (and many others) are upholding it.

You're not doing whatever it is in that case because you're taking what the crowd is doing as a normative to follow. You're doing it because you feel it's the right thing to do.

Obviously. But again, that's what makes you part of the crowd.

Right, but that's not the same as the boiling water scenario. We're not saying anything about what anyone should do with the boiling water. We just mentioned the name/conventional measurement for it as such.

OK, but we just picked a bad measurement for our example. Some measurements do have social connotation.

Say, the concentration of radioactive isotopes in the air. Or a seismic activity early warning system. The operational parameters/calibration of such metrics are very much a moral concern.

Even a thermometer with warning labels for where "hot" starts (in case somebody doesn't know how to relate the numbers to human experience)

[Veritas Aequitas]

Developmental psychology, in which psychological well-being may be analyzed in terms of a pattern of growth across the lifespan.

Personality psychology, in which it is possible to apply Maslow's concept of self-actualization, Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person, Jung's concept of individuation, and Allport's concept of maturity to account for psychological well-being.[16]

Clinical psychology, in which well-being consists of biological, psychological and social needs being met.

Those are all views that are "distorted" by personal feelings, prejudices or interpretations. What else are you figuring they could be than personal feelings, prejudices and interpretations? How do you believe those views wind up in developmental/personality/clinical psychology in the first place?

You are very ignorant of the above re well being.

What makes you think scientific facts are not "distorted" by personal feelings, prejudices or interpretations.
The point is the scientific FSK has its constitutions [all necessary requirements] to ensure as much personal bias are filtered out, thus maintaining objectivity and its credibility.

Psychology and psychiatry are social sciences which also has to meet the requirements of the scientific FSK, i.e. scientific method, peer reviews, testability, etc.

Note,
b]Clinical psychology,[/b] in which well-being consists of biological, psychological and social needs being met.
What is so difficult in measuring and being objective about meeting basic biological needs and psychological. Social needs are merely the extra merits for well being.
Biological basic needs can be measured via physical examinations and blood-tests to determine the well-being of the person.
The psychological and mental well being can be assessed by psychologist and psychiatry.

[Veritas Aequitas]

IYO

People chose to die. People face the inevitable.

Note my point above, repeat,

All human beings are "programmed" to survive till the inevitable of mortality.

Those who are prone to suicide and has committed suicide is because their above inherent program is defective thus not 'normal' which is recognized as an illness within psychiatry.

I have argued the obvious, ALL humans are "programmed" to survive [till inevitable mortality].

Please cite evidence

Note 'will'.
It is an inference from the above, i.e. DNA wise and generically ALL humans are "programmed" to survive [till inevitable mortality].

Those who are prone to suicide and has committed suicide is because their above inherent program is defective thus not 'normal' which is recognized as an illness within psychiatry.

As usual you answer is empty of content.

You are complaining about yourself, i.e. your responses are most empty of content; most of the time it is merely brushing off the arguments of others.
For your own intellectual sanity sake, you must provide well justified arguments to counter why my points are wrong.