What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Can]

I'm very confident that all the apologetic arguments peddled by Craig

First mistake: Craig is the editor, not the author of all the articles. If you'd even glanced at the provided table of contents, you'd know that. These are not Craig's arguments...they're the world's leading scholars in each area. He merely collected them for Blackwell.

And meantime, there's not one iota of credible evidence for the existence of your god - to my knowledge

And yet, you claim to "know" all the arguments, and "can refute every one of them with ease." And you want to know if I'll talk about them.

Okay, yes I will. I do so against my wishes, however. After all, what's the merit in my exposing what I suspect is the case, that so far, you haven't even looked at them, let alone know anything about them? Why should I make this hard on you? What does it get for me? Nothing, really. I have no point to make at your expense...but it's going to look like I do, so I've been avoiding that.

But okay. You have asked. And lest you think I can't...let's start with Mark Linville's argument, on page 391 of the Blackwell Companion. You say you've read, understood and refuted this argument, do you? Linville presents a good case, I would say. So let's go over it.

Well, then, how do you handle his quotation from Nietzsche, on page 392, first paragraph. Nietzsche says that morality "has truth only if God is the truth -- it stands or falls with God." George Eliot the self-declared "freethinker," concurs, saying that morality was not a serious problem to secularists "only for want of discernment." But you have claimed that the God question has no relationship to morality. Apparently, you're at variance with Nietzsche et al. on that.

On what basis do you dispute Linville's comments regarding Nietzsche and Eliot? He's clearly historically accurate there, quoting verbatim. So it must be some rational grounds...

[Dubious]

Ontological arguments on god's existence are nothing more than mind games on a non-entity. Such arguments at the end no-longer have anything to do with god but are merely mental duels between opposing views whose probability is as void as god's existence.

[Immanuel Can]

Ontological arguments on god's existence are nothing more than mind games on a non-entity. Such arguments at the end no-longer have anything to do with god but are merely mental duels between opposing views whose probability is as void as god's existence.

The Ontological Arguments weren't my first choice, either, I confess. At first, they struck me as too abstract to be compelling. But then, at that time, I only knew the Anselmian version, and only second-hand from a textbook writer's summary. So I wasn't really giving them a chance.

It took me considerable time and thought, and an encounter with some better versions, to see past such shallow, "pop," reductional versions offered by most critics of those arguments, in order to see what they were really all about. I now think there's something they offer...but you are right to say they often seem merely academic to people who are only familiar with the superficial versions offered by their detractors.

For example, Robert Maydole has a "Temporal-Contingency" version of an ontological argument, one which he derives from Aquinas, and which has some real merit. For those who understand it, it does present a serious logical challenge to the idea that there is no God.

So while your objection has something to it for some poorly-articulated and dated versions of ontological arguments, it's really not true of some of the more contemporary ones, I think you'll find.

[henry quirk]

Robert Maydole has a "Temporal-Contingency" version of an ontological argument, one which he derives from Aquinas, and which has some real merit.

http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-conten ... utable.png

the site is the only place I found the argument presented 'as is'...I would have preferred to post the png itself but it's too large for the forum

[Dubious]

Ontological arguments on god's existence are nothing more than mind games on a non-entity. Such arguments at the end no-longer have anything to do with god but are merely mental duels between opposing views whose probability is as void as god's existence.

For example, Robert Maydole has a "Temporal-Contingency" version of an ontological argument, one which he derives from Aquinas, and which has some real merit. For those who understand it, it does present a serious logical challenge to the idea that there is no God.

It may be or seem to be a more perfect argument whether modally expounded or not but no argument ever conceived forced into reality that which it strives to prove. As measured by its brilliance, the reality of god's existence resides only in the argument itself. It may be logical to the nth degree, which is ALL it really requires to be successful, without being in the least elemental in what its logic asserts.

[Belinda]

The existence or otherwise of God is interesting and so is the idea God deliberately revealed His ideas and commands to men . Existence is of course not an attribute so cannot define anything. Revealed religion is suspect as the revelation was given to so few. One wonders what God had against Neanderthals that He so neglected them.

I can accept the idea there possibly is a God, as defined as nothing other than impersonal and self- caused cosmic order.

Most believers don't have a clear idea what it is they believe in, and repeat formulas they have heard from priests,most of them including that God is a person, some of them amounting to sentimentality, and others rationalising how they deserve their own prosperity or power. More honest believers don't bother to make sense of supernatural priest-talk and attend church for social or psychological purposes.

