Yes, I realize this. I actually do understand what you are saying and I'm not arguing against your proposition. I also see eliminative materialism as silly, but it is important for arguments against qualia. In other words, the problem of trying to prove that consciousness does in fact present to us different phenomenological characteristics.raw_thought wrote:Look at what I was responding to. Hammer's accusation was that somehow I was arguing that waterboarding is OK. That is the exact opposite of what I was arguing. I was saying that a materialist must say that torture is OK and that since he would obviously avoid torture, he contradicts himself and so therefore his position is absurd.Ginkgo wrote:What you seem to have here is an eliminative theory for materialism. Such a theory is anti-realism. This is different to the reductionist explanation for materialism we have been discussing.raw_thought wrote: You obviously have no clue as to what my argument is. My point is that IF ONE FEELS NO PAIN, and no physical damage occurs, then torture is impossible.
Materialism is not http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/
However, to be clear I will use the term
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mater ... iminative/
I think eliminative materialism is obviously silly.
Imagine that you find yourself at the bar in a Chinese restaurant with someone you just meet. You make the comment that red decor always makes you feel hungry. The other person concurs and, tells you that red decor always makes him feel hungry. Unbeknownst to you this individual suffers from a red/green reversal. To him red things look green and green things look red. While you are admiring the red decor and thinking how hungry you are, the person next to you is actually admiring green decor and thinking how hungry he is. In other words, the two individuals are playing out the same role with different phenomenological characteristics.
If these two individuals exhibit the same behaviour, does it make any sense to argue that the phenomenological characteristics differ?
In relation to pain a materialist would say that if a person acts like they are in pain and they report the fact they are in pain, then this is as far as we need to go.
I don't support the materialist argument, however, it does highlight important problems in the qualia debate.
That's the only point I am making at this stage.