If there is self-caused cosmic order there must also be objective moral order. Objective moral order is discoverable by means of reason just like any other working of nature. It leads directly to left wing politics. However this moral order is not revealed by a magic act of God, but has to be learned by us all by ourselves and the details of moral codes thrashed out in real life by inevitably subjective minds.

[Immanuel Can]

...no argument ever conceived forced into reality that which it strives to prove.

Of course not. That's not how arguments work, actually. An argument is intended to show a rational person what he/she is in the most rational position to think is so; that's all.

[Dubious]

...no argument ever conceived forced into reality that which it strives to prove.

Of course not. That's not how arguments work, actually. An argument is intended to show a rational person what he/she is in the most rational position to think is so; that's all.

On that I agree.

[Immanuel Can]

On that I agree.

I understand where you're coming from on that. When I was first introduced to the version of Anselm I thought he was trying to argue for, I also thought he was trying to do a kind of conceptual analysis that would then compel a sort of grudging assent out of people who didn't really feel anything had been proved. At the same time, I already sensed there was something more going on. But as I say, I had a very weak idea of Anselm at the time, and no idea at all that there were any other kinds of ontological argument, so I needed more information, really.

[Sam26]

It seems to me this question - which has emerged from discussion of my post 'Is morality objective or subjective?' - is the crux in the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists.

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable. That's just their opinion, and we can't say which opinion is correct or true.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

So what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent of judgement, belief or opinion?

Does any moral objectivist here have an answer that doesn't beg the question?

(The claim that objective moral values and judgements come from a god's commands or a god's nature begs the question: what makes a god's commands or a god's nature objectively morally good?)

Here's a possible answer:

Let us assume that all immoral actions have this one property, viz., they harm some individual, either the person acting immoral, or the victims of the immoral act, or both. If this is the case, then there should be a way of determining (in most cases) what that harm could be, and whether the harm is generally objective. For example, if I cut someone's arm off without good reason, are there objective components to the harm done? Yes. First, the blood on the ground (objective), the arm on the ground (objective), the screams of the victim (objective), and the anguish of family and friends (objective). The harm done is why most people call an act immoral, no harm, no immoral act. This is not to say that all harm is immoral, only that all immoral acts cause harm in some way. Moreover, the harm done is not always clear to everyone, but in those cases where it is clear the harm done can be seen by most people as objective.

Another example of an immoral act having an objective component, is lying. We can generally see that lying harms relationships, family relationships, friendships, business relationships, etc. The harm done is clearly objective (at least generally), i.e., one can observe (objectively) that relationships are damaged in some way, sometimes beyond repair.

All of this depends on how you define subjective and objective. You can always define these terms in ways that rule out the other side of the argument. How we generally use these concepts, should determine what is meant by the words. For example, most people would agree that it's an objective fact that the Earth has one moon, i.e., the fact is not determined by the subject, but is determined by the facts (state-of-affairs in the world) themselves. The contingent fact that the Earth has one moon is something that obtains quite apart from what I think, feel, or even say, and it is that, that makes it objective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have not experienced Madagascar but I know of Madagacar from the experiences of other people and Madagascar is POSSIBLE to be experienced if I should attempt at it.

No, that does not follow.

What you would have to think, if reality is subjective, is that these people imagined they went to a place called Madagascar, and if you attempted it, you might have a similar delusion to the one they experienced. But you'd have to insist that there is no real Madagascar to go to, nothing "objectively there" for you to find...only a subjective delusion that there was.

Then you'd have the problem of why their delusion was so similar to yours, given that there was no objective Madagascar "out there" to induce that delusion in you and them equally. So you'd have to say that it was not only a delusion that Madagascar existed, but also that it was the most unexpected coincidence of delusion that you just happened to see a Madagascar of the same sort they saw.

If all this isn't too much for you to swallow, it should be. Subjectivity allows for no objective reality, and thus there is no objective Madagascar, and no explanation for the similarity in your impression, and the impressions of millions of others, that there is.

Your desperate psychology is driving you to eel and twist reality and truths.

Where did I say reality is plainly subjective or absolutely subjective.
I have argued objectivity = justified inter-subject-ive consensus.
Thus objective reality = reality experienced and justified inter-subject-ive consensus.
What is reality is a Given emergence.

Note;

Madagascar is an island country in the Indian Ocean, approximately 400 kilometres (250 miles) off the coast of East Africa.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madagascar

It is common knowledge Madagascar exist as above.

"Madagascar" is just a name, what is really real are the things in bold above, i.e. an island in an Ocean, 400 kilometres from the Coast of a Continent on Earth.

There are videos, google map, verification by people who lived and visited Madagascar confirming Madagascar [as defined] above exists as real.
Madagascar is recognized as a sovereign country within the United Nation.

For those who have not seen the country from space, stayed or landed on the country, they will rely [degrees of confidence level] on third party knowledge and confirmation that Madagascar is real objectively.

Based on current knowledge, no sane person will insist Madagascar is an illusion i.e. not real objectively.
The critical point here is what is claimed to be Madagascar is possible to be experienced and possible to be real because it is make up of things that are possible to be experienced, i.e. an island in an Ocean, 400 kilometres from the Coast of a Continent on Earth.

Thus while someone who have not seen nor visited Madagascar, they will have a reasonably high level of confidence that Madagascar as real objectively - i.e. via intersubjective consensus which is fundamentally 'subjective' - precisely its meta-subjectivity.

There is no difference between Madagascar as an objective geographical truth and objective scientific truths.
The common layman has not seen those scientific atoms which are claimed by scientists to be real objectively but the lay persons believe the scientific truths as true objectively based on the credibility of the scientific method.

Thus;

• P1 Geographical reality/truths which are objective are fundamentally intersubjective- i.e. fundamentally grounded on subjectivity.
  P2 Madagascar [as defined above] is a geographical truth.
  C1 Madagascar [as defined above] is objectively real and fundamentally grounded on intersubjectivity.

[Peter Holmes]

I'm very confident that all the apologetic arguments peddled by Craig

First mistake: Craig is the editor, not the author of all the articles. If you'd even glanced at the provided table of contents, you'd know that. These are not Craig's arguments...they're the world's leading scholars in each area. He merely collected them for Blackwell.

I know. But Craig has been peddling these arguments, in different forms, for years. And there hasn't been a radically new apologetic argument, to my knowledge, for centuries - just ropey re-treads to keep the rust-bucket on the road.

And meantime, there's not one iota of credible evidence for the existence of your god - to my knowledge

And yet, you claim to "know" all the arguments, and "can refute every one of them with ease." And you want to know if I'll talk about them.

Okay, yes I will. I do so against my wishes, however. After all, what's the merit in my exposing what I suspect is the case, that so far, you haven't even looked at them, let alone know anything about them? Why should I make this hard on you? What does it get for me? Nothing, really. I have no point to make at your expense...but it's going to look like I do, so I've been avoiding that.

But okay. You have asked. And lest you think I can't...let's start with Mark Linville's argument, on page 391 of the Blackwell Companion. You say you've read, understood and refuted this argument, do you? Linville presents a good case, I would say. So let's go over it.

Well, then, how do you handle his quotation from Nietzsche, on page 392, first paragraph. Nietzsche says that morality "has truth only if God is the truth -- it stands or falls with God." George Eliot the self-declared "freethinker," concurs, saying that morality was not a serious problem to secularists "only for want of discernment." But you have claimed that the God question has no relationship to morality. Apparently, you're at variance with Nietzsche et al. on that.

On what basis do you dispute Linville's comments regarding Nietzsche and Eliot? He's clearly historically accurate there, quoting verbatim. So it must be some rational grounds...

1 It was Nietzsche who criticised Eliot 'for want of discernment' in not realising that no god means no moral facts. You seem confused.

2 I have no time for Nietzsche's histrionics. He wasn't a philosopher - more a zeitgeist pundit - and he was wrong about the god-morality link.

3 Linville's presentation of the moral argument is a mess. Here it is.

'The moral argument for the existence of God essentially takes Nietzsche's assertion as one of its premises: if there is no God, then "there are altogether no moral facts". But it urges with Evans and against Nietzsche that we have, in our moral experience, good reason to suppose that there are indeed moral facts. And so our moral experience provides some reason for belief in God.'

But this is wrong. The conclusion of the moral argument is something like: 'therefore there is a god'. And there's no way to that conclusion from the premise 'If there is no god, then there are no moral facts'. What could that argument be?

P1: If there is no god, then there are no moral facts.
P2: There are moral facts.
C: Therefore, there is a god.

This is obviously invalid and unsound.

In fact, the valid moral argument, in its simplest form, is this:

P1: If there are moral facts, then there is a god.
P2: There are moral facts.
C: Therefore, there is a god.

But this is obviously unsound, because neither premise is justified. 'Moral experience' or 'intuition' do not establish moral facts.

We can't logically argue from the existence of moral facts to the existence of a god, but then claim that the existence of moral facts depends on the existence of a god. That's question-begging writ large.

Note. I know IC will either not understand the above, or ignore the little it does understand as not compatible with its beliefs, nor with what those clever and highly-qualified people in those books say - and, therefore, clearly, false. The god-virus is a nasty, tenacious and self-protecting critter.

But does anyone else have a critical take on this?

[Veritas Aequitas]

IC has not given us the arguments for the existence of a god, but merely said there's a book that presents the arguments.

Right. You have the arguments. You know where they are. So that means that you have the choice to deal with them or not.

The one thing you know for certain is that your line about "there is no evidence" was not true; what you do about that is up to you. I said earlier that natural arguments do not convince people. This is because you have no terms on which you would regard the existence of God as demonstrated.

There are two reasons for this: the first, you discovered when I asked you what standard of evidence you would accept. As soon as you thought about it, you realized that there actually was nothing that a) you could rationally expect me to be able to arrange for you, since I am not God, and b) if I provided you with anything at all, you'd have an alternate possibility for explanation that would make the proof indecisive.

...

You are giving silly excuses.

To justify God exists as a real thing, one has to produce justified truths based on empirical evidence empirical and philosophical reasoning within a Framework of Knowledge to confirm the things claimed to be real exists.

Example, if I were to prove the table I am writing on is real, I will have to provide the empirical evidences [testing, pictures, videos] in within the conventional Framework of Knowledge to prove the table is real.
If the above conventional approach is not enough, I can invite reputable scientists to test and verify the table is real scientifically.
Thus I claim the table I am writing on is real objectively and it is implied that the claim is open to anyone who want to test and verify themselves the table is actually real.

The majority of people who have seen my pictures, videos of the table I claimed to be real will be convinced it is real because they have similar experiences of a real table in their specific circumstances.
Even if someone has not personally tested and verified the table is real, they will have high confidence the table is very possible to be real and experienced due to the nature and characteristic of the table presented and claimed as real.

Therefore, anyone who insist God is real objectively will have to produce empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning like what is necessary to prove the table I am writing on is real to justify his God is real.
Since the emergence of the idea of God since 10,000 or 100s of thousand years ago, no one has provided direct empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning to justify their God exists are real objectively.

Where theists [billions] claimed they have seen and experienced God personally and that non-theists has not the same experience, the problem is the idea of God is not a possibility for experiential and empirical testings and verification at all by non-theists.
The idea of God is like the idea of a squared-circle which is impossible to exist as real empirically and logically.
As such the idea of God is a non-starter to be considered for testing and verifying via empirical and philosophical reasoning.

However the existence of God is a psychological possibility.
Just a children believe Santa as a real person [in reality that is illusory], on the same psychological mode as Santa, theists believe God exists as real. This is for a critical necessity due to desperate psychological impulses from an existential crisis.

See this;
Theism Driven by Desperate Psychology
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=29316

Do you have any comment on the above which is actually happening within your brain now.
Carpe Diem! Know Thyself!

[Veritas Aequitas]

In fact, the valid moral argument, in its simplest form, is this:

P1: If there are moral facts, then there is a god.
P2: There are moral facts.
C: Therefore, there is a god.

There are loads of arguments and views that Morality is independent of theism and religion.
Therefore God cannot be associated with moral facts per se.

One example among the many;

• Ultimately, we see and foresee no pithily characterizable relationship between religion and morality.
  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4345965/

Morality is driven by an inherent Faculty of Morality within the brain of all humans, where it is reasonable active in some and quite dormant in the majority of people.

[Peter Holmes]

In fact, the valid moral argument, in its simplest form, is this:

P1: If there are moral facts, then there is a god.
P2: There are moral facts.
C: Therefore, there is a god.

There are loads of arguments and views that Morality is independent of theism and religion.

One example among the many;

• Ultimately, we see and foresee no pithily characterizable relationship between religion and morality.
  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4345965/

Morality is driven by an inherent Faculty of Morality within the brain of all humans, where it is reasonable active in some and quite dormant in the majority of people.

Evidence for the existence of 'an inherent faculty of morality within the brain of all humans' is as non-existent as evidence for the existence of a god. You're substituting one fiction for another. And, btw, faculty psychology went out with the ark.